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 IV 
Complementarity, the organizing principle of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), is a largely untested concept in terms of its ability to instigate State 
compliance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICC 
made its debut at a time when States were routinely accused of non-compliance 
with international law, particularly international criminal law. Due to perennial 
concerns over the protection of State sovereignty, an ingenious system of 
allocation of competencies between States and the ICC was evolved. This is 
embodied by the principle of complementarity. 
ABSTRACT 
 
At the heart of complementarity is an arrangement by which States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC are regarded as the prime fora for the prosecution of 
crimes of grave concern to the international community. In the event of inaction, 
however, the ICC is mandated to wrest specific cases from the jurisdiction of 
national courts and try them. In effect, a carrot-and-stick mechanism has been 
built into the Rome Statute to induce States to comply with the Statute. 
 
This thesis examines the principle of complementarity from a theoretical 
perspective, bearing in mind contemporary international law structures and 
institutions. A better understanding of the theoretical assumptions of 
complementarity, it is suggested, will foster a more effective application of the 
tenets of the Rome Statute within the municipal system. The thesis argues that 
complementarity is a catalyst for implementation of the Rome Statute only to the 
extent to which it alters or re-defines well established and encumbering 
procedures and norms within the municipal system. In this regard, although 
South Africa’s status of constitutional democracy may be reason to expect that 
the obligations imposed by the Rome Statute will be observed, that very fact may 
increase the inclination to preserve the “baseline of conduct” rather than be 
swayed by the Rome Statute. 
 V 
 
An illustrative excursion into South African rules and norms is undertaken, after 
which the argument is advanced that not much change has been effected to the 
South African legal landscape through implementation of the Rome Statute. The 
sole exception to this is the issue of prosecutorial discretion. On this, the South 
African legislature has uniquely crafted a mechanism for ensuring 
accountability, presumably with a view to ensuring that South Africa is always 
able to prosecute the crimes concerned. 
 
However, the thesis cautions against complacency, arguing that the tension 
between national law and international obligations may yet play itself out, owing 
to insufficient attention to the role of national courts in giving effect to the Rome 
Statute. The act of implementation may be a response to stimuli such as the 
perceived need to avoid civil liability for international crimes, or the general 
inertia of implementing human rights instruments. Therefore, the carrot-and-
stick mechanism may be lacking in the compulsive qualities it is presumed to 
have. 
 
Through an exploratory survey of South African law, the thesis illustrates that 
prosecutorial accountability is the major factor in determining whether a State 
has fully complied with is obligations under the Rome Statute. However, it also 
points out that the way courts of law apply the new norms in municipal systems 
in the future will be crucial. 
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Chapter One 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
“International society still lacks any of the conditions on which the rise of criminal law depends”1
 
 
1.1 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court
The Evolving Idea of International Criminal Law 
2 (ICC) marks an important 
milestone in the development of international law. Beginning with the end of the 
Second World War and the drawing up of the United Nations Charter,3
 
 the 
international community has realised the importance of preserving international 
peace through ensuring that flagrant abuses of human rights do not go 
unpunished. 
The perpetrators of crimes of international concern are an obvious threat to these 
efforts. Safe havens, unfortunately, still exist for them. The challenge is, therefore, 
to ensure that States are always able and willing to exercise jurisdiction over such 
perpetrators.4
                                                 
1 G Schwarzenberger The Frontiers of  International  Law (1962) 207. 
 
 
2 See the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court adopted at 
Rome in July 1998, avai lable at  http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99-
corr/cstatute.htm (accessed 7th March 2004). The Statute came into 
force on July 1 2002. 
 
3 See the U.N. Charter, preamble, paragraphs 1 and 2:  “ We the peoples 
of the United Nations, determined: 
To save successive generations from the scourge of war which twice in 
our l i fet ime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and  
To reaff irm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person….” 
 
4 See generally T M Franck and B B Lockwood “Preliminary Thoughts 
Towards an International  Convention on Terrorism” (1974) 68 AJIL 69 at 
82; M C Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Law (1992);  
J J Lambert Terrorism and Hostages in International  Law (1990) 134-40; 
S Landau“ Extraterr itor ial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradit ion” (1980) 29 
 2 
 
The development of a body of law to combat crimes of international concern was 
always going to be dogged with difficulty. The main hurdle relates to the very 
nature of international law: a body of law designed to regulate inter-State 
relations, and not itself readily enforceable before municipal courts.5
 
 
Moreover, criminal law is concerned, in the main, with ordering human conduct. 
This is a process that is normally largely steeped in national traditions and 
values.6 Jurisprudentially, this gives expression to what the jurist Von Savigny 
termed the “volksgeist”.7 This is, basically, the articulation of the proposition that 
a nation’s laws are a product of its history.8
 
 
Given the above, the whole notion of “international criminal law” appears a 
contradiction in terms. The evolution of this concept has, therefore, 
understandably been a staggered one. As Beigbeder puts it,  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ICLQ 274 at 282; C S Thomas and M J Kirby “The Montreal Convention 
1971” (1973) 22 ICLQ 163 at 171; L Gross “International Terrorism and 
International Criminal Jurisdiction” (1973) 67 AJIL 508 at 510; L C 
Green “International Crimes and the Legal Process” (1980) 29 ICLQ 567 
at 577; G Gilbert “ The Irish  Interpretat ion of the Polit ical Offence 
Exception” (1992) 41 ICLQ 66. 
 
5 See M N Shaw International  Law 3 ed (1986) 6.  
 
6 See generally I  Loveland “Hate Crimes and the First Amendment” (1994)  
Public Law 174ff;  N Polat “International Law, the Inherent Instabil ity  of 
the  International System, and International Violence” (1999) 19 Oxford 
Journal of  Legal Studies 51 at 66; A Sanders “What Principles Underl ie 
Criminal  Justice Pol icy  in the 1990s?”  (1998) 18 Oxford Journal  of  Legal 
Studies  533 ff ;  I  Hare “Legislat ing Against Hate: The Legal Response to 
Crimes” (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies  415 at 416, 424-38; G 
Schwarzenberger The Frontiers of  International  Law (1962) 207. 
 
7 V Savigny The System of  Modern Roman Law (1867) 12. See also L 
Popsil Anthropology of  Law: a Comparative  Study  (1971) 141. 
 
8 See also J C Barker International Law and International Relations  
(2000) 48. 
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  “International criminal law is a law in the making, an imperfect and soft law, a law in 
slow evolution”.9
 
 
The creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the late 1940s to try Nazi war 
criminals heralded a new era in the international community’s efforts. With the 
creation of the Tribunal, a set of principles known as the ”Nuremberg 
Principles”10
 
 emerged and has greatly influenced the development of 
international criminal law. In the wake of the Second World War, questions were 
being raised about the doctrinal shortcomings of international law at the time, 
and the specific need to ensure that individuals could be held accountable for 
their international crimes. This idea embodied the first Principle. 
Secondly, the idea that one could evade criminal responsibility due to their 
official capacity within the State machinery was rejected. Criminal responsibility 
would attach irrespective of official capacity. This idea also finds expression in 
the Rome Statute.11
 
 
Thirdly, criminal responsibility would attach to individuals regardless of 
whether national law was silent on, condoned, or actually required the 
behaviour in question. Through this principle, for instance, superior orders 
became irrelevant in determining criminal responsibility.12
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
9 See Y Beigbeder Judging War Criminals: The Pol i t ics of  International  
Justice  (1999) 2.  
 
10 See B Broomhall  International Justice and the International Criminal  
Court:  Between Sovereignty and the Rule of  Law (2003) 19-23. 
 
11 See Rome Statute op cit Art icle 27. 
 
12Broomhall op cit at 21. See also F L Morrison “The Signif icance of  
Nuremberg for Modern International Law” (1995) 149 Mil i tary Law Review 
207 at 214-215. 
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Fourthly, individual responsibility for international crime meant that the 
international community had to give serious thought to the issue of enforcement. 
The idea gave rise to the need for enforcement through international tribunals as 
well as through national courts.13
 
 
Finally, the link was affirmed between the fight against international crime and 
the maintenance of peace in the post-war world. Therefore, one sees the core 
prohibitions of international criminal law, such as that against genocide, as 
expressions of the basic foundation of the post-war international order. 14
The Nuremberg Tribunal therefore set the standards for modern international 
criminal law. As Richard Overy puts it,
 
15
 
 the ICC is a direct descendant of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal. The Nuremberg Principles have found expression 
in the Statute of the ICC. 
 Recently, similar Tribunals have been established under the auspices of the 
United Nations Security Council with respect to war crimes in Rwanda 16and the 
former Yugoslavia. 17
 
 
The ICC, a permanent international institution, is, however, the superstructure 
for trying crimes of international concern. The Court is seen as the culmination of 
                                                 
13 Broomhall op cit at 22. 
 
14 Ib id.  
 
15 See R Overy “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making” 
in P Sands (ed) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of  International 
Criminal Justice  (2003) 1 at 28-29. 
 
16 SC Res. 955 (1994).  
 
17 SC Res. 827 (1993).  
 
 5 
long and arduous efforts to “internationalise” criminal law.18Earlier efforts to do 
so had not met with resounding success: from the 1907 Hague Peace Conference 
when the idea of an international criminal court was first mooted, to 1948 when 
the United Nations General Assembly mandated the International Law 
Commission to “study” the possibility of establishing an international judicial 
organ to try the perpetrators of genocide.19
 
 States simply lacked the political will 
to follow these efforts through, mainly due to concerns about their sovereignty.  
The Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, moreover, are restricted to their specific 
conflicts. They are also seen as creatures of the UN Security Council, and thus 
amenable to political manipulation.20 The ICC, on the other hand, is seen as more 
transparent given the clear laws and procedures it will apply.21
 
 
Regrettably, however, the authority and legitimacy of the Court are significantly 
undercut by the fact that some States, notably the United States of America, 
                                                 
18 See G Werle and F Jessberger “International Criminal Justice is 
Coming Home: The New German Code of Crimes against International 
Law” (2002) 13(2)  Criminal Law Forum 191 at 193-4; H Kaul 
“Breakthrough in Rome: The Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
(1999) 59/60 Law and State 114 at 115. See also M Schuster “The Rome 
Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of a 
Sword” (2003) 14(1) Criminal Law Forum 1. The writer states:  
“International law is quintessentially about achieving common legal 
ground, something that is particularly true when it comes to questions of 
international criminal just ice.  The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, achieved after years of negotiations, is the paradigmatic 
i l lustrat ion for such an accumulation of  concessions and compromises”.  
( Ib id)  
 
19 GAR 260 of 9/12/1948. 
 
20 See, for example, M Mutua “Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda Tribunals” (1997) 11 Temple International and Comparative Law 
Journal 167 at 171; D N Sharp “Prosecutions,  Development, and Justice:  
The Trial of Hissein Habre” (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal  147 
at 154- Available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs,hrj/current/sharp.shtml#He
ading40. (Accessed 19/4/04).  
 
21 G Triggs (note 76 inf ra)  3.  
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Russia and China, have chosen not to ratify its Statute.22
 
 One of the concerns 
expressed is the apprehension that the Court is likely to be used for “political” 
prosecutions, a matter about which the United States is particularly sensitive.  
This foreshadows one of the seemingly intractable problems that continue to dog 
international criminal law: lack of political will to prosecute crimes that are of 
serious concern to the international community. 
1.2 
The Rome Statute of the ICC establishes a permanent Court
The Nature and Jurisdiction of the ICC 
23 to try the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.24 With the 
exception of aggression, which is, as yet, to be comprehensively defined25, the 
elements of these crimes are set out in detail in the Statute.26 The Court has its 
seat at The Hague27 in the Netherlands and has four (4) main organs.28
 
 
It has been lamented that the Court’s jurisdiction “is neither universal nor direct 
and it does not automatically cover all international crimes [defined by the 
Statute]”.29
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 This is because the Court, being treaty-based, may exercise 
22 Ib id.  
 
23 See Rome Statute op cit Article 1.  
 
24 Op cit,  Art icle 5(1).  
 
25 Op cit,  Article 5(2). See also M Schuster loc c i t (note 18 above).  
 
26 See Rome Statute op cit,  Art icles 6 to 8.  
 
27 Op cit,  Article 3(1).  
 
28 These are: The Presidency;  A Pre-trial Division, a Trial Division and an 
Appeals Division; The Office of  the Prosecutor; and the Registry. See the 
Rome Statute op cit Article 34. 
 
29 K Ambos “Editorial” (1998) 6(4) European Journal of  Crime, Criminal  
Law and Criminal  Justice 320. 
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jurisdiction only if a State has, in essence, “consented” to its jurisdiction, either 
through ratifying the Statute30 or through an ad hoc stipulation.31
 
 
On another level, the Court’s jurisdiction is only complementary to that of 
national jurisdictions.32
 
 Essentially, therefore, primacy is given to national 
jurisdictions in the matter of prosecuting the defined crimes. The Court will only 
exercise its adjudicative power if national mechanisms are found wanting. This 
phenomenon forms the subject of this study.  The aim of this thesis is to establish 
how complementarity may be understood as having the effect of influencing the 
legislative choices that a State makes. 
 1.3 
In international law, all States have a duty either to prosecute or extradite those 
suspected of having committed certain crimes (aut dedere, aut judicare).
What is Complementarity? 
33 It has 
been stated that the duty is an absolute one: if extradition is not effected, 
prosecution must follow, and vice versa.34
 
 
Presumably in line with this general obligation, and with it in mind, States, Party 
to the Statute have ordained that the prosecution of Statute crimes shall be the 
                                                 
30 “A treaty does not create either obl igat ions or rights for a third State 
without its consent”.  See Art icle 34 of  The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treat ies (1969). See also The Rome Statute op cit Article 12(1).  
 
31Op cit,  Article 12(3).  
 
32 The Rome Statute op cit,  Art icles 1, 17 and 18. 
 
33 Lat in for “extradite or prosecute”. See generally M C Bassiouni and E 
M Wise Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in 
International Law (1974).  
 
34 See generally G Gilbert Aspects of  Extradition Law (1991).  
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primary obligation of States. In terms of Article 1735
 
 of the Rome Statute, the 
Court will not entertain a case, which is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
state, unless it appears that the State concerned is unwilling or unable to 
genuinely investigate or prosecute. 
The determination as to whether a State is unwilling or unable to expedite a case 
lies with the Court.36 The Statute sets out certain desiderata to guide the Court in 
making this determination. It seems to the author, however, quite extraordinary 
that the Court is granted such a power in an arrangement intended to be 
“complementary”. It has, thus, been cautioned that this power to make such a 
determination against a State is an “exceptionally invasive” one.37
 
 On the other 
hand, it ought to be remembered that State Parties have effectively bound 
themselves to respect the Court’s exercise of such powers.  
What is important for present purposes is whether this dilemma influences States 
in the kind of provisions they make in their implementing legislation. It has been 
                                                 
35Article 17 (1) reads in part: “…the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where:  
a)  The case is being invest igated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdict ion over it,  unless the State is unwil l ing or unable genuinely 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
b)  The case has been invest igated by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it and the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwil l ingness or inabil ity of 
the State genuinely to prosecute;  
c)  The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not allowed 
under Article 20,paragraph 3;  
d)  The case is not of suff icient gravity to justify further act ion by the 
Court”.  
 
36 Rome Statute  op c it Article 17(2)  
 
37 See T C Steele “ The Contribution of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court to the Enforcement of International Law in the Light of  
the Experiences of the ICTY”  (2002) 27 SAYIL 1 at 59.  
 
 9 
asserted that complementarity is a catalyst for implementation.38
 
 This thesis will 
be concerned with closely scrutinising this claim with regard to the provisions of 
South African legislation.  
It is clear from the foregoing that the Court will exercise a supervisory role in 
enforcing the basic tenets of complementarity. By retaining the power to 
pronounce on the adequacy of national criminal justice systems, the Court will 
ensure that prosecutions for core crimes occur more readily than would 
otherwise be the case. The obligation may therefore be expressed in the form of a 
double imperative: prosecute or have the Court intrude upon your sovereignty. 
This “carrot and stick” mechanism is the cornerstone of the principle of 
complementarity.39
 
 
This principle is, it will be argued, a novelty in international law.40
                                                 
38 See Werle and Jessberger op cit (note 18 above) at 214. 
 The obvious 
difficulty with which the drafters of the Rome Statute were faced was that States 
were keen to protect their sovereignty. They were, thus, not likely to agree to an 
 
39 See J K Kleffner “The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of  Substantive Criminal Law” (2003) 1 Journal of  
International Criminal Justice 86 at 94. See also Steele op cit (note 37 
above) at  21: “The principle of Complementarity can only be effect ive in 
inducing prosecutions at the national level  to the extent that the threat 
of prosecution by the [ICC] in article-17 circumstances is real”. See also 
J T Holmes “The Principle of Complementarity” in R S Lee(ed) The 
International Criminal Court:  Issues,  Negotiation, Resul ts (1999); 
Broomhall op cit (note 10 above) at 1.   
 
40 For the view that complementarity is a compromise, see Steele op ci t 
(note 37 above) at 10. It is a novelty in the sense that, unlike other 
international criminal law treat ies, it  does not expressly obl ige State 
parties to enact the substantive cr iminal law of the Statute as part of  
their national law (the exception to this is Art icle 70 which relates to 
offences against the administrat ion of justice).  An example of a treaty 
which obl iges State parties to enact at least part of its substantive law is 
The (Geneva) Convention Relat ive to  the Protection of  Civil ian Persons in 
Time of War (1950) 75 U.N.T.S.  287, Art icle 146 of which states: 
“…Parties undertake to enact any legislat ion necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions”. See also Steele op cit (note 36 above) at 9.  
 10 
arrangement such as obtains in the cases of the International Tribunals for 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, where these Tribunals have primacy over States. 41
 
 Yet 
the urgent need was felt to crystallize international consensus in order to ensure 
that the core crimes are punished. Striking a balance between these two 
considerations seems a tall order indeed.  
It is, perhaps, in this light that one ought to view the inclusion of this principle in 
the Rome Statute. It is apparent that the principle did not evoke a lot of 
controversy when it was first included in the International Law Commission’s 
(ILC) Draft Statute.42 This, in the author’s humble view, does not necessarily 
point to a consensus in terms of the content of the principle of 
complementarity.43 It was rather a pragmatic approach to a complex and divisive 
issue.44
 
  This approach produced the much-vaunted idea of complementarity 
whose contours were, however, not fully defined. 
There is, thus, a need to more carefully define this principle given its supposed 
impact on the national implementation of international criminal law. An attempt 
will be made later in this study to cast the principle in a theoretical framework 
which accords with international law jurisprudence.45
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
41 See H A Strydom & S Du Toit “Transnational Crime: The South African 
Response” (1998) 23 SAYIL 116 at 121. 
 
42 Steele op cit (note 37 above) at 9; Broomhall op cit (note 10 above) at  
86. 
 
43 Steele loc ci t (note 42 above).  
 
44 An ad hoc  committee was tasked with reviewing the Draft Report 
produced by the International Law Commission (ILC). Its report reveals 
the divergent views of delegates,  ranging from the caution that 
complementarity should not create a presumption in favour of  national 
courts, to the fear that the ICC would be allowed to pass judgment on 
national courts. To access the report, see note 55 ( inf ra) .  
 
45 See chapter two ( inf ra) .  
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It is worth mentioning at the outset that complementarity is conceived as 
notionally distinct from the obligation to co-operate with the Court. Thus, Article 
86 of the Statute obliges State Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution’ of the crimes within its jurisdiction. However, it is 
submitted that the two notions have an obvious link insofar as the Statute 
provides that “effective prosecution” of international crimes “must be ensured 
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation”.46 We will therefore treat the subject of complementarity as 
entailing the duty to cooperate, thus discussing provisions under Part 9 of the 
Statute47
 
. It is the author’s considered view that a State Party to the Statute 
cannot ensure the effective prosecution of the core crimes without first putting 
mechanisms in place that would ensure full cooperation with the Court. 
1.4 
The challenge of the complementarity regime is the actual response of the State 
Parties, which will be through the legislative choices they make.
Complementarity and Challenges for an Implementing State- 
Protecting State Sovereignty. 
48 Given that, 
traditionally, States have always been viewed as the main actors on the 
international plane, it stands to reason that they would be relied upon to enforce 
the Statute.49
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 The problem, however, is that such expectations must take 
cognizance of the fact that States differ in their political, social, economic and 
46 Rome Statute,  preamble, paragraph 4 (emphasis added). See also Werle 
& Jessberger op cit (note 18 above) at 194. 
 
47 This Part of the Statute is entitled “International Cooperat ion and 
Judicial Assistance”.   
 
48 See Kleffner op cit (note 10 above) at 88. 
 
49 See Broomhall op cit (note 10 above) at 13. 
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cultural make-up. This fact, in turn, tends to influence the kind of legislative 
choices that they make. Savigny’s volksgeist50
 
, therefore, must be reckoned with 
in such matters. 
As has been seen above, the basic premise of the complementarity principle is the 
Statute’s “threat” to involve the Court should a State’s national justice system be 
found wanting.51
 
  Underlying this threat, it is submitted, is the assumption that 
States treasure their sovereignty and that they would go to great lengths to 
ensure that it shall not be interfered with. This is the challenge facing every State 
Party to the Statute. 
A noteworthy trend in the creation of international institutions, especially after 
the Second World War, is that these are generally meant to chip away at 
traditional notions of State sovereignty.52 Thus, there is the emergence of 
international institutions such as the European Union, which are termed 
“supranational”. These institutions operate on the basis of the presumed 
willingness of States to give up some of their sovereignty.53
                                                 
50 Note 7 above.  
  On the other hand, 
the principle of complementarity is an assurance, albeit conditional, that States’ 
 
51 See pages 6-7 above. 
 
52 See Broomhall op cit at 42-43. 
 
53 See generally N D White The Law of  International Organisations (1996) 
at 46-43; H G Schermers, International Insti tutional Law (1980) at 27-33; 
P Taylor International Organization in the Modern World (1993) at 191-
192; T M Franck Fairness in the International Legal and Insti tutional  
System (1993) 57-61. However, it  has been pointed out that,  at present,  
there are no “pure” supranational organizations, and that one can 
therefore only speak of “relative” supranationality. See White op cit at  
46. On the essential characteristics of supranational organizat ions, see 
Schermers op cit at 28-29. 
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sovereignty will be respected. In this way, the Statute creates a unique 
international institution in the ICC.54
 
 
For an implementing State under the ICC Statute, the choice is between 
prosecuting the core crimes, on the one hand, and being adjudged unable to do 
so, on the other, thus losing curial power over a specific case. In making its 
choice at the legislative level, a State would be guided by considerations such as 
the following: 
1. Whether the State, when acting in the framework of cooperation with the 
Court, acts within the ambit of the Court’s authority as its organ or 
whether this is done on its authority and subject to national law. 
2. Traditional considerations of essential interest (ordre public). 
3. Compliance with other conventions.55
 
 
For African States, issues of sovereignty are particularly important given these 
States’ history of colonialism and the immediate task of nation building.56
                                                 
54That is, when viewed against the backdrop of such recent developments 
as the establishment of ICTR and ICTY, which seek to attenuate State 
sovereignty. In apparent reference to the ICC model, Broomhall op cit at  
43 asserts that this rapprochement between the rule of law and State 
sovereignty is coherent in principle, but not realizable in pract ice. He 
states: “This tension has characterized the development of  international 
criminal law from its origins to the present day…and there is no reason 
to expect that it wil l  not continue to characterize it after the entry into 
force of the Rome Statute….” 
  South 
Africa, in particular, has quite peculiar aspects of its return to the international 
community, which could influence or explain its legislative choices.  An example 
 
55 See Report of the Ad Hoc  Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court- Review of the Major Substantive and 
Administrative Issues Arising out of the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court Prepared by the International Criminal 
Commission- Annex 1 thereto, available at 
 http:// www.radicalparty.org/icc/adhoc (accessed 27/2/04).  
 
56 A J G M Sanders International Jurisprudence in Af rican Context (1979) 
122.  
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is the use of amnesties and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) as a 
means of redressing past abuses of human rights has had a major impact on the 
reconstruction process.57 It is significant to mention that the ICC Statute is silent 
on such processes, a matter which has resulted in considerable debate regarding 
their austerity.58
 
 The essential inquiry is whether any future resort to such 
processes in respect of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court would 
be in line with South Africa’s obligations under the Statute. These issues will be 
discussed in this study. 
South Africa has enacted The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act59 to give effect to the Rome Statute. This piece 
of legislation forms the basis of South Africa’s observance of its obligations under 
the Statute60
                                                                                                                                                 
 
. How far has the legislation re-shaped South Africa’s legal 
57 For an extensive discussion of the merits of  the TRC process, see S 
Garkawe “The South African Truth and Reconci liation Commission: A 
Suitable Model to Enhance the Role and Rights of the Vict ims of Gross 
Violations of  Human Rights?” avai lable at:  
http://www.austli i .edu.au/au/journals/MULR/2003/14.html (accessed 
7/4/04).  
 
58 See, for example, Beigbeder op cit (note 8 above) at 125. For his part,  
Professor John Dugard argues that amnesty and Truth and 
Reconcil iat ion Commissions (TRC’s) are an integral part  of national 
healing and reconstruction, and are consistent with the Rome Statute’s 
pol icy of accountability for the commission of international crimes.  See 
J Dugard “Possible Conflict of Jurisdict ion with Truth Commissions” in A 
Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court:  
A Commentary  (2002) 693 at 702-703.  
 
59 Act 27of 2002. 
 
60 The Preamble to the Act reads:  
“ To provide for a framework to ensure the effective implementation of  
the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court in South Africa; to 
ensure that South Africa conforms with its obl igations set out in the 
statute; to provide for the cr ime of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes; to provide for the prosecution in South Afr ican courts of  
persons accused of having committed the said crimes in South Africa and 
beyond the borders of South Africa in certain circumstances; to provide 
for the arrest of persons accused of having committed the said crimes 
and their surrender to the said Court in certain circumstances;  to 
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landscape as regards the prosecution of international crimes? The answer to this 
question is the key to understanding the link between the principle of 
complementarity and the implementation of the Rome Statute. The relevance of 
this question becomes apparent when one considers the old debate about how 
international law is enforced: does the “threat” of loss of sovereignty over the 
judicial process amount to a sufficient stimulus for State compliance with 
international law? 
 
1.5 
We will approach the present study with two main assumptions to guide us in 
achieving our goal. These hypotheses are, however, provisional and may need 
re-adjustment at a later stage, especially as regards the theoretical understanding 
of the principle of complementarity. The hypotheses are as follows: 
The Working Hypotheses 
 
Firstly, the regime of complementarity is, in effect, a system designed for the 
notional “perfect” criminal justice system where prosecutions are assured in 
every case. To enforce the regime of complementarity to the letter would mean 
that the ICC ceases to exist, as an institution, for no cases will come before it.61
 
 
This, it will be argued, was hardly the intention of the Rome Statute’s drafters. 
Secondly, most prosecutions will occur at the national level. Thus, such 
prosecutions will be dogged by the usual problems associated with national 
justice systems, such as the lack of political will to prosecute, diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                 
provide for cooperation by South Africa with the said Court; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith”.   
 
61 See J T Holmes “Complementarity: National Courts versus  the ICC” in 
A Cassese et al  (eds)  The Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary  (2002) 667. See specif ical ly note 3 ( ib id) for  the following 
view quoted from Ambassador Phill ippe Kirsch: “It is the essence of the 
principle of complementarity that if  a national judicial system functions 
properly, there is no need for the ICC to assume jurisdiction”. 
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considerations and fragile judicial systems. Each State Party, it will be argued, 
will therefore need to totally restructure its justice system and reconfigure its 
laws in a manner not envisaged by the Rome Statute. 
 
1.6  
The study will be carried out within the wider context of the problem of 
harmonizing international criminal law and national criminal justice systems in 
order to ensure that the culture of impunity for offenders is eliminated.
Context of the Study 
62 The 
study will proceed on the premise that complementarity is an innovation and a 
product of compromise.63
 
 This thesis will therefore seek to isolate the various 
competing interests that led to this compromise in order to see whether, and to 
what extent, these concerns have been addressed in South Africa’s implementing 
legislation. 
The choice of South Africa as the subject of this study is justified by the fact that, 
as a prosperous African country, its implementation mechanisms are likely to be 
viewed as a benchmark for other countries within the region and the 
continent.64At present, very few African countries have actually ratified the 
Rome Statute65
                                                                                                                                                 
 
, let alone enacted legislation to implement it. South Africa’s 
62 See paragraph 4 of  the preamble to the Statute of  the International 
Criminal Court.  
 
63 See generally Kleffner op cit (note 39 above) at 87-89. See also Steele 
op cit (note 37 above) at 9.  
 
64 This is typif ied ,  inter al ia,  by the fact  that in March 2003 the Kingdom 
of Lesotho conducted a follow-up workshop on efforts to enact a law 
implementing the ICC statute, at which a lot of the discussion was 
centred on the South African legislation. The author represented the Law 
Society of Lesotho at the workshop. 
 
65 As at 5th March 2006, the Afr ican countries that had ratif ied the 
Statute were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,  Congo, The 
Central Afr ican Republic,  The Democratic Republic of  Congo, Djibouti,  
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali,  
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efforts to implement the Statute may therefore provide a reference point for other 
countries wishing to follow suit. 
 
Moreover, as a new emerging democracy, South Africa needs to strengthen her 
criminal justice system in such a way that crime in general and international 
crime in particular, is effectively controlled. Emerging democracies often present 
unique problems in this regard, in that as they become more receptive to external 
influences and therefore more cosmopolitan, a strain is placed on their capacity 
to detect and prosecute crime. The perception that South Africa is a safe haven 
for those being sought after for their crimes abroad would no doubt lead to a 
situation where South Africa is unable to fulfil her international obligations. 
 
 A case in point is that of former Ethiopian ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam, who 
came into the country for medical treatment. Subsequently, there were calls for 
his extradition to Ethiopia for gross violations of human rights he allegedly 
presided over.66
 
 A strong criminal justice system helps to avoid such episodes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mauritius, Namibia,  Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Afr ica,  
Tanzania and Uganda and Zambia. South Afr ica is the only African State 
that has enacted legislat ion to implement the Rome Statute. Source:  
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratif ications.html .  
(accessed 5/3/06).  
 
66 The former leader of Ethiopia arr ived in South Africa in 1999, from 
Zimbabwe where he had been living in exi le. Amnesty International, the 
human rights organization, was at the forefront of call ing on the South 
African Government to ensure that Mengistu did not leave the country 
while invest igations into his al leged abuses were continuing.  
Nevertheless, on 7 December 1999 the South African Government 
announced that Mengistu had returned to Zimbabwe. See Amnesty 
International ’s response at 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR530131999?open&of=EN
G-ZAF (accessed 17/5/04). Human Rights Watch, another rights group, 
called on the South African Government to try Mengistu in South African 
courts.  See http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/nov/eth1124.htm (accessed 
17/5/04).  
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1.7 
The study looks at South Africa’s implementing legislation from the 
complementarity viewpoint. Thus, an analysis of the legislation’s provisions will 
be attempted only insofar as they relate to the issue of complementarity. Where 
pieces of legislation from other jurisdictions are discussed, this is for the limited 
purpose of illustrating their complementarity aspects. Points of difference and 
similarity between the provisions of the legislation and those of the Rome Statute 
will be discussed with reference to complementarity. 
Scope of the Study 
 
A theoretical discussion of the principle of complementarity necessitates a 
discussion of the various theories of international law and its enforcement. 
However, the study will not venture into a determination of which particular 
theory is plausible. Rather, the discussion should lead to a better understanding 
of the origins of the principle of complementarity and how it is meant to 
function. 
 
A comparative survey of similar legislation from different jurisdictions will also 
be made in the course of the study. This is for purposes of understanding the 
different legal settings within which these laws are passed, and making 
suggestions for reform at the end of the study. 
 
 1.8 
Broadly, the study aims to answer the question whether the principle of 
complementarity is a viable one in terms of instigating a robust regime of 
international criminal law. A case study of the South African legislation will be 
used for these purposes. Equally important is the issue of whether South Africa’s 
implementation regime accords with its obligations at international law. 
Goals of the Study 
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It will therefore be important to first answer the subsidiary question of what the 
content of a State party’s obligations under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court is. Is it merely to put in place the co-operative machinery set 
forth in the Statute, or are States further obligated to adopt the substantive law 
embodied in the Statute?67 This is closely related to the question whether 
discretion is accorded to States, party to the Rome Statute, in the actual 
implementation of the Statute.68
 
 
It is hoped that the study will critically analyse the complementarity concept, a 
glue of uncertain content that has been entrusted with the task of holding 
together States whose professed goal is to fight the culture of impunity for 
offenders. The study is of an illustrative genre, aimed at depicting the broad 
concerns of a State implementing the Rome Statute, as well as the difficulty of 
transposing international obligations onto the municipal plane.  By investigating 
the manner of implementation by South Africa, the study aims to show that the 
concept of complementarity answers specifically to the “unwillingness” strand of 
the problem of impunity, rather than “inability”. This means that, in order for 
complementarity to be an effective catalyst for implementation, it must, in some 
manner, interfere with prosecutorial discretion. 
 
                                                 
67 Kleffner op cit (note 39 above) at 91-94. Cf Werle and Jessberger op cit  
(note 18 above) at 194. 
 
68 For example, the Ratif ication Manual, developed by the International 
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, leaves the matter 
of rules of evidence largely to the State Party’s discretion, but with the 
guideline that crimes under the statute should be “effectively 
investigated and prosecuted”. See Rights & Democracy and The 
International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Pol icy International  Criminal Court: Manual f or the Ratif ication and 
Implementation of  the Rome Statute  (May 2000) 13. Also see,  in the 
context of  Human Rights treaties, A Orakhelashriu   “The Position of  the 
Individual in International Law” (2001) 31(2) Cal if ornia Western 
International Law Journal  241 at 265. 
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1.9 
The literature consulted indicates the classical view that there is a perennial 
discord between international law and national law, and a discussion of the 
characteristics of, and differences between, the two systems. However, as 
Heiskanen suggests it,
Literature Review 
69 the monist versus dualist debate does not reflect the real 
issue, namely, how the two systems of law can be made to co-exist. He further 
propounds the “pragmatic” view that the issue is one of the applicability of 
international law within the municipal sphere.70
 
 
That complementarity can act as a catalyst for national implementation is 
evinced clearly by the literature. As Kleffner points out, “the defects of domestic 
laws, which render a national judicial system totally or substantially unavailable, 
can make a case admissible before the Court”.71
 
 However, the learned writer 
does not look into the provisions of any specific legislation in an attempt to 
demonstrate any possible link between complementarity and national 
implementation. 
An ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
reviewed the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission. The 
                                                 
69 V Heiskanen International  Legal  Topics (1992) 4. See also Fitzmaurice,  
The General Principles of  International Law (1957) 68-94.  At 79-80, the 
learned author asserts: “Formally…international and municipal law as 
systems can never come into conflict. What may occur is… a confl ict  of 
obl igations, or an inabil ity for the State on the domestic plane to act in 
the manner required by international law”. See also T Maluwa “The 
Incorporat ion of  International law and its Interpretational Role in 
Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey” (1998) 23 
SAYIL  45 at 49-50. 
 
70 Heiskanen op cit at 20. 
 
71 Kleffner op cit (note 39 above) at 89. 
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committee’s report72 reveals the divergent views of delegates on the issue of 
complementarity, ranging from the fear that complementarity would create a 
presumption in favour of national courts, to the caution that the ICC should not 
be allowed to pass judgement over national courts.73
 
 Concerns have also been 
raised about whether States, in co-operating with the ICC, are to be organs of the 
Court or are to do so by virtue of their own authority and subject to national law. 
The learned authors Werle and Jessberger, in their article “International Criminal 
Justice is Coming Home: The New German Code of Crimes against International 
Law”, 74
 
 analyse the German Law implementing the Statute of the ICC. 
However, the ultimate goal of their article is to assess the likely impact of the 
legislation on the development of international law. By contrast, what the author 
will seek to reflect upon is the corollary: how the principle of complementarity as 
understood in international law may influence the legislative decisions of a State.   
It is apparent that some writers do not regard the South African legislation as 
being problem-free. One, for instance, encounters the view that the legislation 
“purports” to bring South Africa’s domestic obligations in line with its 
                                                 
72 Available at http://www.radicalparty.org/icc/adhoc (accessed 
24/2/04).  
 
73  For the view that the ICC should be competent only to review 
decisions taken by national courts,  see B Graefrath “Universal 
Jurisdict ion and an International Criminal Court” avai lable at 
http://www.l ib.uchicago.edu (accessed 21/2/04).  
                                                                                                                                                                     
74 See Werle and Jessberger loc ci t.  
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obligations under the Rome Statute.75 The writers concerned do not, however, 
delve into any analysis of the legislation’s provisions.76
 
 
Writers also seem to differ on the whole question of the effect of 
complementarity. For example, the learned authors De Wet and Strydom,77 in 
analysing section 5(5) of South Africa’s Act 27 of 2002 legislation,78 point out that 
the provision is a manifestation of the complementarity principle. They then 
assert that complementarity creates a presumption in favour of national 
prosecutions. Kleffner, however, does not seem to view the principle as having 
such an effect.79
 
 
On the issue of States’ compliance with international law, much has been written. 
Some of the literature ventures, perhaps not surprisingly, into the realm of 
political theory, thus emphasizing the affinity between international law and 
politics. John Rawls, for instance, is essentially of the view that a State’s 
observance of international law is explicable on the basis of what benefits it 
                                                 
75 G Erasmus et al  “The Application of International Criminal Law before 
Domestic Courts in the Light of Recent Developments in International 
and Constitut ional Law” (2002) 27 SAYIL 64 at 79. 
 
76 For a detai led overview of the Austral ian implementing legislation, see 
G Triggs “Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court: A Quiet Revolution in Australian Law?” avai lable at:  
http://www.austli i .edu.au/journals/SydLRev/2003/23.html (accessed 
7/4/04). In his article, however, the learned author does not consider 
the issue purely from a complementarity standpoint.  
 
77 E De wet and H Strydom “Implementing International Humanitarian 
Law: Developments in South Africa and Other Jurisdict ions with Special  
Reference to International War Crimes Tribunals” (2000) 25 SAYIL 42 at 
51.  
 
78 It effectively provides that the National Director ’s refusal to prosecute 
is not a bar to prosecution. 
 
79 See Kleffner (note 39 above).  
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hopes to derive from observance.80 Thus, argues the author, “when an institution 
creates benefits through the voluntary cooperation of its members, those who 
share in the benefits have an obligation to support the institution through 
cooperation”.81
 
 
However, argues Henkin,82 there is a distinction between the reasons for a state 
accepting new law and those which motivate it to observe existing law. Refusal 
to accept new law does not usually attract sanctions.83
 
 This assertion is an 
interesting one to discuss in the context of complementarity. 
1.10 
The study is divided into five (5) chapters. The first chapter is a general 
introduction to the topic under discussion. In it a brief historical account of the 
development of international criminal law to the present day is given. This 
account alludes to the establishment of the ICC. An attempt is also made to 
explain the meaning of the principle of complementarity. 
Chapter Arrangement 
 
The second chapter briefly traces the origin of the principle of complementarity. 
This is done with a view to ultimately placing the principle within some 
theoretical framework. The chapter is therefore quite wide-ranging in its 
discussion. The aim is to grasp how States are likely to understand the principle 
and apply it in the actual implementation of the Rome Statute. The aim is 
                                                 
80 See J Rawls “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play” in S Hook(ed) 
Law and Philosophy (1964) 73. 
 
81 Ib id.  
 
82 L Henkin How Nations Behave 2 ed (1979) 31. 
 
83 Ib id.  
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therefore to illustrate that complementarity may be understood in terms of 
contemporary concepts of international law. 
 
The third chapter considers South Africa’s position in the scheme of the 
implementation of the Rome Statute. South Africa’s laws will be considered with 
regard to international humanitarian law issues, especially as they applied prior 
to the enactment of the implementing legislation. The chapter then considers in 
detail the provisions of the implementing legislation. This provides a basis for 
comparing the position, as it existed prior to the enactment of the legislation with 
the position as it now obtains. The author also “disaggregates”84 the State into its 
three components85
 
 for purposes of illustrating how each one’s handling of 
international law issues affects compliance within the municipal system. The 
chapter therefore provides a general overview of South Africa’s handling of 
cooperation in international criminal matters. 
The fourth chapter then carries the discussion in chapter three forward by 
attempting to rationalize any divergence in the position prior to and after the 
ICC legislation. The discussion in chapter two is also picked up here, as one 
would have considered both theory and State practice in the previous chapters. 
This should enable the author to better explain any divergence. In particular, the 
chapter will discuss other factors, apart from complementarity, that might have 
influenced the decision to implement and the manner of implementation, in the 
case of South Africa. 
 
                                                 
84 See B Kingsbury “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of  
Competing Conceptions of International Law” (1998) 19 Michigan Journal  
of  International Law 345 at 356. The rationalist theory of international 
law tends to regard the State as a single entity. However, through 
“disaggregation”, it  is argued in this thesis that the Judiciary is pivotal  
to any effort at compliance with international law norms. 
 
85 That is, the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive. 
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Finally, the fifth chapter assesses the impact of the implementing legislation on 
the South African legal landscape and draws some conclusions. 
Recommendations will be made on how States might better ensure that they are 
able to prosecute the crimes falling under the Court’s jurisdiction. The issue 
whether complementarity, as a means of enforcement, may be utilised in other 
spheres of international law apart from criminal law, will also be addressed. 
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Chapter Two 
 
SEARCHING FOR A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
“Where… there is a dernier cri, such as suggestions for the development of an international criminal 
law, it is advisable not to follow uncritically in the train of the enthusiastic protagonists of such an idea, 
but to pause and reflect on the meaning and value of it all”.1
 
 
2.1 
The old debate over the true nature of international law, and whether it really is 
law, rages on.
Introduction 
2 What is clear, however, is that international law is, in important 
respects, different from municipal law. Thus, for instance, it does not have a 
centralised enforcement agency to ensure compliance with its rules.3
 
 
It is within this context that the thesis discusses the principle of complementarity 
and its place in international law. As has been seen, complementarity has been 
posited as a “catalyst” for the implementation of the Rome Statute.4
                                                 
1 G Schwarzenberger “The Problem of an International Criminal Law” 
(1950) 3 Current Legal Problems  263. 
 What this 
means is that the principle is seen by some as having the potential to induce 
States to observe their obligations under the Rome Statute. It is, therefore, 
particularly important that one understands the theoretical context within which 
the principle might have been conceived. 
 
2 See, for example, JG Starke Introduction to International  Law 10 ed  
(1989) 18. 
 
3 Starke op cit at 27-31. 
 
4 See chapter one, note 71 above.  
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This theoretical discussion is crucial to the present study.5 One must locate the 
theoretical basis for complementarity if one is to understand how it might 
operate to induce States to comply with international law. This chapter therefore 
discusses the different methods of enforcement in international law, as well as 
the different theories of international law. Much as one must acknowledge that 
“The ultimate reasons that impel States to uphold the observance of international 
law belong to the domain of political science, and cannot be explained by a 
strictly legal analysis”,6
 
 complementarity is a legal concept, and an attempt 
ought to be made to analyse it as such.  
The discussion in this chapter begins by addressing the origins of 
complementarity. This is against the background of the perennial problem of the 
non-observance of international obligations by States. As has been suggested 
above,7
                                                 
5 See B Broomhall  op cit (chapter one, note 10 above) who puts it  thus at 
p 58: 
 complementarity was a result of compromise and concessions. It is 
suggested that in the atmosphere of an international conference with delegates 
keen to see the establishment of the first truly International Criminal Court, it is 
not likely that they would have fully addressed their minds to such a matter as 
the theoretical basis for complementarity. This chapter therefore aims to explore 
this issue more closely. 
“…International criminal law will only move towards more regular 
enforcement, or only maximize the legit imacy of such enforcement as it  
does achieve, if  the ‘real world’ condit ions in which it operates-including 
those of a sometimes unsettled and even contradictory international law-
are examined more closely than has been done so far. Such pragmatic 
analysis must be considered a key task for the future, if  the effect ive 
enforcement of international criminal law is to be secured in even a 
minimally fair and legitimate manner”.  
 
6 Starke op cit (note 2 above) at 31; Henkin op cit at 39-40. 
 
7 See page 5 above.  
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This chapter is not an attempt to arrive at a definite conclusion as to which 
theory of international law is correct or plausible.8
 
 It is rather an attempt to see if 
one might explain complementarity in terms of one or other of the theories. 
2.2 
It should be noted here that the Rome Statute of the ICC does not actually 
employ the term “complementarity”. The term does, however, seem to have 
arisen as a result of commentators describing the nature of the Court’s 
jurisdiction as provided for in the Statute. 
The Origins of Complementarity 
 
As has been suggested above,9 a feature of international law that has always 
been regarded as one of its weak points is that it lacks a central enforcement 
agency akin to what one would find in a domestic setting. International criminal 
law, by extension, has long suffered from this setback. Closely related to this 
dynamic are concerns over State sovereignty, which, as we have seen, have over 
the years hampered efforts to internationalise criminal law.10
 
 
It is instructive to study the Rome Statute’s travaux preparatoires in order to gain 
an insight into the manner in which the principle of complementarity evolved. In 
a sense, this amounts to interpreting the complementarity provisions of the 
Statute by ascertaining what the intention of the contracting parties was in 
settling for the principle. 
 
                                                 
8 For a general discussion of the theories of international law, see M N 
Shaw International Law 3r d ed (1991) 3-12. 
 
9 Shaw op cit at 22.  
 
10 See Broomhall op cit (chapter one, note 10 above) at 58. 
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2.2.1 
At the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court,
The Travaux Preparatoires 
11 several statements were made by States’ representatives regarding the 
vision they had for a future Court.12
 
 They decried the lack of progress over the 
years in achieving effective prosecutions for human rights atrocities, and 
expressed the hope that the Court would instigate a new resolve. 
In his statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bosnia and Herzegovina, His 
Excellency Dr. Jadranko Prlic, expressed the view that the Court’s sovereignty 
and independence, as well as its complementarity to national Courts, would 
bring an end to atrocities. He mentioned that, while Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
always cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the 
latter had still not been effective in terms of successful prosecutions.13
 
  
The statement by the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Ljerka Mintas Hodak, 
also acknowledged the pivotal role played by the ICTY in bringing to justice 
those who had committed atrocities. He, however, hinted to problems that 
Croatia had had with the Tribunal, especially regarding aspects of its procedures 
and hoped that the Court would help cure such difficulties. Significantly, he said 
that one of the cornerstones of the Court should be the principle of subsidiarity.14
 
 
                                                 
11 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of  an International Criminal Court, held at Rome, Italy 
(15 June-17 July 1998).  
 
12 These are available at the “No Peace without Justice” website: at  
http://www.npwj.org/iccrome/index.shtml (Accessed 20/4/04).  
 
13 Ib id.  
 
14 Ib id.  
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The head of the Japanese delegation, Mr. Hisashi Owada, expressed the view 
that the Court should be formed on the basis of the principle of complementarity, 
meaning that the Court’s jurisdiction should be invoked only when the national 
justice system was not operational or effective in relation with the specific case 
concerned. He also beseeched fellow delegates not to be influenced by parochial 
interests such as concerns about State sovereignty.15
 
 
As for the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Y.V. Ushakov, he 
envisaged a Court that operated in accordance with the prerogatives of the UN 
Security Council. He said that Russia desired a Court that would exercise its 
jurisdiction only with the consent of the territorial and the custodial State, except 
in situations where the Security Council had referred a matter to the Court, in 
which case the Court would exercise compulsory jurisdiction.16
 
 
Speaking on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
countries,17 the late Mr. D. Omar, then South African Justice Minister, envisaged 
a Court with competence to decide admissibility issues regarding the inability or 
unwillingness of national justice systems to try those responsible for violations. 
However, he stated that, in doing so, the Court must respect the complementary 
relationship between itself and the national justice systems.18
 
 
Significant opposition to the idea of an International Criminal Court in general 
and the concept of complementarity in particular came from the United States. 
                                                 
15 Ib id.  
 
16 Ib id.  
 
17 These consist of South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia,  
Malawi, The Democratic Republic of  Congo, Tanzania,  Mauritius,  
Mozambique, Angola and Swaziland. 
 
18 See note 12 above.  
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The American position was that the 19Court would diminish national 
sovereignty, and that the Court would also entertain politicised prosecutions. In 
its complemenarity role, the Court would be a “jurisdictional leviathan”20. The 
fear was expressed that the Court’s powers would be far-reaching, in effect 
bringing about a judicial review of national jurisdictions.21
 
 The head of the 
American delegation to the Rome Conference, David Scheffer, voiced the fear 
that the Court would be used to try American soldiers on Peace-keeping 
missions abroad. 
However, the Canadian foreign affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, envisaged “a 
court worth having”. He acknowledged the obvious tension between the need to 
protect national sovereignty and the necessity of bringing an end to gross abuses 
of human rights, but saw the Court as an “innovation” that would serve a global 
need.22
 
 Significantly, he saw the Court’s role as one not only of building peace 
through reconciliation, but also addressing the needs of the victims of atrocities 
through justice. 
From the above statements, it will be seen that the chief concern for delegates 
was the kind of relationship that the Court would have with national courts.23
                                                 
19 The full statement is available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/statements/governments/ usscheffer (accessed 
27/6/04).  
 
They were sensitive that the latter should not pale into insignificance in terms of 
 
20 G T Dempsey “Reasonable Doubt: The Case against the Proposed International 
Criminal Court” (1998) 311 Cato Policy Analysis 1. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 See statement at the No Peace Without Justice Website, available at 
 http:// www.npwj.org (accessed 29/4/05). 
 
23 See also J Crawford “The Draft ing of the Rome Statute” in P Sands (ed) 
From Nuremberg to The Hague (2003) 133-134. 
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their role in the prosecution of the core crimes.24
 
  At the same time, however, it 
was made clear that, to end the culture of impunity, an institution was necessary 
that would redefine the concept of national sovereignty. 
2.2.2 
         
Comparison with the International Criminal Tribunals for  
The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia were 
established by the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, which entrusts the Council with the task of overseeing 
international peace and security. For both the ICTR and ICTY, very particular 
conflicts with their own idiosyncrasies and demands needed to be addressed, 
and the need was felt to involve the Security Council in trying the perpetrators 
and ensuring that similar atrocities did not recur in future. 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia           
 
 It is significant to mention that in the wake of both conflicts, the respective 
national justice systems were empirically and singularly unsuited for bringing 
the perpetrators to justice. In the case of Yugoslavia, there was a discernible 
unwillingness to prosecute, while in Rwanda the justice system had virtually 
ground to a halt resulting in inability to do so. 
 
In the sphere of international criminal law, a major problem to be contended 
with is that of the demarcation of the roles of national courts and international 
                                                 
24 This is akin to the concerns expressed in relat ion to subsidiarity,  as to 
which see inf ra,  pages 35-37. Polit icians and the press in Europe 
stressed the importance of the retention of competence by national 
governments. See C McCrudden “The Effect iveness of European Equality 
Law: National Mechanisms for Enforcing Gender Equality Law in the 
Light of European Requirements” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of  Legal  
Studies 320 at 366.  See also D Lasok “Subsidiarity and the Occupied 
Field” (1992) 11 New Law Journal  1228 at 1230. 
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tribunals respectively.25
 
 In the case of the ICTY and ICTR, Articles 9 and 8 of 
their respective constitutive Statutes are in pari materia. They provide that ‘the 
International Tribunal[s] and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law ‘. 
However, it was also recognised that unanimity in terms of process is some times 
elusive, hence the Statutes give the Tribunals primacy in case of conflict. 
For present purposes, it is important to analyse this aspect of the basic structure 
of the Tribunals. Conferring primacy on the Tribunals is prima facie a truncation 
of States’ sovereignty. In the words of Judge Sidhawa, sitting in the Tribunal’s 
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, this arrangement: 
 “…obliges States to accede to and accept requests for deferral on the ground of 
suspension of their sovereign rights to try the accused themselves and compels states to 
accept the fact that certain domestic crimes are really international in character and 
endanger international peace and that such international crimes should be tried by an 
international tribunal, that being an appropriate and competent legal body duly 
established for that purpose by law “.26
The above dictum evinces some major theoretical assumptions that arguably 
form the substratum of the two Tribunals. It is sufficient to mention them briefly, 
for a more detailed discussion will be undertaken herebelow: The first is the 
implicit assertion of a theory of competing rights as between the Tribunals on the 
one hand and States on the other. The second is the positivist theory of 
 
                                                 
25 See J Denecke The Admissibil i ty of  a Case Before the International  
Criminal Court: An Analysis of  Jurisdiction and Complementarity  (2001) 
66. 
 
26 Prosecutor v Tadic  (Jurisdiction), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, 
106 ILR 453. 
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international law in terms of which the wish of the “law giver” is law in its own 
right, backed by sanctions.27
 
 
When one looks at the scheme of the Rome Statute, on the other hand, it is clear 
that primacy in terms of the prosecution of the core crimes is accorded to the 
States Parties and not the Court. This arrangement ensures that the prosecution 
of core crimes “remains” the cardinal duty of States28
 
, with the Court only 
becoming seized with a matter once it becomes clear that the concerned State is 
unable or unwilling to prosecute. 
It is interesting to analyse this position in terms of the Tadic dictum above in order 
to see whether the Court is premised on substantially different principles. It is 
clear that, unlike the case with the Tribunals, the Rome Statute actually affirms 
the sovereign right of States to try accused persons. The Statute seems to 
predicate this right on the pre-existing duty of States to prosecute all crimes of 
international concern.29 There is, thus, a co-extension between the right and the 
duty to prosecute. However, as will be argued here below, the idea that one can 
explain complementarity in terms of the maxim aut dedere aut judicare is 
problematic, not least because of the lingering confusion evinced by the literature 
as to what the concept actually means.30
                                                 
27 H Kelsen Pure Theory of  Law (Trans.1967) at 320 (“In accordance with 
the concept of law here accepted, so-cal led international law is “ law” if  it  
is a coercive order,  that is to say, a set of norms regulating human 
behaviour by attaching certain coercive acts (sanctions) as consequences 
to certain facts, as delicts, determined by this order….”)  
 
 
28 See preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 
29 See Rome Statute, preamble, paragraph 6:  
“The States Part ies to this Statute…recalling that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its cr iminal jurisdict ion over those responsible for 
international crimes….” 
 
30 See note 44 inf ra.  
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2.2.3 
          
Comparison of Complementarity with the Principle of  
As has been seen above,
Subsidiarity under European Law 
31 the sentiments expressed by delegates during 
negotiations for the Rome Statute included that the Court should be premised on 
the principle of subsidiarity.32 This principle is exemplified within the structures 
of the European Union, and describes the complex relationship between the 
Union and the sovereign States that form it.33 It is “a mixed national/ community 
system…in which the emphasis is placed on the pooling of sovereignties”.34
 
  
The Treaty of Maastricht,35
                                                 
31 See page 28 above. Subsidiarity has its origin in Roman Catholic social  
thought. Based on the autonomy and dignity of the human individual, it  
postulates that government should undertake only those initiatives that 
exceed the capacity of individuals or private groups acting 
independently.See 
http://
 upon which the present European Union is based, 
categorically sets out the terms of subsidiarity thus: “…the Community shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty...In areas which 
do not fall within its exclusive jurisdiction, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member 
www.encyclopaedia.thefreedictionary.com/subsidiarity (accessed 
13/5/2004).  
 
32 See also Crawford op cit (note 23 above) at 138. 
 
33 See S Hix “The Study of  the European Community: The Challenge of  
Comparative Polit ics” in B F Nelsen and ACG Stubb (eds) The European 
Union 2  ed (1998) 331. 
 
34 Ib id. See also R O Keohane and S Hoffman “Inst itutional Change in 
Europe in the 1980s” in Keohane and Hoffman The New European 
Community (1991) 10. 
 
35 The Treaty on European Union, Maastricht,  7 February 1992, 1757 
UNTS 3.  
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States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community “.36
 
  
Evident in the above exposition is a deliberate demarcation of roles between the 
Community and States, thus a tacit recognition of the potential for conflict 
between the two in a given case.37 It is, perhaps, not facile to conclude that this 
potential for conflict is not a preserve of the policy sphere. It is an instance of the 
power differential between States and international institutions, which may be 
manifested in matters of both policy and law.38 Whereas on the one hand the 
principle of subsidiarity operates within the context of legislative competence, 
and is thus an instrument for managing conflict in policy, complementarity on 
the other hand addresses the issue of judicial competence. Complementarity 
seeks to harmonise the judicial powers of the ICC and States Parties. Thus, an 
institution such as the ICC presents similar challenges to those encountered in 
the subsidiarity regime. Hence, it is submitted, the reference to “subsidiarity” 
during the Rome negotiations. Moreover, complementarity enjoins the Court to 
have regard to the interests of a case before admitting it. If the case is not of 
sufficient gravity, the Court would decline jurisdiction.39
                                                 
36 Op cit,  Article 3b. This bears the hallmarks of the managerial theory of  
compliance, discussed at page 58 inf ra.  
 This is akin to the 
“scale and effect” factor that the European Community is obliged to consider 
under subsidiarity. 
 
37 See the statement by the Croatian delegate to the Rome Conference 
(page 29 above).  
 
38 This is also a pointer to how effective a given international inst itution 
is. Indeed, echoing the basic approach of this thesis, it  has been stated:  
“The effect iveness of Community law needs to be conceived as a 
theoretical issue. Effect iveness may refer not only to compliance but also 
to implementation, enforcement and impact”. See F Snyder “The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Inst itutions, Processes, Tools 
and Techniques” (1993) 56 MLR 19 at 24-25. 
 
39 See Rome Statute, Article 17 (1) (d). 
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However, unlike subsidiarity, complementarity is generally not expressed in 
terms of a limitation of the Court’s powers in relation to States.40 The 
determination that a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute triggers the Court’s 
powers, which are then exercised without any further reference to that State.41 By 
contrast, the European Treaty requires the Community to act within the confines 
of the powers conferred by the Treaty in relation to those matters that do not fall 
within the Community’s exclusive jurisdiction.42
 
 Evidently, this envisages a 
situation where the concerned State would still possess competence over the 
matter. In a sense, subsidiarity dictates “measured interference”. The policy 
seems to be that of caution, by virtue of which interference would be difficult to 
justify. 
This measured interference resonates another aspect of subsidiarity that is worth 
mentioning. This is the natural law underpinning of the concept. The language of 
the above provision manifests the desire to resort to reason, principles and 
policies as a basis for interfering. “Scale and effect” considerations are factors in 
that process of reasoning. In any event, subsidiarity bears very little by way of 
                                                 
40 However,  Article 17 (2) of the Rome Statute provides guidelines for the 
Court in considering whether a State is unable or unwil ling to prosecute.  
In summary, the Court inquires whether the proceedings are being 
undertaken for the purpose of shielding the defender, whether any delay 
experienced is inconsistent with an intention to prosecute,  and whether 
the proceedings are not being conducted independently or impartially. In 
considering these matters, the Court does not defer to the concerned 
State.  
 
41 Except in terms of  Article 18 (1) of the Statute, which obl iges the 
Prosecutor to notify States of an investigat ion in certain specif ied 
circumstances.  
 
42 For the view that this apparent l imit is only notional, see G Burca 
“Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Signif icance after Amsterdam” avai lable at: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990703.html (accessed 
13/5/04).  
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the traditional hallmarks of a positivist dispensation in terms of which law is 
law, irrespective of the ethical and other justifications behind it. There is an 
attempt at rationalization.43
 
 Although Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute is of 
similar import in that the effects of any proposed action must be considered, no 
guidance is provided as to how the evaluation will be made. It leaves open the 
possibility that the ICC will refuse to admit a case despite a State’s unwillingness 
to prosecute, so long as the matter is not of sufficient gravity. This, it is 
submitted, would be an act of deference to the State concerned. It is therefore 
clear that, in a manner similar to what obtains under the subsidiarity regime, the 
Rome Statute envisages that the ICC will defer to States in certain cases. 
2.3
 
 Theoretical Foundations 
2.3.1
At customary international law, all States are under an obligation to either 
prosecute or extradite those suspected of having committed international crimes. 
This obligation is thus generally conceptualised as being absolute, as a binary 
imperative: you either prosecute or extradite.
 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 
44
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 The present task is to connect this 
43 McCrudden op cit (note 20 above) at 367. 
 
44 However, this is not to say that the principle is free of  conceptual 
dif f iculties. For instance, J Dugard, in his seminal work International  
Law: A South Af rican Perspective (1994) 123, asserts that all that the 
principle does is to al low States to exercise jurisdiction, rather than 
compel them to do so.  See also the decision of the Supreme Court of  
Columbia in Re Bachnofer 28 Int ’l  L.  Rep 322 (1963), and that of  the 
Supreme Court of Chile in Re Muzza Aceituno 18 int ’ l  L. Rep 315 (1951).  
In both cases, no obl igation to extradite was specif ically recognised. 
International law was invoked simply to supply the conditions where 
extradition would, if  undertaken voluntari ly, be regulated. See I  E 
Shearer Extradition in International  Law (1971) 26, fn 2. Also, Broomhall 
op cit (chapter one note 10 above) at  110 asserts that genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity give rise to “permissive 
international jurisdiction” at customary international law. The 
International Court of Justice, in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of  
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concept to the principle of complementarity as embodied in the Rome Statute, in 
a way that takes into account the evolution of extradition over the years. 
 
As mentioned above, the principle of complementarity seems to have been built 
on the foundation of this prior obligation on States to either prosecute or 
extradite. This appears to be what the States Parties to the Rome Statute meant to 
signify by “recalling” that there was a duty on all States to ensure that they 
exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.45 Although there is no express use of the maxim aut dedere aut judicare in 
the Rome Statute, it seems obvious that this is what was contemplated.46
 
 
Moreover, a corollary of the obligation to exercise jurisdiction is surely that if for 
any reason this cannot be achieved, extradition must be resorted to. This is the 
import of the maxim aut dedere aut judicare. 
Extradition generally takes place within the framework of bilateral extradition 
agreements.47
                                                                                                                                                 
11 April  2000 (Democratic Republic of  Congo V. Belgium) ILM 41 (2002) 
p536, has effect ively decided that diplomatic immunity may be allowed to 
overr ide the duty to prosecute. See the discussion of this case at page 41 
inf ra.  
 Such agreements record the specific crimes that the contracting 
States henceforth regard as extraditable. It seems that the notion of a general 
duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty is far from being unreservedly 
 
45 See Rome Statute, preamble, paragraph 6. 
 
46 See No Peace without Justice & UNICEF International Criminal Justice  
and Children (2002) 99: “Al l States have a duty either to prosecute or 
extradite (aut dedere aut judicare )  those suspected of having committed 
certain crimes under international law. The ICC is therefore structured 
according to the principle of complementarity….” (Emphasis added).  
 
47 Shearer op cit (note 44 above) at  22.  However, in some countries,  
extradition may take place on the basis of grace or comity rather than 
obl igation. This would normally be achieved by legislation. Ib id.  See also 
M G Cowling “Unmasking ‘Disguised’ Extradition: Some Glimmer of Hope” 
(1992) 109 SALJ 241. 
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accepted in international law. The actual practice of States appears to point to the 
fact that extradition is done through the medium of extradition treaties as 
desired.48
 
  
The question whether the obligation created under the maxim aut dedere aut 
judicare is permissive or mandatory is crucial to the present enquiry. What 
appears to be the prevalent view is that, at least in the cases of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, the obligation is permissive.49
 
 It is 
submitted that such an approach is an exercise in pragmatism, and takes 
cognisance of the power differential between States, hence the need to approach 
each case with reference to the relationship between the specific States involved.  
On the other hand, some commentators argue that the obligation created is 
mandatory at customary law. They assert that compulsory universal jurisdiction 
flows from the fact that the core international crimes are violations of jus cogens 
norms,50 which fact in turn gives rise to obligations erga omnes.51
“ States’ practice evidences that, more often than not, impunity has been allowed for jus 
cogens crimes, the theory of universality has been far from universally recognized and 
applied, and the duty to prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other 
than when it arises out of specific treaty obligations”.
 However, this is 
all at the level of theory, for in practice, States have tended to leave the matter to 
the arena of international treaty. As Bassiouni observes: 
52
                                                 
48 Shearer op cit at 27. See also Broomhall op cit (chapter one, note 10 
above) at 122. 
 
 
49 See Kleffner op cit (chapter one, note 39 above) at 97. 
 
50 M C Bassiouni “International Crimes:  Jus Cogens  and Obligatio Erga  
Omnes” (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 41 at 63. 
 
51 Ib id.  
 
52 Ib id.  
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Indeed, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not risen to the occasion with 
regard to the acceptance of the principle of universal jurisdiction. In the Arrest 
Warrant Case53, the Court effectively held that a Minister of foreign affairs enjoys 
full immunity when abroad, regardless of whether the alleged acts were 
performed in a private or official capacity. Thus the arrest warrant issued by 
Belgium against the Congolese foreign Minister was a nullity. It seems to the 
author that this decision is a negation of the Nuremburg principles mentioned 
earlier54, specifically the idea that criminal responsibility should attach to 
individuals irrespective of their official capacity.55
 
  
 It is acknowledged that the case involved a delicate balancing act between the 
need to afford individuals protection against human rights abuses, on the one 
hand, and the need to ensure that diplomats discharge their functions effectively 
and unhindered, on the other. However, using diplomatic immunity to defeat 
individual rights was, with respect, an unfortunate outcome which further 
illustrates the weakness of the principle of universal jurisdiction. It is suggested 
elsewhere that complementarity transposes the issue of jurisdiction from the 
realm of customary international law to the sphere of treaty in order to achieve 
more clarity.56
 
 
Given that the necessary opinio juris57
                                                 
53 Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11th April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Belgium) ILM 41 (2002) p 536. 
 for the concept of compulsory universal 
jurisdiction is thus manifestly lacking, the issue is whether the Rome Statute does 
 
54 See pages 3 and 4 above.  
 
55 See also Ro me Sta tute  ( supra )  Ar t icle  27.  
 
56 See chapter f ive inf ra.  
57 This is one of the twin requirements for the establishment of custom in 
international law, and refers to the acceptance of custom as binding as a 
 42 
not in fact create a new obligation not previously existing under customary 
international law. It is suggested that the answer to this question is in the 
affirmative. It is just as well, for treaties are one of the sources of international 
law.58 However, the significant point to mention is that “treaty crimes” as 
opposed to “customary crimes” are the cradle of the maxim aut dedere aut 
judicare.59 With the exception of piracy at customary law, treaties have been the 
distinctive avenue through which extraditable crimes have been created. For this 
reason, it is submitted that, rather than “recalling” that States were under an 
obligation to either prosecute or “extradite”60
 
, the States Parties were in fact 
ordaining that this should be so. 
A further aspect of the unclear nature of the link between the aut dedere principle 
and complementarity deserves mention. This is that extradition is normally 
                                                                                                                                                 
matter of law. See The North Sea Continental Shelf  Cases  (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The 
Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1969, 3. The Court had to decide whether the State 
pract ice of continental l imitat ion through the principle of equidistance 
has, subsequent to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
shelf,  been of such a kind as to satisfy the opinio juris  requirement. By 
11 votes to 6, the Court held that it had not, and that delimitation must 
be the object of agreement between the States concerned. Also of  
signif icance to the present enquiry is Judge Tanaka’s caution in his 
dissenting opinion in the following terms: “…it is extremely diff icult to 
get evidence of [opinio juris ]  existence in concrete cases.  This factor,  
relating to international motivation and being of a psychological  nature,  
cannot be ascertained very easily, particularly when diverse legislative 
and executive organs of a government participate in an internal process 
of decision-making in respect of ratif icat ion or other State acts”.  
 
58 Starke op cit (note 2 above) at 32. 
 
59 See R Jennings and A Watts (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed 
(1996) 998, who are non-committal about the existence of universal 
jurisdict ion at all except as provided by treaty or through the crime of  
piracy at customary law. See also J J Lambert Terrorism and Hostages in 
International Law (1990) 135. However, slavery and war crimes have 
often been mentioned as other customary law examples. See, for 
example, M Ndulo “The Developing Law of Air Hijacking” (1971-73) 5 
Zambia Law Journal 125 at 129-130. 
 
60 Rome Statute (supra), preamble, paragraph 6. 
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carried out between States, and not between States and other entities.61
“Prosecution is premised on a State’s willingness, but also on its ability to prosecute 
fairly and effectively. In the absence of these premises, the duty to extradite 
 In this 
regard, Bassiouni makes the following observation: 
to a State 
willing and capable of prosecuting fairly and effectively arises”.62
For the simple reason that the ICC is not a State but an international institution, it 
seems fair to argue that the Rome Statute does not envisage “extradition” stricto 
sensu. It is submitted that the institution of extradition cannot be extricated from 
the distinctive power play between States, a dynamic that is clearly lacking in the 
State-institution scenario. In the latter, pre-defined rules and the allocation of 
competencies ensure a more streamlined relationship, while the former is often 
determined and characterised by political expediency.
 (Emphasis added). 
63
 
 
 As a matter of fact, the author argues that the suitability of extradition to the 
inter-State sphere is so pronounced that one of the exceptions often found in 
extradition treaties is telling: the “political offence exception”.64
                                                 
61 See S K Gupta “Sanctum for the War Criminal:  Extradition Law and the 
International Criminal Court” (2000) 3 Calif ornia Criminal Law Review 1 
at 3, available at 
 Extradition is not 
germane to the complementarity regime that represents the relationship between 
national jurisdictions and the ICC, not national jurisdictions inter se. 
http://www.boalt.org/CCLR/v3/v3guptanf.htm 
(accessed 18/5/04); Black’s Law Dict ionary 6 ed (1990) 585. 
 
62 M C Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal  Law 
2n d ed (1999) 220. 
 
63 Shearer op cit (note 40 above) at 22. 
 
64 The idea behind this exception is that,  i f  the offence linked with the 
suspect is essentially a pol it ical one or was committed in the course of  
pol it ical agitation, there is no duty to extradite.  For more on this 
concept,  see general ly G Gilbert  “The Irish Interpretat ion of the Polit ical  
Offence Exception” (1992) 41 ICLQ 66; B A Wortley “Polit ical Crime In 
English Law and in International Law” (1971) 65 BYIL 219; D P King “The 
Pol it ical Offence Exception in International Extradition” (1980) 13 CILSA 
247. 
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Indeed, this ambivalence about the place of extradition in the Rome Statute was 
difficult to avoid when the final text was settled upon.65  Article 89 of the Rome 
Statute66 deals, if ambiguously, with the matter of extradition. The travaux 
preparatoires of the Article reveals that delegates were split over the use of the 
terms “surrender”, “transfer”, and “extradition” to describe the process through 
which defendants would be released to the Court. 67 The dilemma that faced the 
drafters of Article 89 was that if States given the free reign to utilise their 
extradition laws while at the same time assuming obligations under the Statute, 
then extradition might serve as a defence for defendants who faced the prospect 
of being released to the Court.68 By allowing States to approach the matter as 
they saw fit in each case, extradition laws would be resorted to where it was 
politically convenient.69
 
 
 Regrettably, from the point of view of the Court’s efficiency, the language of 
Article 89 leaves just such a possibility. Perhaps more significantly, it illustrates 
                                                 
65 Gupta op cit (note 61 above) at  19.  
 
66 Entitled “Surrender of Persons to the Court”.  
 
67 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Fifth Session, Annex: Report of  the Working Group on a Draft Statute for 
an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at  
324-30, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993) 
 
68 Cf  the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for both the ICTY and ICTR, 
which provide that the obligat ions regarding the surrender or transfer of  
a defendant prevai l over the national law or extradition treaties of the 
State concerned. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of  
Persons Responsible for Serious Violat ions of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/3/Rev.9, art 28 (1997);  
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of  Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violat ions of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, Rules of  
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/3/Rev.9, art.28 (1996).  
 
69 Gupta op cit at 6.  
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the difficulty of attempting to premise the unique relationship between the Court 
and national jurisdictions on the aut dedere principle. 
 
2.3.2
It is important to make the point that the provisions of the Rome Statute 
regarding the crimes of international concern are the subjects of various other 
treaties.
 Pacta Sunt Servanda 
70 The issue is whether the principle of complementarity is an extension 
of the obligation to observe these and other like agreements (hence pacta sunt 
servanda). In chapter four of this thesis, the related issue of “auto-challenge” with 
respect to human rights obligations is discussed.71
 
 
As has already been mentioned, the ICC has some level of uniqueness in that it 
has been created by treaty. This is in contradistinction to, for instance, the ICTY 
and ICTR, which owe their genesis to Resolutions of the UN Security Council. Ex 
facie, an institution created by treaty portends broad agreement amongst the 
States Parties, therefore one’s expectation would be that concerns about the 
institution’s legitimacy would be minimal, if not altogether absent. Having 
undertaken treaty obligations, States are expected to obey their commitments in 
good faith (pacta sunt servanda).72
                                                 
70 Examples are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, GA Res 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948; Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc A/39/51 
(1984). 
 Indeed, as will be seen below, the French 
 
71 See page 122   below.  
 
72 See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treat ies, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27, article 26 (“Every treaty 
in force is binding upon the parties to it  and must be performed by them 
in good faith”) See also H Wehberg “Pacta Sunt Servanda” (1959) 53 AJIL 
775 at 782. 
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Constitutional Council, in one of its opinions, has held that complementarity is a 
derivative of the maxim pacta sunt servanda.73
 
 
As Diehl74 cautions, much more serious thought ought to be given to three 
crucial questions: First, how resolutely does the particular State accept the 
particular agreement? Second, how willing is it to comply with that agreement? 
Third, how tolerant will it be of violations committed by others? These questions 
go beyond the traditional conceptualisation of treaties as documents consented 
to by States.75
 
 Diehl argues that whether a State is party to a treaty has no 
correlation to whether it will observe its terms. It is not unknown for cs to break 
their treaty commitments. The present author agrees with this observation, and 
will be spurred by it in investigating the specific case of South Africa and the 
Rome Statute in the subsequent chapters. It is important to answer the three 
questions posed above with regard to South Africa’s Act 27 of 2002. 
Complementarity could be conceptualised as a specifically agreed regime76
                                                 
73 See page 48 below. 
 that 
seeks to subject national jurisdictions to some sort of vetting. The significance of 
it being an agreed regime rather than a gradually evolving one is that there is 
more exactness about the goals to be pursued by the States Parties, and the 
 
74 P F Diehl “Reconceptualizing Treaty Consent” (2003) 6 Across Borders 
International Law Journal  3, avai lable at  
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/borders/borders.html (accessed 14/4/04).  
 
75 See D Bodansky “The Legit imacy of  International Governance: A 
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?” (1999) 93 AJIL 
596 at 597 (“In international law, the strongly consensualist  basis of  
obl igation has tended to moot the issue of legitimacy”) 
 
76 Regimes have been defined as “sets of  implicit or explicit  principles,  
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’  
expectations converge in a given area of international relat ions”. See S 
Haggard and B A Simmons “Theories of International Regimes” (1987) 41 
International Organization 491 at 493-494. 
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processes to be employed in that endeavour. As has been suggested, the major 
problem before the Rome Conference was the lack of prosecution of offenders. 
This was despite pervasive agreement on the outlawing of the crimes concerned. 
The Rome Statute therefore represents an effort to establish effective jurisdiction 
over offenders. It is suggested later in the thesis that the human rights dimension 
of the Rome Statute is a major reason for submission to such a regime.77
  
 
However, a regime instils order and maintains it. The idea, therefore, of a “treaty 
regime” such as that instigated by the Rome Statute, ought still to be seen in that 
light. It debunks any notion of a parity relationship between the ICC and 
national jurisdictions, a relationship that is merely “complementary”. A 
hierarchy is inevitably implied in a relationship where one entity is to have 
vetting powers over another, as envisaged by Article 18 of the Rome Statute. At 
the apex of this hierarchy is the Court.78
 
 
The question of moment is whether pacta sunt servanda could be construed as the 
basis of an undertaking, by a State, to submit to the ICC’s jurisdiction if found 
unable or unwilling to prosecute. The conditionality implied in this undertaking 
suggests that it is not an exact and clear one, made serio ac deliberato. This is 
especially so for a treaty which was concluded against the backdrop of 
                                                 
77 See chapter four infra. 
 
78 This may be contrasted with the situation between the International 
Court of  Justice and the UN Security Council.  The former has definitively 
held that there is no hierarchy between the two institut ions. See the 
Lockerbie Case  1992 ICJ Rep 20 at 131-132. Interestingly, the Court, in 
effect, decided that it need not defer to the Security Council in cases 
where the Court was seized with a matter that was contemporaneously 
before the Council.  On the other hand, as a matter of pol icy, the Security 
Council awaits the Court ’s decision before dealing with a matter. See V 
Gowlland-Debbas “The Relationship between the International Court of  
Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case” 
(1994) 88 AJIL 643 at 656. See also the Anglo- Iranian Oil  Company Case  
1992 ICJ Rep44 at 154. 
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particularly abominable atrocities and human rights abuses.79
 
 It is always open 
to a State to argue that no inability or unwillingness has been established in a 
particular case, and that therefore the pre-condition for the vesting of jurisdiction 
in the ICC is absent. The Rome Statute is not sufficiently clear on how the 
desiderata in Article 17 of the Rome Statute will be applied. As a result, it is 
suggested that there is agreement on the need to bring the perpetrators of 
international crime to justice, but no agreement on the exact details of the process 
by which this will be achieved. 
2.3.3 
         
Conditional Transfer of Judicial Power to an International  
One of the corollaries of a State’s exercise of sovereignty over its own territory is 
that it exercises curial power over any disputes or crimes happening in that 
territory.
Body 
80
 
 This postulate recognises that such curial powers are exercised 
without the intrusion or spurring-on of any extraneous phenomena. Without this 
jurisdiction, the exercise of a State’s sovereignty would be imperfect. 
The power of jurisdiction is therefore, on the above hypothesis, not to be given 
away lightly. As has been shown above, there is always a veritable tussle 
between two entities when they both have competence over the same subject 
                                                 
79 See E Stein “International Law in Internal Law: Toward 
Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitut ions?” (1994) 
88 AJIL 427 at 450, for the view that it is problematic to rely on the 
“good faith” of States particularly in the case of treat ies aimed at 
granting r ights to, and imposing obl igations upon, individuals. 
 
80 See A Ross a  Textbook of  International Law (1947) 155 (“each State is 
competent, within its terr itory to perform actions which-actually or 
potential ly-consist  in the use of  the State’s instrument of  power”).  In his 
dissenting opinion in the SS Lotus Case  (1927) PCIJ Series A No.10 at 
94, Judge Ajibola spoke of “the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of  a 
State over its own territory”.  
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matter. In such a situation, the question of deferral will inevitably arise.81 This 
may be as a result of the fact that competence-allocation rules within any 
international regime are often imperfect and unclear.82
 
 This textual 
indeterminacy of the rules brings to sharp relief the problem of aligning 
international norms to the municipal situation, where there is friction between 
the two. 
What, then, is the prognosis for a regime that seems to proceed from the premise 
that a State’s judicial processes are accessory to those of an international judicial 
institution? This author argues that this is the net effect of the complementarity 
regime, with its insistence that a State pass the “ability” and “willingness” tests 
before it can exercise full control over its curial functions. By interposing these 
twin requirements, the Rome Statute articulates a new and innovative notion, 
namely, the conditional exercise of national sovereignty through the judicial 
process.  
 
Literature and case law emanating from certain jurisdictions in the advent of the 
Rome Statute suggests antipathy, at least by some, towards the above notion. The 
concern has been expressed from the perspective of individual rights, specifically 
the right to a fair trial before a competent court. For instance, on the 21st of April 
1999, the Council of State of Belgium rendered an opinion regarding Belgium’s 
ratification of the Rome Statute.83
                                                 
81 For instance, the Rome Statute deals with the issue of deference as 
between the Court and the UN Security Council (See Rome Statute op cit  
Article 16). Perhaps understandably,  however,  the Statute does not,  in a 
similar manner, deal with the relat ionship between the Court and States,  
other than through the mechanism described as “complementarity”.  
 In terms of Article 13 of the Belgian 
 
82 See Heiskanen op cit (chapter one, note 69 above) at  238 (“…it seems 
there can be no power without ambiguity”).  
 
83 See International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC), Issues Raised 
With Regard to the 1998 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court 
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constitution as it then read, no one could be subtracted against his will from the 
judge that the law had assigned him. 
 
 In consequence of this, the Council held, no Belgian tribunal could relinquish its 
competence in favour of the ICC, as this would offend against a constitutional 
proscription. Central to the Council’s reasoning was the principle of the 
independence of justice, protected under Article 151 of the Belgian constitution 
and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966).84 The Court also considered the potential impact of Articles 16 and 18 of 
the Rome Statute and opined that, insofar as they applied to national 
jurisdictions, they would run counter to Belgium’s Constitutional imperatives.85
 
 
Earlier that year, the French Constitutional Council had been faced with a similar 
matter. It was asked to rule whether ratification of the Rome Statute required a 
revision of the Constitution.86 After examining several issues pertaining to the 
Statute, it concluded that a revision of the Constitution was necessary. However, 
pertaining to the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC, it considered that this 
was a derivative of the pacta sunt servanda principle, which, it opined, was well 
defined.87
                                                                                                                                                 
by National Consti tutional Courts and Councils of  State (30 September 
2001) 2.  
 In effect, the Council reasoned therefore that France would simply 
have to ensure that it was always able and willing to prosecute. The 
requirements of “ability” and “willingness” did not infringe on national 
 
84 Ib id.  
 
85 Ib id.  
 
86 Op cit at 1.  
 
87 Ib id.  
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sovereignty. The Court also considered that Article 57(3) of the Rome Statute was 
not antithetical to the exercise of national sovereignty.88
 
   
The above examples bespeak a latent resistance towards the notion of 
transferring or relinquishing judicial powers to an international institution. Such 
a notion resonates complications in terms of human rights norms as well as State 
sovereignty, which compel the viewing of complementarity through a different 
prism.89
 
 On the one hand, human rights advocates would certainly inveigh 
against a system that simply transposes a national trial onto the international 
scene, reducing the defendant to a mere pawn in the tussle between the ICC and 
the State concerned. Such a transposition, they would argue, would have had 
precious little to do with the case itself and more to do with the Court’s 
perception of whether the State could be trusted to conduct an effective trial. On 
the other hand, those concerned about State sovereignty would point out that the 
complementarity mechanism is gratuitously intrusive with regard to States and 
their judicial organs. 
  A further consideration to bear in mind is that the punishment of crime is often 
seen as such a jealously guarded prerogative of the State or the crown.90
                                                 
88 Ib id.  
 In many 
countries, prosecutions are instituted in the name of the State. This factor alone 
 
89 These diff icult ies can often only be resolved through some form of  
constitutional provision. For example, within the context of the European 
Community, some State constitutions in the 1970s al lowed for the 
delegation of sovereign powers to international organizations. The 
constitutions of France and Italy are examples. Regarding such power 
transfer, the European Court of Justice stated in Costa v. ENEL 10 Rec 
1143, 1160 (1964): “The transfer by the States from their internal legal 
system to the community legal order of  rights and obligat ions to reflect  
those set  forth in the Treaty therefore entails a definite el imination of  
their sovereign rights….” 
 
90 See, for example, R V. Sikumba (1955) 3 SA 125 [EDLD]. 
 
 52 
seems to militate against any notion of States delegating away such an important 
function as the investigation and prosecution of crime. Therefore, it is here, 
perhaps, that any similarity between the European regime and the 
complementarity regime comes to an end. It is in this light that challenges to the 
complementarity regime might begin to appear. 
 
The conflict in Darfur, western Sudan, exemplifies the challenges of working the 
principle of complementarity in practice. In his second report to the UN Security 
Council on the situation in Darfur, the ICC Prosecutor indicated that the 
Sudanese authorities had set up “special courts” to try those accused of 
perpetrating atrocities in the Darfur region.91 In addition, the authorities had 
embarked on a process of tribal reconciliation as a way of ending the conflict in 
the region. After pointing out that, due to the atmosphere of insecurity in the 
region, there are limitations on the Sudanese authorities’ ability to conduct 
effective investigations, the report states that the Prosecutor has identified certain 
cases for prosecution.92
 
 On the issue of admissibility, the report states: 
“In accordance with Article 53 (2) 9b) of the [Rome] Statute, the legal test is the specific cases selected by 
the office for prosecution, and not the state of the Sudanese justice system as a whole”.93
 
 
However, it is submitted that, to the extent that the Prosecutor evaluates the 
efficacy of investigations in a situation of conflict, the Prosecutor necessarily 
passes judgment on the state of the criminal justice system. Even though the 
evaluation is done on a case-by-case basis, the ultimate indicator is the 
background against which these investigations take place. 
                                                 
91 See the Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), 13th 
December 2005, available at http://www.amicc.org/documents (accessed 19/2/06). 
 
92 Supra a t  2 .  
 
93 Supra  a t  5 .  
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2.3.4 
          
Complementarity as an Aspect of the Rule of International  
It has been cautioned often enough that the likening of the international legal 
system to national systems can be very misleading.
Law 
94
 
 The two possess distinct 
and disparate, if sometimes overlapping, attributes. International law is 
predominantly concerned with ordering relations between sovereign States, 
while municipal law’s province is the regulation of human conduct. 
Additionally, unlike international law, municipal law is characterised by an 
elaborate system of oversight and enforcement. 
When all this is said, however, appealing to municipal law concepts in a bid to 
rationalise the international legal system is not entirely a faux pas. There are 
particularly cogent reasons in this day and age for embarking on such an 
enterprise. International law has ceased to be merely a corpus of law regulating 
the relationship between States,95 but has also become an instrument for ordering 
relations between States and international organizations. Individuals, too, have 
become actors on the international scene.96
 
  International law has increasingly 
sought to bestow upon them rights and saddle them with obligations. 
Against this backdrop, it is submitted, one may analyse the complementarity 
regime in terms of the doctrine of the rule of law. Aimed principally at enforcing 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
94 See Broomhall op cit at  53; T M Franck “Legit imacy in the International 
System” (1988) 82 AJIL 705 at 706. 
 
95 See Broomhall op cit at 20. See also R Jennings and A Watts (eds)  
Oppenheim’s International  Law 9th ed (1994) 5 (“…[public international 
law] governs the relations of States and other subjects of international 
law among themselves….)  
 
96 Broomhall loc c i t.  
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precepts of criminal law, complementarity resonates the idea of the rule of law.97
 
  
It portends the instillation of order where there has been anarchy in the form of 
impunity for offenders. To the extent that complementarity is posited to be a 
palliative for the problem of impunity, it seeks to legitimise the ICC’s power to 
pronounce that a national jurisdiction is deficient.  
Additionally, since the concept implies that national jurisdictions will be under 
the keen eye of the ICC, the notion of national accountability to the international 
system is indicated.98 States must now account for their use of judicial power 
insofar as the core crimes are concerned. This accountability will be realised 
through the desiderata set out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which enumerates 
the matters to be considered by the ICC in determining the bona fides of national 
prosecution initiatives.99
 
     
It is important to consider the traditional conception of the rule of law as it 
applies to the modern State. In the constitutional order of the State, the rule of 
law is a constraining device, a method to check the potential excesses of power, 
predominantly through legal means. According to Dicey, who is considered its 
foremost proponent, the concept entails three precepts.100 These are, first, that no 
person may be punished except for a distinct breach of law administered by the 
Courts.101 Second, all are equal before the law and are entitled to its protection.102
                                                 
97 Broomhall op cit (chapter one, note 10 above) at 52. 
 
 
98 Ib id.  
 
99 See Rome Statute op cit Art icle 17. 
 
100 See A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of  the Constitution 10 ed 
(1959); A Fagan “The Classical Rule of Law Theory: Does It Work?” (1988) 
5 (4) Responsa Meridiana 362. 
 
101 Dicey op cit at 188. 
 
102 Dicey op cit at 193. 
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Third, the general principles of the constitution are a result of the decisions of the 
courts, which legitimise future government action.103
 
 
 In Dicey’s view, government was a threat to individual liberty because of its 
immense power, and only courts could interpose to protect that liberty.  It is, 
therefore, fair to say that Dicey viewed the law and courts as having a crucial 
role to play in a rule-of-law dispensation.104
 
       
As regards complementarity, the principle certainly does emphasize the role of 
the ICC as its final arbiter. Rather than leave it to individual States to determine 
when and how to apply the principle, the Rome Statute assigns that role to an 
international judicial institution. Even though, strictly speaking, the Court does 
not have “formal” jurisdiction over States, in the sense that States are incapable 
of committing crimes, it does have “informal” jurisdiction over them as regards 
the application of the complementarity regime. In a sense, States become 
“punishable” for failing to honour their obligations under the regime.105
 
  The 
ICC’s power is, however, curbed through the careful delineation of the 
considerations it ought to take into account when passing judgment on a State. 
The above analogy, however, has its limits. The most important one is that the 
relationship between the State and the individual is sui generis, with its 
                                                 
103 Dicey op cit at 195. 
 
104 The importance of adjudication in the international arena was alluded 
to by Jeremy Bentham, according to whom “international relations on the 
basis of law does not require a sovereign power to originate its 
rules…but only a judicial power to interpret and apply rules having their  
origin in custom and treaties”. See T Nardin Law, Moral i ty and the 
Relations of  States (1983) 79. 
 
105 It is suggested that the principle of complementarity is one premised 
on the imposit ion of punitive measures rather than the conferring of  
rewards. See Franck op cit (note 93 above) at 730. 
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distinctive overtones of power and subjugation. The State possesses power over 
its subject, and through the threat of the use of that power, achieves obedience. 
This power exists independently of any attempt to curtail it. Dicey’s formulation 
of the doctrine of the rule of law recognises this innate power of the State and, as 
an extraneous influence, seeks to moderate it. 
 
 The ICC, on the other hand, has no such innate power over the States Parties. Its 
power over the States Parties is sourced from the same principle that seeks to 
check it, that is, complementarity. Furthermore, the exercise of such power 
would have to conform to the guidelines set out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
as well as the strictures in Article 18 of the same Statute.106
 
 While it is true that 
Dicey’s doctrine similarly aspires to impose such strictures, the point is that this 
attempt is made in spite of State power, not because of it.  
The foregoing discussion illustrates the contradiction inherent in trying to 
premise complementarity on the idea of the international rule of law. It has to be 
recalled that international law’s enforcement mechanisms are not nearly 
comparable to those of national jurisdictions.107 As was suggested above,108 
international criminal law, in particular, has suffered a long period of 
emasculation as a result of this fact. What complementarity seeks to do is really 
to dress the ICC with power109
                                                 
106 Contrast this view with that expressed at page 30 above, namely that 
complementatity is not general ly cast in terms of l imitat ions to the ICC’s 
powers.  
 rather than the converse. Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute, it is suggested, is a pragmatic attempt to allay any fears that this power 
will be used arbitrarily. It remains to be seen how the Court would apply this 
 
107 Crawford op cit (note 23 above) at 113. 
 
108 See Chapter 1, pages 2 to 4 above.  
 
109 However, as will be argued below, this power is only putative.  
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provision in specific cases.  The Darfur case discussed above110
 
 is still in its 
preliminary stages and will be interesting to watch. 
It has been argued that the international rule of law and State sovereignty are 
incompatible.111 In fact, the argument goes, resort to the UN security apparatus is 
necessary to ensure an optimal balance between the two, for past experience has 
shown that there is no will to censure States which fail to cooperate with 
international criminal tribunals. As has been shown, in the case of the ICC, the 
idea of creating the Court through a Resolution of the Security Council was 
rejected.112
 
 It seems that States would rather deal with the subtle powers granted 
to the Court by the Statute, than contend with the more pervasive powers of the 
Security Council. 
 The ICC’s powers are only putative and need not be exercised at all so long as 
there is faithful prosecution of international criminals. In this regard, the Rome 
Statute has been criticised as being excessively deferential to concerns about State 
sovereignty.113
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
110 See page 52 above. 
 
111 Broomhall op cit at 71;  
 
112 In the run-up to the signing of the Rome Statute, it  had been 
suggested that, given past experiences of non-cooperation, the Court 
should be set up through the Security Council.  See J Dugard “Obstacles 
in the Way of an International Criminal Court” (1997) 56 Cambridge Law 
Journal  329 at 336. 
 
113 A Cassese “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflect ions” (1999) 10 EJIL 144 at 170-171. 
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2.3.5
Understanding why States comply with international agreements has become a 
major topic for scholarly investigation.
 The Managerial Theory of Compliance 
114 Jurists have mainly drawn from 
international relations theory in propounding theories of compliance with 
international law.115
 
 This especially important of international lawyers as a basis 
for understanding how best to address the concerns of States in international 
agreements in order to ensure optimal compliance. In the context of this thesis, it 
is important to consider whether what theoretical assumptions underpin the 
concept of complementarity. 
One of the major theories under continual scrutiny is the managerial theory of 
compliance. The basic thrust of this theory is that the compliance activities of any 
given number of participants in an endeavour can be managed according to well-
defined rules.116
 
 This theory is really the antithesis of the impositional model of 
compliance, which insists on the various participants towing the line in 
accordance with a certain regime. The managerial model acknowledges and 
indeed anticipates certain subtle differences in the way the participants comply, 
thus focusing rather on gradually reconciling the various modes of compliance 
with a view to achieving the ultimate goal of the regime. The hallmark of this 
theory is, therefore, freedom to manoeuvre and to explore solutions to problems. 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Harold Hong Ju Ko “Why do Nations Obey International Law?” 
(1997) 106 YLJ 2599; Andrew T. Guzman “A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law” (2002) 90 California Law Review 1823. 
 
115 See Robert O. Keohane “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics” 
(1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 487. 
 
116 See generally W W B White “A Community of Courts: Toward a System 
of International Criminal Law Enforcement” (2003) 24 Michigan Journal  
of  International  Law 1 at 83. 
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The key value of the managerial model of compliance is its “socialization”117 
component. States are given the leeway to tailor their compliance machinery in 
accordance with their own aspirations, while at the same time meeting their basic 
international obligations. The idea is that the internally evolved models meet 
with acceptance and approval within the State. For instance, because of the 
unique history and problems that Rwanda has experienced, a system of 
community courts known as gacaca has evolved to complement the work of the 
normal courts in trying genocide suspects. The gacaca system is rooted in a 
traditional dispute settlement mechanism typical of Rwandan society.118
 
 
The principle of complementarity, as has been pointed out, was the subject of 
intense debate and discussion at the Rome Conference. It is, in itself, a novel 
concept that, as has been seen, bears similarities with the concept of subsidiarity. 
However, complementariy is very much the cradle of “hard” as opposed to 
“soft” obligations, for it tends to subject States’ compliance to a system of 
sanctions in the form of loss of jurisdiction. 
 
 Complementarity is the product of agreement rather than socialization.119
                                                 
117 See White  op c it at 84. 
 
Complementarity does not, directly or indirectly, address the issue of the 
capacity of States to comply with the Rome Statute. Rather, it assumes that non-
compliance is a product of the “rational calculation” of States intending to evade 
international obligations. 
 
118 Op cit at 55. 
 
119 See K Linos “How can International Law shape National Welfare 
States?: Evidence from Compliance with European Union Directives” 
Paper presented at the 2004 Plenary Conference of the European Pol it ical 
Science Network- Prague, 18-19 June 2004 (…the managerial  
thesis…attributes compliance failures not to rat ional calculation, but 
instead to treaty ambiguity, capacity l imitations of  States, and 
uncontrollable social  and economic changes”)  
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2.4 
The objective of this chapter was not to pigeonhole the principle of 
complementarity into a neatly defined theory. The point was rather to view 
complementarity through as many lenses as possible from the standpoint of 
international law theory. It is submitted that it would not have been sufficient to 
simply view complementarity as a novel principle in international law without 
embarking on some sort of theoretical enquiry about its import. 
Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the emergence of the principle of 
complementarity as a means to establish and regulate the relationship between 
the ICC and national jurisdictions was influenced by a number of factors. These 
relate both to the international institutional arrangements that existed at the time, 
as well as the recognition of the shortcomings that had hitherto afflicted the 
development of international criminal law in particular. Within the context of an 
emerging system of world governance in which concerns over State sovereignty 
are assuming less significance,120 it was possible to come up with a model that at 
least sought to address those concerns. Here, the European Union system, in 
particular, was heavily relied upon.121
 
 
 The values of transparency and effectiveness, which characterise the European 
system, can be traced in the complementarity regime. This seems to be in keeping 
with the general observation that there is a great affinity between the principles 
                                                 
120 See L R Helfer “Constitut ional Analogies in the International Legal 
System” avai lable at :  
http://www.l ls.edu/academics/faculty/pubs/HelferTransnationalConstit
utionDraft.PDF (accessed 22/5/04).  
 
121 See pages 35-38 above.  
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of international law and European culture.122 However, for this very reason, the 
complementarity regime may begin to face serious challenges. What the 
complementarity regime seeks to do is to transplant the European volksgeist to 
other legal systems. This may prove unrealistic in the long run, as States continue 
to insist on their sovereignty.123 Ironically, the fear has also been expressed that 
complementarity may not be a strong enough tool, owing to its being overly 
deferential to State sovereignty.124
 
 
This thesis has alluded to the position, in relation to the fight against 
international crime, as it existed prior to the advent of the ICC. Ineffectual as it 
may have been, it represented the realities of international law, illustrating that 
State sovereignty continues to be an obstacle to the true realization of 
international governance. This was (and, it will be suggested later in this thesis, 
still is) the internal logic of the international criminal justice system.125
 
 
Complementarity seeks, in a pragmatic way, to subvert this logic.   
It is submitted that the complementarity regime does have manifestations of an 
imperious system that exerts demands on its adherents and does not in turn 
confer any benefits upon them. There is no reward system for the States that 
shore up to the expectations of the Rome Statute. From the point of view of the 
State, the faithful prosecution of the core crimes is an end in itself. This 
                                                 
122 Editorial  “Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the 
Essentializat ion of Culture” (1992) 106 (2) Harvard Law Review 730 at 
733. 
  
123 See Savigny loc c i t (chapter one, note 7 above); O Kahn “On Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 MLR 1 at 7; J C Barker  
International Law and International Relations (2000) 48. 
 
124 Cassese loc c i t (note 113 above).  
 
125 See E Orucu “An Exercise in the Internal Logic of Legal Systems” 
(1987) 7 (3) Legal Studies  310 at 311-312. 
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submission contradicts the view that every nation derives some benefits from 
international law and international agreements.126
 
 It may be true that the 
international community, as a collective, benefits from such agreements. 
However, a State may have its own parochial interests that are at odds with those 
of the international community. Yet it may adhere to an agreement even though 
its own interests are not thereby served! 
Complementarity possesses little by way of natural law inclinations. To the 
extent that the proscriptions contained in the Rome Statute are based on the 
common morality of mankind, the Statute has a natural law background. 
However, in its operation with regard to States, it appears to be steeped in a 
positivist thinking which requires States to observe a certain code rather than 
encourage them to achieve the goals of the Rome Statute through their own 
means.127 This may be a result of the common purposes of participants at the 
Rome Conference, or due to social necessity.128 Given the opprobrium with 
which the atrocities preceding the Rome Statute were regarded, it is hardly 
convincing to state that complementarity does not require States Parties to enact 
the substantive law of the Statute.129
 
   
                                                 
126 Henkin op cit at 29. See also L Bri lmayer Justifying International Acts  
(1989) 63. 
 
127 The ideological dif ferences between the two theories create the 
differences between the theories regarding the nature and extent of 
perceived obligat ions. See B Reynolds “Natural Law Versus Positivism: 
The Fundamental Conflict” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal  of  Legal Studies 
441. 
 
128 See O Schachter “Towards a Theory of International Obligation” (1968) 
8 Virginia Journal of  International Law 300 at 304. 
 
129 See Werle and Jessberger op cit (Chapter one, note 17 above) at 194. 
 
 63 
If one has regard to the purpose of the Statute, it is clear that such enactment is 
required.130
 
 This is in contradistinction to the European system, which appeals 
more to natural law and reason, and largely lets member States choose the means 
of implementing the Union’s policies.  
Lastly, there is an important distinction that has emerged from the foregoing 
discussion. This distinction relates to the relationship between the Court and the 
individual on the one hand, and the Court and States Parties on the other. As 
regards the former, the Court has jurisdiction over individuals, just as States do. 
However, as regards the latter, it is clear that the Court will have a supervisory 
role over States. There will thus be a hierarchy. It is therefore suggested that the 
relationship between the Court and States Parties may be described as 
complementary only in the sense that both will try similar offences. In reality, 
however, the relationship between the two is hierarchical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 Op cit at 195. 
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Chapter Three 
 
SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION  IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 
“In an optimal solution, sharing of the implementing functions between 
international and national judiciaries would generate a functional synergy 
comparable to that found in a mature federal system, with national and 
provincial courts providing mutual reinforcement of essential norms”.1
 
  
3.1 
The enactment in South Africa of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC Act
Introduction 
2 (hereafter SAIA) is undoubtedly a salutary step towards compliance 
with the tenets of the Rome Statute. It places South Africa on a sound footing 
with regard to her contribution in the fight against international crime. The Act is 
a clear indication of the political will3
 
 to make a dent on the burgeoning menace 
that is international crime, and to ensure that International criminals do not 
evade justice. It also gives the assurance that South Africa is not a safe haven for 
fugitives. 
                                                 
1 I  Tal lgren “Complet ing the ‘International Criminal Order ’:  The Rhetoric 
of International Repression and the Notion of Complementarity in the 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court” (1998) 67 (2) Nordic 
Journal of  International Law 107 at 109. 
  
2 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court Act No.27 of 2002. 
 
3 As regards the importance of polit ics for the enforcement of  
international criminal law, see S J Toope “Emerging Patterns of  
Governance and International Law” in M Byers (ed) The Role of  Law in 
International Pol i t ics  (2000) 104.  
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It is important to consider SAIA in terms of the wider context of the South 
African criminal justice system and the manner in which it deals with 
international crime.4 Within that context, legislative enactments and judicial 
attitudes preceding and after SAIA are significant. International humanitarian 
norms and human rights norms, case law, and principles of criminal procedure 
and evidence arise for consideration as aspects of a particular criminal justice 
system, and provide a background for evaluating the strides made in enacting 
new norms. This chapter therefore provides an overview of South Africa’s 
“baseline of conduct”5 in combating international crime. This is important in the 
wider context of the thesis, as it will help to establish to what extent the 
procedures put in place after the enactment of SAIA are different from those that 
preceded SAIA. In this way, the claim that complementarity is a catalyst for 
implementation will be scrutinised.6
 
 This chapter will consider SAIA against the 
foregoing background.  The ultimate aim of the chapter is to gauge SAIA in 
terms of its likely impact on the prosecution of international crimes. 
The legal institutions characterizing post-Apartheid South Africa are more apt to 
the present study, it being the case that the ICC Statute only operates with 
prospective effect.7 Indeed, SAIA itself would, according to the conventional 
canons of statutory interpretation, operate prospectively.8
                                                 
4 See G Triggs op cit (chapter one, note 76) for a similar discussion of the 
Australian legislat ion. 
 However, in order to 
 
5 See L Heifer “Constitut ional Analogies in the International Legal 
System” (2004) 37 Loyola of  Los Angeles Law Review 1 at 21. 
 
6 See G Werle and F Jessberger “International Criminal Justice is Coming 
Home: The New German Code of Crimes against International Law” (2002) 
13 (2) Criminal  Law Forum 191 at 214. 
 
7 See Rome Statute Article 11 (1) (“The Court has jurisdiction only with 
respect to cr imes committed after the entry into force of this Statute”).  
 
8Since SAIA itself  is a “penal” legislat ion, it fal ls to be interpreted 
prospectively by South African courts.  See general ly on the subject of  
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achieve the stated objectives of this chapter, it will be important to delve into the 
Apartheid era norms in order to attain a comprehensive view of the importance 
of SAIA in the South African legal landscape.  The South African constitution 
and sundry legislative enactments9
 
 will form the basis for discussion, together 
with illustrative case law. The central and all-important enquiry is whether SAIA 
represents a seismic shift from such pre-established norms. In answering this 
question, the thesis uno flatu will assess SAIA’s compliance with the ICC Statute. 
It is hoped that, as the discussion in this chapter progresses regarding the 
legislative choices and judicial attitudes in South Africa, an elementary picture 
will emerge as to the theoretical underpinnings of complementarity discussed 
above. This picture will further be refined in chapter four. 
 
3.2 
The South African legal system has not had an easy co-existence with 
international law in general.
South Africa and International Crime 
10 This was especially the case during the Apartheid 
era, when South Africa’s attitude towards international law was, at best, 
regarded as “ambivalent”.11
                                                                                                                                                 
retrospectivity, S G G Edgar Craie on Statute Law 7 ed (1971); F Dunkel 
and D Smit “Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Re-examined: 
A Comment on Two Decisions of the German Federal Constitut ional 
Court” (2004) 5 (6) German Law Journal  619 at 625; R Clarke 
“Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and 
East Timor Trials” (2003) 5 Asian Law 1 at 3; Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights (1948) Art icle 11(2).  
 Understandably, the international odium that the 
Apartheid system triggered meant that the Apartheid government no longer felt 
 
9 Only the major enactments, in the sense of their importance to the 
procedural enforcement of  international criminal law, wil l be considered 
in this work. 
 
10 See J Dugard “International Law and the South African Constitut ion” 
(1997) 8(1) EJIL 77. 
 
11 Ib id.  
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obligated to regard itself as being bound by the tenets of good neighbourliness 
and the comity of nations. In fact, matters came to a head when, in 1973, 
Apartheid was declared a crime against humanity by the international 
community.12
 
 
It is important to lay a foundation for this state of affairs. South Africa’s legal 
system was one that recognised the supremacy of the Legislature.13 This meant 
that the legislature could pass any law untrammelled by any constitutional or 
other considerations regarding respect for international law.14 This had obvious 
repercussions for the enforcement of international criminal law as well, for this 
does depend upon a State’s acceptance of international law generally. Although 
South Africa was a party to the Hague Regulations of 190715 and the four Geneva 
Conventions of 194916
                                                 
12 See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  
the Crime of Apartheid,  adopted and opened for signature,  ratif ication by 
General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVII I ) of 30th November 1973. 
, for instance, South Africa refused to sign the 1977 
Additional Protocols Relating to the Protection of Victims of International and 
 
13 See G Marshall Parl iamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth  
(1957) 139-248. 
 
14 See the Appel late Division’s decision in Ndlwana v. Hofmeyr 1937 AD 
229, which confirmed the supremacy of Parliament. It was held that once 
Parliament had passed a law, courts of law could not question but could 
not apply it.  But see the subsequent decision in Minister of  Interior v. 
Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (AD). In this case Parl iament had set up a “High 
Court of Parliament” which was challenged on the basis that Parliament 
had no powers to set up such a body. The Appellate Division held that 
the High Court of Parliament could not constitute a “court”. Centlivres 
CJ held: “In the case before us Parl iament has described itself  as a court 
of law, but such a descript ion does not alter the fact that the high court 
of Parliament is Parliament…and not a court of law. In my view 
Parliament cannot, by passing an Act giving itself  the name of a court of  
law, come to any decision which will have the effect of destroying the 
entrenched provisions of…the constitution”.  
 
15 See Convention (IV) Respect ing the Laws and Customs of War and its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
 
16 The Geneva Conventions were ratif ied by South Africa in 1952. 
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Non-international Armed Conflicts.17 The apparent reason for this was that the 
latter applied to conflicts in which particular groups were fighting against racist 
regimes.18
 
 
Given the foregoing, it is apt to state that the principles of International 
Humanitarian Law received scant regard in Apartheid South Africa. As a 
corollary, the outlawing of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
within the South African legal system was, to use Professor Dugard’s 
terminology, “ambivalent”.19
 
 However, with the advent of Constitutional 
democracy, the importance of international law and international criminal law 
within the legal system has been accentuated. 
3.3 
It is important to consider the legislative provisions that are in place for the 
purpose of enhancing South Africa’s cooperation in international criminal 
matters in general. This is for two reasons. First, these provisions are expected 
to complement the application of SAIA. One should therefore ascertain 
whether there would be any conflict in the application of these pieces of 
legislation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is helpful to gauge the 
extent to which SAIA has modified or altered the “baseline of conduct”
The Legislative Framework of South Africa’s Fight against 
International Crime 
20
                                                 
17 South Africa only became a party to the Addit ional Protocols in 
September 1999. 
 
established by the pre-existing legislation. This is important in the context of 
 
18 Article 1(4).  
 
19 Dugard loc c i t (note 10 above).  
 
20 See Heifer loc cit.  
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ascertaining whether SAIA is “revolutionary”21
 
, in which case it may be 
asserted that complementarity is a catalyst for implementation. What follows 
is a discussion of various pieces of legislation with this goal in mind. 
3.3.1 The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act22
This Act seeks to regulate the involvement of South African citizens, whether 
individuals or juristic persons, in armed conflicts abroad. The Act takes its cue 
from the constitution of 1996, which expresses the ideal of realizing peace and 
harmony, both nationally and internationally.
 
23
 
 
The Act defines foreign military assistance as including “military services or 
military-related services” or any attempt to render such services which may be in 
the form of medical or paramedical services, personnel recruitment, procurement 
of equipment, finance or training, or any action aimed at overthrowing a 
government, or furthering the military interests of a party to a conflict. 24 
However, the Act excludes from its ambit assistance of a humanitarian nature 
granted to civilians in an area of armed conflict.25
 
 
Apart from outlawing mercenary activities abroad, the Act provides a 
framework for regulating the provision of foreign military assistance. In essence, 
a person wishing to render such assistance to any State, organ of State, group of 
persons or individual, ought to first obtain permission from the National 
                                                 
21 See Triggs loc c i t (chapter one, note 76). 
 
22 Act 15 of 1998. 
 
23 Op cit,  preamble. See also The Constitution of  the Republic of  South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 198(b).  
 
24 Op cit,  sect ion 1( ii i ) .  
 
25 Op cit,  sect ion 1 ( i i i )  (d).  
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Conventional Arms Control Committee.26 The Committee would then consider 
any such application and make an appropriate recommendation to the Minister 
in charge of Defence.27
 
  
The matters to which regard must be had in granting or refusing any such 
permission are expressly stipulated by the Act.28
 
 In a nutshell, they may be 
captured under the rubric of international law and international comity. Thus, 
authorisation or permission may not be granted if it would result in the violation 
of one or other of South Africa’s international obligations, if it would be contrary 
to her national or international interests, if it would support terrorism or 
encourage regional conflicts. 
Seemingly, the Act does not regulate the deployment of South African regular 
forces. This is a matter regulated by the Constitution and international law. The 
Constitution mandates the President to deploy the Defence Force, inter alia, in 
fulfilment of an international obligation.29 However, this power is subject to 
parliamentary oversight.30 Under rather controversial circumstances, on the 11th 
of September 1998 the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
participated in a SADC31-sanctioned intervention in Lesotho to quell civil unrest. 
At the time, it was difficult to legally justify this action since SADC is not a 
defence organization.32 Subsequently, however, a SADC Mutual Defence Pact33
                                                 
26 Op cit,  sect ion 4(1).  
 
 
27 Op cit,  sect ion 4(2).  
 
28 Op cit,  section 7(1).  
 
29 See the Constitution (op cit )  section 201 (2) (c).  
  
30 Op cit section 201 (3).  
 
31 Southern African Development Community.  
 
32 In this respect, it  is dif ferent from, for instance, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organizat ion (NATO).  
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has been signed between the member States, which appears to make it easier for 
South African troops to be deployed in foreign States. 
 
Therefore, it is fair to state that the provision of military assistance is not 
outlawed, but is tightly regulated. Crucially, the member of the Executive 
responsible for defence is required, in considering a request for permission under 
the Act, to assess the impact that any such assistance would have on South 
Africa’s foreign policy. This would necessitate an input by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it is submitted.  
 
3.3.2 The Military Disciplinary Code34
The Code regulates military discipline. In terms of Chapter One of the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act,
 
35 which repeals section 2 of the Code, 
the latter applies, inter alia, to all persons attached to the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) in terms of the law,36 members of the auxiliary force,37 
students attending any military training institution,38 members of the permanent 
force39 and reserve force,40 and Prisoners of War (POWs) recognised as such in 
terms of international law.41
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
33 Signed at Arusha on 26 August, 2003. 
 
34 First Schedule to the Defence Act 44 of 1957, as repealed by the 
Defence Act 42 of 2002. The latter repeals the former save for, inter al ia, 
section 104, which provides for the Schedule. Therefore, in terms of Act 
42 of 2002, the Mil i tary Disciplinary Code sti l l  stands. See Schedule to 
Act 42 of 2002. 
 
35 Act 16 of 1999. 
 
36 Op cit section 3 (2) (e).  
 
37 Op cit section 3 (2) (d).  
 
38 Op cit section 3 (2) ( f ) .  
 
39 Op cit section 3 (2) (a).  
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The Code principally creates offences relating to military discipline, while Act 16 
of 2002 creates specialised military courts to deal with these offences.42 Thus, 
those deserting to join enemy forces,43 communicating intelligence to the 
enemy,44 fomenting mutinies,45 serving with the enemy while being held as 
Prisoners of War (POWs),46 or helping the enemy to procure ammunition or 
other equipment,47
 
 do commit an offence and are liable, upon conviction, to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty years. 
Commanders of troops, vessels and aircraft who fail to pursue the enemy 
commit an offence for which they shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 
ten years.48 It is also an offence for those under lawful command to disobey 
lawful orders.49
 
 Depending on the specific circumstances, the periods of 
imprisonment range from six months to two years. 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Op cit section 3 (2) (b)  
 
41 Op cit sect ion 3 (2) (h).  
 
42 See Chapter 2 of Act 16 of 1999. 
 
43 Military Discipl inary Code op cit section 4 (d).  
 
44 Op cit section 4 (b)  
 
45 Op cit sect ion 4 (h).  
 
46 Op cit sect ion 4 (e).  
  
47 Op cit section 4 (f )  
 
48 Op cit section 5 (c) .  Particularly, section 27 of the Defence Act 42 of  
2002 authorizes any warship or aircraft  of the Defence Force to engage 
in “hot pursuit” of any ship at sea in accordance with the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
 
49 Op cit section 19. 
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Significantly, the Code does not oust any jurisdiction that a civil court would 
otherwise have over a person.50 Therefore, members of the disciplined forces 
may find themselves before civil courts for acts amounting to offences under any 
other law. Particularly, a person subject to the Code who is suspected of having 
committed murder, treason, rape or culpable homicide shall be tried in a civilian 
court51 in accordance with section 27 of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act.52  However, the Code recognises the defences of autrefois convict and autrefois 
acquit to any charges brought against a person before a military court.53
 
 
The significance of section 27 of the National Prosecutions Authority Act in this 
context is that, once information has been laid before an Investigating Director, 
then there shall be an inquiry into those allegations, which shall take place in 
camera.54
 
 This provision, together with the aforementioned section of Act 16 of 
1999, seems geared towards the protection of military information whose 
disclosure would endanger national security. The rationale for having an 
Investigating Directorate is that such information is kept out of the public 
domain, while at the same time justice is done through the effective investigation 
and prosecution of these crimes.  
                                                 
50 Military Code op cit section 54. 
 
51 See section 3(3) of the Mil itary Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 
16 of 1999. 
 
52 Section 27 of the Act provides for the laying of  information regarding 
certain specif ied offences before an Investigat ing Director.  
 
53 Op cit section 55. 
 
54 See section 28(3) of  the National Prosecuting Authority Act op cit.  
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The Code stipulates that offences will generally prescribe after a period of three 
years, save for treason, murder, rape, culpable homicide and sundry other 
specified offences.55
 
 
3.3.3 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act56
The Act provides a framework for the investigation and exposure of the nature, 
causes and extent of the human rights abuses that took place during South 
Africa’s past.
 
57 It also provides for a mechanism for granting amnesty to those 
who, having participated in the atrocities, fully disclose the circumstances of 
their participation.58
 
 This is an integral part of the healing process embarked 
upon by South Africa after the end of Apartheid and the inauguration of 
constitutional democracy. 
An Amnesty Committee established in terms of the Act considers applications 
for amnesty, with or without a hearing as the case may require.59 The Committee 
may then grant amnesty, whose effect is to foreclose any criminal or civil 
proceedings arising from the applicant’s activities during the period under 
review.60
 
 
The processes sanctioned by this Act have been the subject of intense debate. The 
concern raised in some quarters is that the Act’s provisions fly in the face of 
every State’s international obligation to investigate allegations of past human 
                                                 
55 See Mil itary Code op cit sect ion 58. 
 
56 Act 34 of 1995. 
 
57 Op cit preamble.  
 
58 Ib id.  
 
59 Op cit sections 16 and 17. 
 
60 Op cit section 20(7).  
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rights violations and institute prosecutions if the evidence warrants such 
action.61 It has also been conceded, however, that international law does not 
require States to take action that poses a serious threat to vital national 
interests.62
 
 
In what sense does the reconciliation process accord with South Africa’s vital 
national interests? The South African Constitutional Court, in the seminal case of 
Azania Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa63, 
was faced with a constitutional challenge to section 20(7) of the Act which 
empowers the Amnesty Committee to grant amnesty, thus eliminating any 
possibility of a civil action by aggrieved families against an alleged perpetrator. 
The Court pointedly steered clear of any analysis of the problem in terms of 
South Africa’s international obligations. Instead, the Court viewed the interim 
constitution’s64 ideal of achieving “National Unity and Reconciliation” as 
sanctioning the limitation on the right of access to courts. In the opinion of the 
late Mahomed DP65
                                                                                                                                                 
 
, the enquiry was simply whether the constitution sanctioned 
61 See D Orentl icher “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal  2537. 
 
62 Op cit 2595. 
 
63 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), per Mahomed DP. 
 
64 Act 200 of 1993. 
 
65 AZAPO supra at 25: “The issue which falls to be determined is whether 
section 20(7) of the Act is inconsistent with the constitution. I f  it  is, the 
enquiry as to whether or not international law prescribes a di fferent duty 
is irrelevant to that determination.” (Per Mahomed DP). Professor John 
Dugard has crit icized the judgment, describing it as disappointing from 
the perspect ive of international law, although “probably correct as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation”. See Dugard Op cit (note 8 above) 
at 89. See also Z Motala “The Constitut ional Court ’s Approach to 
International Law and its Method of Interpret ing the “Amnesty Decision”: 
Intellectual Honesty or Pol it ical Expediency?” (1996) 21 SAYIL 29.  
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such a law, the applicability of international law not being relevant, at least not 
directly. 
 
Perhaps the Court’s task in AZAPO was made easier by the fact that, effectively, 
the Court was making a decision over the State practice of the forum. In that 
sense the Constitutional Court was better placed than the House of Lords in the 
Pinochet case,66 because in the latter case Chile’s State practice was in issue. 
However, the House of Lords did not feel constrained to consider only the 
Chilean situation. The Court considered that the practice of granting amnesties 
was well established, citing examples from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.67
 
 
It is submitted that the Court in AZAPO ought to have considered international 
practice regarding the matter.68 That it might have come to the conclusion that 
State practice in this regard was unsettled is immaterial. Considering the 
problem from an international law perspective would have helped to legitimise 
international law within the municipal system. Eschewing this path only served 
to reinforce the perception that international law pursues a different agenda from 
that of municipal law. This phenomenon, which has been termed the “micro-
macro problem”, is discussed elsewhere in this thesis.69
 
 
The result produced by the AZAPO decision is ahistorical, and a non sequitor to 
the efforts of the international community to punish apartheid as a crime against 
                                                 
66 R V. Bow Street Metropol i tan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex Parte Pinochet 
[1998] 4 ALL ER 897 (HL).  
 
67 Supra at 929, per Lord Lloyd. 
 
68 Courts in other jurisdictions have, in similar circumstances, resorted 
to a consideration of the international law rules on crimes against 
humanity. See, for example,  Polyukhovich V. The Commonwealth of  
Austral ia (1991) 172 CLR 501 (Australian High Court );  R V. Finta (1989) 
61 DLR (4th) 85 (Ontario High Court).  
 
69 See page 157 below. 
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humanity.70
 
 Far from leading to a political compromise, the amnesty process 
may in fact result in deep-seated resentment towards the municipal system. This 
is not true reconciliation. The idea of pitting the constitution against international 
law in order to achieve this “compromise” does not augur well for the 
development of international law. 
The point to be made here is that the above reasoning in AZAPO evinces a 
conscious deferral to national interests, as opposed to international law or 
international comity. This thesis will, at a later stage, address the question 
whether South African courts are in future likely to exhibit such deference on 
matters perhaps not equally emblematic of South Africa’s past.    
 
3.3.4 The Extradition Act71
The Act provides for the extradition of persons to foreign States with respect to 
certain offences.
 
72
 
 This would be pursuant to extradition agreements between 
South Africa and such foreign States. Persons alleged to have committed certain 
offences in the territory of a foreign State with whom South Africa has an 
extradition agreement are therefore liable to be extradited. 
However, the Act also allows for the “surrender” of persons to States with whom 
South Africa has no extradition agreement, but only for acts that would also be 
punishable in South Africa as offences.73
                                                 
70 It has been argued that the AZAPO case cal led for the “broad brush of  
history”. See J Dugard “International Law and Foreign Relat ions” (1996) 
Annual  Survey of  South Af rican Law 165. 
 The State President, however, must 
 
71 Act 67 of 1962. 
 
72 Op cit preamble.  
 
73 Op cit section 3(2).  
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consent in writing to such surrender.74 It seems, therefore, that the provision 
goes beyond the formal requirement of an extradition agreement, and caters for 
situations where none exists.75 It is submitted that the State President, in 
deciding whether or not to consent, would effectively be exercising a foreign 
policy decision. In such situations, considerations of international comity, rather 
than law, would be determinative. The only exception to this appears to be cases 
where the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty on the suspect is real. 
In such a case, international comity will be over-ridden by the legal requirement 
that an assurance be sought from the other State that the suspect’s life will be 
spared in the event of a conviction.76
 
 
The above provision of the Extradition Act was challenged for its alleged 
unconstitutionality in Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others.77
 
 In that case, Harksen, a German national residing in South Africa, was 
wanted in Germany to stand trial on charges of fraud. In the absence of an 
extradition treaty between South Africa and Germany, the South African 
President relied on section 3(2) of the Extradition Act to consent to Harksen’s 
extradition. It was argued on Harksen’s behalf that such consent in effect 
amounted to an “international agreement” in terms of the constitution, and that 
since there had been no legislative involvement in the conclusion of this 
agreement as required by the constitution, it was a fortiori unconstitutional. 
                                                 
74 Ib id.  
 
75 See chapter two, note 42. 
 
76 See Mohamed V. President of  the Republic of  South Af rica 2001 (3)  SA 
837 (CC) (discussed at page 99 inf ra ) .  
 
77 2000(1) SA 1185 (CPD). The subsequent Constitutional Court decision 
is reported at 2000(2) SA 825 (CC).  
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The Cape High Court (per Van Zyl J) roundly rejected this argument and held 
that any international agreement must create reciprocal rights and obligations for 
the parties, an element that was clearly lacking in this case as this was a domestic 
act carried out by virtue of a legislative enactment.78
 
 The Court therefore 
endorsed the view that certain informal arrangements are not “international 
agreements” and therefore fall outside the purview of the constitution. 
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Goldstone J approached the matter from 
the point of view of the significance of the Extradition Act. In the learned Judge’s 
view, the Act only regulated extradition “on the domestic plane”, as opposed to 
initiating the extradition process. The Court, likewise, dismissed the application. 
This decision appears to underline the fact that, in international law, extradition 
may take place in the absence of an extradition agreement. This, however, 
depends entirely on the state of the law in the extraditing State, as well as the 
arrangements and negotiations79
 
 in place between the States concerned. 
Requests for extradition, in terms of the Act, are directed to the Minister for 
Justice.80
 
 The request must be made by a diplomatic or consular representative of 
the requesting State, or by a minister of the requesting State. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs does not feature in the process in terms of the Act. 
Another aspect of the extradition process deserving mention is the role of the 
magistracy. In accordance with the Act, magistrates play a crucial role in issuing 
warrants of arrest upon notification by the Minister for Justice that a request has 
                                                 
78 (2001) 1 SA 1185 (CPD), par 52. 
 
79 In the Harksen  case,  these consisted of  the exchange of  diplomatic 
notes between the two governments.  
 
80 Extradit ion Act op cit sect ion 4 (1).  
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been made for the suspect’s surrender.81 They may also issue warrants for the 
further detention of persons arrested without warrants under any law.82
 
 
The Act makes interesting categorizations in terms of States. With respect to 
African States, a magistrate in South Africa may simply endorse warrants of 
arrest issued therein, provided that the relevant extradition agreement says so.83 
This obviates the need for the Minister for Justice to transmit a request to the 
magistrate. All that need be done is for the warrant issued in such State to be 
produced before the magistrate. Such States are termed “associated States”.84 On 
the other hand, “foreign States” consist of any other foreign territory that cannot 
be dealt with under the rubric of “associated States”.85
 
 There seems, therefore, to 
be an explicit policy of according preferential treatment to African States when it 
comes to matters of extradition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Op cit sect ion 5.  
 
82 Op cit sect ion 7.  
 
83 Op cit section 6.  
 
84 In terms of sect ion 1 ( i ) ,  “Associated State” means any State to which 
section 6 of the Act applies. See also J Dugard International Law: a South 
Af rican Perspective  2 ed (2000) 171.A further category of  “designated 
States” has been added by amendment. See the Extradit ion Amendment 
Act 77 of 1996, section 1 (a).   
 
85 Extradit ion Act op cit sect ion 1 ( i i i ) .  
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3.3.5 The International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act86
The Act facilitates the provision of assistance in criminal matters between South 
Africa and other States.
 
87 Its main concern is the provision of evidence and the 
execution of sentences, as well as the handling of the proceeds of crime between 
South Africa and such other States.88
 
 
The Act empowers judicial officers to issue letters of request should it appear in 
the course of proceedings that it is necessary to examine a person who is in a 
foreign State.89 This course would be resorted to if it is in the interests of justice, 
and if the attendance of the person concerned cannot be obtained without undue 
delay, expense or inconvenience.90 Although the judicial officer may, in cases of 
emergency, send the letter of request directly to the court or tribunal of a foreign 
State,91 in all other cases the request ought to be sent to the Director-General of 
the Ministry of Justice for onward transmission.92
 
 
On the other hand, a similar request emanating from a foreign State must first be 
channelled to the Director-General.93
                                                 
86 Act 75 of 1996. 
 Upon being satisfied that there are 
proceedings pending in the foreign State and that an offence may have been 
committed, the Director-General would then forward the request to the Minister 
 
87 Op cit preamble.  
 
88 Ib id.  
 
89 Op cit sect ion 2(1).  
 
90 Ib id.  
 
91 Op cit sect ion 2 (4) (a)  
 
92 Op cit section 2 (3) (a) and (b).  
 
93 Op cit sect ion 7 (1).  
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of Justice for approval.94 Upon such approval, the Director-General then 
forwards the request to the magistrate in whose area of jurisdiction the suspect is 
believed to be.95
 
 
As regards the admissibility of evidence obtained by letter of request, such is 
deemed to be under oath if the witness was warned, in terms of the requested 
State’s law, to tell the truth.96
 
 This obviates the need for a formal oath being 
administered at the proceedings. However, it appears that the evidence would 
still have to meet the general test of relevance in order to be admissible. Hearsay 
evidence, for instance, would not be admitted. 
In the scheme of the Act, therefore, a request from a foreign State is treated 
relatively stringently, and requires the personal attention of the political head of 
the Justice Ministry. Understandably, such a request could be far-reaching in 
terms of its implications for the legal system. By contrast, a request by South 
Africa may on occasion be handled less onerously, such that a judicial officer has 
direct contact with the officials of a foreign State.  
 
That the Act affects foreign relations between South Africa and other States is 
beyond doubt.  However, all indications are that the Judiciary will be keen to 
emphasize that matters arising from the application of the Act are justiciable, the 
foreign relations dimension notwithstanding. Thus in Kolbatschenko V. King NO97
                                                 
94 Op cit section 7 (2) read with (4).  
 
the applicant attacked the procedure that had been adopted under the Act on the 
basis that it violated his constitutional rights. For the respondent, it was argued 
 
95 Op cit section 7 (5).  
 
96 Op cit sect ion 5 (1).  
 
97 2001 (4) SA 336 (C).   
 
 83 
in limine that matters pertaining to the Act were not justiciable as the Act related 
to foreign affairs, the exclusive domain of the Executive. The Court dismissed 
this contention, holding that the Act was justiciable inasmuch as the procedure 
followed impinged on applicant’s rights.98
 
  
The case of Thatcher v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
presented yet another opportunity for the Act’s interpretation. Thatcher, a British 
national resident in South Africa, was suspected of having been involved in 
financing an eventually abortive coup in Equatorial Guinea. Relying principally 
on the provisions of the Act, the South African authorities issued a subpoena 
against Thatcher consequent upon receiving a request for assistance from 
Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Thatcher challenged the subpoena, inter alia, on the basis that it infringed his 
constitutional right to silence99 and to protection against self-incrimination.100
                                                 
98 Supra at 357. What dist inguishes this case from Kaunda supra(see 
page 99 inf ra)  is the fact that, in the latter case, the applicants’  main 
prayer was effectively for a mandamus  compelling the South Afr ican 
Government to prevail upon the Zimbabwean government to deal with the 
applicants in a certain way (extradition to South Africa).  The Court 
would not countenance such a strategy. In Kolbatschenko (supra) ,  the 
applicant ’s presence within the Republic brought him under the 
constitution’s protection, making foreign relations a secondary concern. 
 He 
averred that the process amounted to an attempt by the South African authorities 
to embark on a fishing expedition in order to have an insight into his possible 
defence. This, he argued, would enable the authorities to prefer charges against 
him with prior knowledge of his defence. He further contended that his answers 
in obedience to the subpoena could be used to initiate his extradition to Equatorial 
Guinea. He therefore prayed that the process be set aside. 
 
99 Constitut ion, Act 108 of 1996, section 35 (1) (a) and (c).  
 
100 Op cit,  section 35 (3) (h) and (j ) .  
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The Cape High Court, in dismissing the application, observed that there was 
nothing offensive about a legislative provision that compelled an individual to 
answer questions, provided that the answers to such questions must be excluded 
to the extent that they were incriminating. Since no criminal proceedings were as 
yet pending against Thatcher, it could not avail him to complain at that stage.101 
The Court regarded the matter before it as involving matters of foreign policy, of 
which the Executive was the best judge.102
 
 
The Thatcher103 decision, handed down on the 24th November 2004, is the 
culmination of a succession of judicial pronouncements that seem to indicate that 
South African courts are reticent to interfere in matters involving foreign policy. 
More significantly, the Court in Thatcher appears to have eschewed the “legacy of 
Makwanyane and Mohamed”,104
 
 two decisions in which the Constitutional Court 
regarded the death penalty as a violation of the right to life. In concluding this 
chapter, this thesis will address the importance of the Thatcher decision for the 
enforcement of SAIA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 See paragraph 94 of  the judgment.  
 
102 See paragraph 102 of the judgment.  
 
103 Supra 
 
104 Supra paragraph 98. 
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3.3.6 The Constitution105
In terms of the South African constitution, international law is recognised by the 
South African legal system. All legislation ought, as far as possible, to be 
interpreted in consonance with the tenets of international law.
 
106 The constitution 
also makes customary international law applicable in South Africa unless it is 
inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of Parliament.107
 
 
The latter position is a reflection of the South African common law, which is of a 
monist orientation with regard to customary international law.108 This seems to 
have been the position in South Africa for decades now, as exemplified by the 
case R v. Giuseppe and Others 109
 
 where the 1929 Geneva Convention on the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, was applied by the Court as part of South African 
law, even though the Convention had not been implemented by South Africa. 
There is an interesting point of divergence between the 1996 constitution and its 
predecessor, the 1993 interim constitution. While the latter expressly provided in 
Section 231(4) that “the rules of customary international law [are] binding on the 
Republic”, the former omitted the word “binding” from its language. This has 
engendered some debate concerning the significance of such an omission. The 
argument has been made that this means that all rules of customary international 
                                                 
105 The Constitut ion of the Republic of South Afr ica Act 108 of 1996. 
 
106 Op cit sect ion 233. 
 
107 Op cit sect ion232. 
 
108 See South Atlantic Island Development Corporation v. Buchan  1971 (1)  
SA 234 at 238. 
 
109 1934 TPD 139. 
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law, irrespective of whether South Africa objects to any, are part of South African 
law.110
 
 The entirety of customary international law is per se binding. 
 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that it is not proper to regard South 
Africa as being bound by a rule to which she has persistently objected.111 On the 
strength of the latter argument, it is possible to argue that, as respects the alleged 
duty on governments to prosecute the atrocities of past regimes, South Africa is a 
persistent objector, and is therefore not bound by any such rule.112 South Africa’s 
tacit objection has been through the amnesty procedures, which, as has been 
seen, have been given the Constitutional Court’s imprimatur in the AZAPO113
 
 
case. 
The term “binding”, it is suggested, was indicative of the fact that South African 
courts recognised that a State cannot be bound by a rule of customary 
international law to which it objects. Perhaps the need was felt to make that 
abundantly clear in the interim constitution of 1993, hence the term. However, as 
                                                 
110 See R Keightley “Public International Law and the Final Constitution” 
(1996) 12 SAJHR 405 at 408. 
 
111 See N Botha “International Law and the South African Interim 
Constitut ion” (1994) 1 South Af rican Public Law 245 at 255. 
 
112 See J Gavron “Amnesties in the Light of Developments in International 
Law and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court” (2002) 
51 ICLQ 91 at 106. At 104, the writer argues that the amnesty process is 
in contravention of  customary international law relating to crimes 
against humanity. See also C Braude and D Spitz “Memory and the 
Spectre of International Justice: A Comment on AZAPO” (1997) 13 SAJHR 
269, 273; C C Joyner “Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations:  
The Universal Declarat ion and the Search for Accountability” (1998) 
26(4) Denver Journal  of  International Law and Pol icy 591 at 602. In fact, 
quite to the contrary, it  has been argued that there is an “emerging 
pract ice” of domestic transit ional amnesty. Such a practice, South Africa 
might argue, seems to counter the al leged customary international law 
rule of  prosecution. See A F Perez “The Peri ls of Pinochet: Problems for 
Transitional Justice and a Supranational Governance Solution” (2000) 
28(2) Denver Journal  of  International Law and Pol icy 175 at 185. 
 
113 Supra. 
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it came to be regarded as axiomatic that a State cannot be bound by a rule to 
which it objects, the term was done away with as being tautologous.114
 
 
It is submitted that a rule to which South Africa objects is probably evidence of 
lack of opinio juris on the subject, and therefore is not, properly speaking, a rule 
of customary international law. A judicial officer presiding over a matter in 
South Africa is not likely to apply a rule about which reservations have been 
expressed.115 Indeed, in the past, South African judges have been accused of 
being overly positivistic in their interpretation of the law and simply insisting on 
legislative enactments and judicial decisions as statements of the law.116 
Seemingly, the attitude is that legislators, as the popular representatives, are best 
placed to effect changes to the law.117
                                                 
114 Dugard op cit (note 8 above) at 80. 
 
 
115 See P Kovacs “Developments and Limits in International 
Jurisprudence” (2003) 31(3) Denver Journal  of  International Law and 
Pol icy  461 at 477-478 (Judges ought to be concerned about the social  
acceptability of their  decisions) 
 
116 See H Botha “The Values and Principles Underlying the 1993 
Constitut ion” (1994) 9(2) South Af rican Publ ic Law 233 at 234; J Dugard 
“The Judicial Process, Posit ivism and Civil Liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 
at 186-187, 200. An instance of this predisposition is the case of  
Moulang v. Port El izabeth Municipal i ty 1958(2) SA 518 (AD), where fai lure 
to act to protect the rights of others was viewed against the backdrop of  
statutory permissive powers, exercised in the public interest. At 523, 
Schreiner AJ said:  “I  do not think that the Court should enter upon the 
suggested reinvest igation of the bases of such a well establ ished set of  
rules as that to be found in the four decisions of this Court in quest ion. 
Whatever may be the better view about l iabi lity for omissions in general,  
the part icular branch of law with which we are concerned should not be 
disturbed merely in order to make it confirm with what may or may not 
be the proper inference to be drawn from certain passages in the Digest. 
I f  the pract ical results of the present state of the law are seen on 
balance to be seriously unsatisfactory the remedy lies in legislation”. See 
also D M Davis “Integrity and Ideology: Towards a Crit ical  Theory of the 
Judicial Function” (1995) 112 SALJ 104 (warning of the danger of  
developing a juristocracy, owing to the fact that the judiciary wil l now 
decide such a wide range of issues under the Constitut ional 
dispensation)  
 
117 See, for example, the Constitutional Court ’s decision in Jordan & 2 
Others V. The State  2002 (6) SA 642 (CC).  In this case, although the 
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With regard to treaty law, traditionally South Africa has adopted a dualist 
approach in terms of which a treaty is not part of municipal law until legislation 
is passed to give effect to the treaty. The treaty-making role falls exclusively 
within the competency of the Executive arm of Government. This, however, is 
tempered with the need for parliamentary approval of treaties.118 Thus, Section 
231 of the Constitution provides for a shared role between the National 
Executive and the Legislature with regard to treaty making. While negotiation 
and signature are for the Executive, a treaty binds the Republic only after 
Parliament, through its two Houses, has assented to it.119
 
  
3.3.7 The National Prosecuting Authority Act120
The Act creates a single Prosecuting Authority for the Republic. This contrasts 
with the position during the Apartheid era when provincial Attorney Generals 
were entrusted with the prosecution of crime. Prosecutorial discretion was also 
not subject to judicial control, except through judicial review. The Act therefore 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court found a section of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 
discriminatory, it  nevertheless refrained from issuing a declaration of  
inval idity,  reasoning that Parliament should be given a chance to 
ameliorate the offensive provision.Supra paragraphs 123-128 of the 
judgment (per O’ Regan J and Sachs J).  
 
118 A comparable position is that under English law, as a corol lary of the 
Crown’s exclusive control  of foreign relations, treaty-making power 
resides in the Executive and, according to Lord Denning, the exercise of  
that power cannot be challenged in English courts. See Blackburn v.  
Attorney  General  [1971] 1 WLR 1037 (CA). On the other hand, it was held 
in AG for Canada v. AG f or Ontario  [1937] AC 326 at 347 (PC), that while 
the formation of treaties is for the Executive, implementation is for the 
Legislature. See also L Collins “Foreign Relations and the Judiciary” 
(2002) 51 ICLQ 485 at 493. 
 
119 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of  1996, 
section 231. 
 
120 Act 32 of 1998. 
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repeals the Attorney–General Act of 1992,121 under which the system of 
provincial Attorney Generals still operated. Under the present Act, the Minister 
of Justice exercises ultimate control over the Authority.122
 
 This ensures political 
accountability in the prosecutorial process. 
In addition to laying out the basic structure and composition of the Authority, 
the Act further makes provision for the President’s power to set up 
“Investigating Directorates”123 in respect of specified offences. It is important to 
note, however, that this can only be with the concurrence of the Minister of 
Justice and the National Director of Public Prosecutions.124 This raises the 
delicate issue of the extent of the Executive’s powers in relation to the 
prosecution machinery.125 As a result of ministerial control, it is undoubtedly the 
case that the Executive does feature in the formulation of policy. It is suggested 
that this is due to the fact that prosecutorial policy involves the vital interests of 
the State, the ordre public, as overseen by the Executive.126
                                                 
121 Act 92 of 1992. 
  
 
122 Op cit section 33. 
 
123 Op cit section 7.  
 
124 Ib id 
 
125 With regard to the doctrine of separation of powers, it  has been 
contended in the United States that it is impermissible for the President 
to appoint a “Special Prosecutor” to prosecute certain high-ranking 
off icials in government. The Supreme Court ’s majority judgment in 
Morrison v. Olson  108 S. Ct 2597 (1998) sanctif ied this of f ice, but this 
decision has attracted a lot of adverse commentary. See S A J Dangel “Is 
Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v.  Olson and the 
Framers’ Intent” (1990) 99 YLJ 1069. 
 
126 See B Wible “De-jeopardizing Justice: Domestic Prosecutions for 
International Crimes and the Need for Transnational Convergence” (2002) 
31(2) Denver Journal of  International Law and Pol icy  265 at 293 (“When 
prosecutors are part of the executive framework their actions may be 
adequately constrained by polit ical actors so as not to upset polit ical  
sett lements that would be more productive than a judicial proceeding”).    
 
 90 
Significantly, the National Director is, under the Act, responsible for formulating 
policy and issuing policy directives.127
 
 This is in line with the constitutional 
imperative of ensuring an effective and transparent prosecution service. It is also 
a far cry from the previous position when provincial prosecutorial autonomy 
meant that there was no unitary or uniform policy. 
Interestingly, recent press reports indicate that the Authority has resolved not to 
stop investigating Apartheid-era criminals unless requested to do so by 
Parliament.128 It has also been revealed that no blanket amnesty is being 
considered for such suspects.129
 
 Judging by such public pronouncements, it is 
apparent that the office of the National Director formulates prosecutorial policy 
subject to direction by at least two arms of Government, namely, the Executive 
and the Legislature. However, in terms of the prosecution of actual cases, the 
National Director exercises an independent discretion. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 See National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21. 
 
128 B Humber “More Amnesties for South Africa?” available at  
http://www.brandonhumber.com/pipermail/list.brandonhamber.com/20
04-April/000080.htm (accessed 17/7/2004). On the need for “democratic 
accountability” through parl iamentary oversight,  see J Sarkin and S 
Cowen “The Draft National Prosecuting Authority Bill  1997: A Critique” 
(1997) 10 (1) South Af rican Journal of  Criminal Justice 64 at 71 to 72. 
 
129 See media briefing by Honorable Dr. P Maduna, Minister for Justice 
and Constitut ional Development, 13th  February 2004, avai lable at: 
http://www.pmg.org.za/brief ings/feb2004/04021justice.htm (accessed 
17/7/2004); Speech by the National Director of Public Prosecutions,  
Advocate Bulelani Ngcuka, at the International Society for the Reform of  
Criminal Law Conference,  Canberra, 26-30 August 2001, available at  
http://www.isrcl.org/papers/Ngcuka.pdf (accessed 17/7/2004).  
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3.3.8 
         
The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International  
Criminal Court Act130
Against the foregoing background of laws calculated to deal with international 
crime, it is clear that the ascension of South Africa from the status of Pariah State 
to that of a respected international player has coincided with increased 
legislative activity in the international law sphere. The enactment of SAIA will 
undoubtedly have an impact on the enforcement of international criminal law in 
South Africa. But just how revolutionary is it? This thesis next considers SAIA’s 
provisions insofar as complementarity is concerned. 
 
 
The Act creates a framework for the effective implementation of the Rome 
Statute, and also seeks to ensure that, in the event that a prosecution is not 
undertaken, the ICC is enabled to investigate and prosecute the relevant cases.131 
This is in line with the basic idea of the complementarity principle. However, as 
has been seen, merely explaining treaty obligations in terms of State consent is 
misleading.132 One must identify other motivations for assuming treaty 
obligations.133
 
 
The applicable law is spelt out in the Act.134 This consists of the constitution, 
conventional law, customary international law and comparable foreign law. In 
terms of SAIA, the court must consider, and may apply, any of these.135
                                                 
130 Act 27 0f 2002. 
 It is apt 
 
131 Op cit section 3(e).  
 
132 See pages 45 to 48 above.  
 
133 See Diehl loc c i t (chapter two, note 73 above).  
 
134 Op cit section 2.  
 
135 Ib id.  
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to compare this position with Section 39 of the constitution136
“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter any tribunal or forum 
, which, in the 
context of the protection of the rights spelt out in the Bill of Rights, states: 
a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom 
b) must consider international law; and 
c) may consider foreign law. 
 Therefore, it seems that the spirit behind section 39 of the constitution would 
have to infuse the interpretation of the Act, inasmuch as the court applying the 
Act must have regard to international law as well as comparable foreign law.  
The court must consider South Africa’s international obligations in order to 
resolve any ambiguities. However, this apparent synergy belies the potential for 
tension in the actual interpretation and application of international norms on the 
municipal scene, as exemplified by the AZAPO decision discussed above. In 
interpreting an Act of SAIA’s significance, the essential interests of a State are an 
important consideration to bear in mind. In this scheme, the aspirations of the 
“international community” are alien.137 Inherent in Statehood, it is submitted, is 
resistance to the notion of absorbing foreign influence. The loose amalgam 
commonly known as the “international community”138is not on par with the 
more organic structure of a State, characterised by shared values and goals, and 
thus constituting a germination ground for the volksgeist.139
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
136 Act 108 of 1996. 
 
137 See the AZAPO case (supra )  discussed at page 75 above .  
 
138 See note 139 inf ra.  
 
139 See S J Toope “Emerging Patterns of  Governance and International 
Law” in M Byers (ed) The Role of  Law in International Pol i t ics (2000) 91 at 
103 to 104 (There is no such thing as the “international community”. 
Nations just have to learn to l ive together as strangers).  
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Section 5 of SAIA deals with the institution of prosecutions under the Act in 
South African courts. In accordance with this section, the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions must first consent to any prosecution commenced under the 
Act. Significantly, the provision enjoins the National Director, when deciding 
whether to prosecute, to have regard to the Republic’s obligations under the 
complementarity principle.140 Should the National Director decline to prosecute 
under this section, he is required to provide the Central Authority141 with the full 
reasons for his decision, which must then be forwarded to the ICC’s Registrar.142
 
 
Two matters arise for comment in this regard. First, it seems that not all 
investigations regarding Rome Statute violations need be placed before the 
National Director. He need not conduct the prosecution himself: all that the Act 
requires him to do is to consent to the prosecution. However, this presupposes 
that the investigation has been placed before him. Theoretically, an instance may 
well arise where a matter is not placed before the National Director, perhaps in 
order to shield the suspect. In such cases, the ICC would be precluded from 
considering the matter owing to the absence of the sine qua non to the Court’s 
powers, namely, the National Director’s decision. To remedy this situation, there 
may be need for the Act to enjoin the National Director to investigate all Rome 
Statute-related matters in person. However, a comprehensive prosecution policy 
with regard to such matters would obviate the need for this step. 
 
                                                 
140 Op cit sect ion 5 (3).  
 
141 According to section 1 (def init ion section) paragraph ii i ,  this is the 
Director-General, Ministry of Justice and Constitut ional Development.  
 
142 Op cit section 5(5).  
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Second, the Section gives the National Director a free hand to prosecute in the 
Republic without first having to defer to the ICC.143 This is in recognition of the 
fact that States have the primary duty to prosecute.144
 
 
 However, in the context of the relationship between the ICC and national courts, 
it may be important to express this in terms of a right/duty paradigm: do States 
have the right to prosecute, and the ICC the corresponding duty to defer to such 
prosecutions? It is suggested that the answer is in the affirmative, as the ICC 
cannot admit a case so long as an investigation is being undertaken in good faith. 
Thus there is, on the part of the ICC, a duty of restraint as States seek to exhaust 
their legal processes in prosecuting cases. 
 
The above position may be contrasted with an interesting provision in the 
Swedish Cooperation with the International Criminal Court Act.145
“Prosecution and criminal proceedings in Sweden for an act may not take place…if the 
[ICC] has decided that the issue of liability for the act should be considered by the [ICC] 
although a Swedish preliminary investigation or prosecution is in progress….” 
 Section 16 of 
the Act provides as follows: 
Nothing in the Rome Statute empowers the ICC to make such a determination as 
to the issue of liability, least of all where an investigation is in progress.146
                                                 
143 Except that the prosecution of  an offence against the administrat ion 
of justice may only take place with the consent of the National Director 
and at the request of  the ICC. See the Rome Statute op cit section 37(2).  
 The 
 
144 Under the Austral ian International Criminal Court (Consequential  
Amendments)  Act 2002, no proceedings may be brought without the 
Attorney General ’s written consent. Any decision by the Attorney-General 
“is f inal,  must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or 
called in quest ion, and it is not subject to prohibition,  mandamus ,  
injunction, declaration or certiorari”. Op cit,  Section 268.121 (2).  
 
145 Co-operation with the International Criminal Court Act (2002: 329).  
 
146 See Rome Statute Article 17 (1) (a).  
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only plausible basis for interference by the ICC seems to be lack of bona fides in 
the investigation or prosecution process.147
 
  
Therefore, the above provision may be interpreted as a repudiation of the State’s 
primary duty to prosecute, in the sense that it relinquishes that responsibility to 
the ICC in circumstances not contemplated by the Rome Statute. It could also be 
viewed as an effective waiver of a State’s right to do so. The above provision is 
set out in terms indicating that it is an all embracing, for-all-times waiver. It is, 
however, submitted that it would be highly unusual for a State to waive its 
jurisdiction so fundamentally, much less by legislation. It may well be that a 
State may waive its jurisdiction in a particular case. This question is left open by 
the Rome Statute, and was not addressed at the Rome Conference.148
 
 
The Act also regulates the endorsement in the Republic of warrants of arrest 
issued by the ICC. In terms of Section 8, a request for arrest issuing from the ICC 
must be referred to the Central Authority149 who must forward the same to a 
magistrate. The magistrate is obliged to endorse the warrant for execution. It will 
be recalled that under the Extradition Act, endorsement only occurs in the case of 
warrants issued within certain “associated States”.150
                                                 
147 See Triggs op cit (chapter one, note 76) at 17. 
 Section 8 of SAIA seems to 
be the extension, therefore, of a “Most Favoured Nation” treatment accorded to 
certain States (and institutions) on the basis of their perceived importance to the 
municipal legal order. This treatment portends a favourable regime of 
cooperation with the ICC. 
 
148 J T Holmes “The principle of Complementarity” in R S Lee (ed) The 
International Criminal Court, The Making of  the Rome Statute, Issues, 
Negotiations, Resul ts  (1999) 41 at 77 to 78. 
 
149 See note 141 above.  
 
150 Extradit ion Act op cit sect ion 6.  
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However, in the case of provisional warrants of arrest, a request from the ICC to 
the Central Authority must subsequently be forwarded to the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions who should apply for a warrant of arrest in respect of the 
concerned person.151
 
 It seems that the ICC must specifically request for the 
“provisional arrest” of the concerned person under this section. Indications are 
that this would be in cases of emergency, for instance, where it is believed that 
the suspect may commit more crimes or tamper with witnesses in the Republic. 
In terms of SAIA, the ICC may also request South Africa to transfer a prisoner to 
it for purposes of giving evidence or in order to assist in investigations.152 A 
“prisoner” in this instance would be a person serving a sentence or awaiting 
trial.153
 
 The relevant provision is of a wide import and is not confined to 
prisoners serving sentences or detained under the Act, making it possible to 
transfer a prisoner who is serving sentence for a traffic offence to the ICC if his 
assistance there will be material. 
The Rome Statute makes provision for the transfer of prisoners to the ICC to 
testify or assist in investigations.154 It is significant to underscore the point that, 
in this context, “prisoner” refers to a person already serving sentence within the 
transferring State.155
                                                 
151 Act 27 of 2002 (SAIA) sect ion 9.  
 However, three conditions are attached to any request by 
the ICC to a State for assistance in this regard, to wit, the prisoner must give his 
 
152 Op cit section 20. 
 
153 SAIA op cit section 1 (xii i ) .  
 
154 See Rome Statute op cit,  Article 93(7) (a). 
 
155 For this reason, and for the avoidance of doubt, such a person is 
hereinafter referred to as a “prisoner witness”.  
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or her consent to the transfer,156 the requested State must assent to the transfer,157 
and the prisoner must remain in custody during the period of the transfer.158
 
 The 
first two conditions, it is submitted, raise issues of human rights and foreign 
policy that call for closer scrutiny. 
On the human rights front, it seems that any transfer would have to be on an 
entirely voluntary basis in the sense that the prisoner would have to assent to 
it.159 On a cursory reading of Article 93(7) of the Rome Statute, an individual 
would not be transferred if he did not consent, State consent notwithstanding. It 
seems that the prisoner is here given primacy with regard to this decision. 
Section 20 of SAIA implements this primacy in the Republic, but in rather 
ambivalent terms, as suggested herebelow. The Section makes provision for the 
event that a prisoner consents to the transfer, in which case the Commissioner for 
Correctional Services would issue an appropriate warrant of transfer.160
 
  
However, the Section glaringly omits to make provision for the event that a 
prisoner resists transfer. In the latter event, it is suggested, there would ensue a 
veritable tussle between individual and State, especially if the State is inclined to 
consent to the transfer in a bid to fulfil its obligation to co-operate with the ICC. 
                                                 
156 Op cit Article 93 (7) (a) ( i ) .  
 
157 Op cit Article 93(7) (a) ( i i ) .  
 
158 Op cit Article 93(7) (b).  
 
159 The literature on prisoner transfer indicates that this phenomenon is 
normally encountered between States,  and the transfer is usually 
permanent (serving sentences) rather than temporary (test ifying).  A 
major concern in prisoner-transfer agreements appears to be the 
protect ion of the civil l ibert ies of prisoners. See generally M A Aziz 
“Transfer of Prisoners: International Perspective” in M C Bassiouni 
International Criminal Law: Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms 2 ed 
(1999) 487at 491. 
 
160 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act 27 of 2002, section 20(b).  
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Presumably, the matter would end up in the Constitutional Court for 
adjudication. It is respectfully submitted that such consent would not fall under 
the rubric “administrative action”161, but would rather be an “executive” 
decision by the Commissioner of Correctional Services.162
 
 This means that the 
Court would have to enquire whether the limitation of the prisoner’s rights is 
authorised under section 36 of the constitution. 
The above situation is reminiscent of the difficulty with which a magistrate was 
faced in the United States in the Ntakirutimana case.163
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 In that case, a Rwandan 
national had been provisionally arrested in Texas for his alleged involvement in 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A request for his surrender had been made by the 
ICTR to the United States, pursuant to an agreement that had been concluded 
between the two States. The United States government filed a motion for the 
hearing of the request. Magistrate M. C. Norton denied the request on the 
ground, inter alia, that the agreement between the United States and the Tribunal 
had not been ratified by Senate after being enacted by Congress as required by 
161 In terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, 
section 1 (i )  (a) and ( i i ) ,  decisions of organs of State are not 
automatically “administrative action”. It is to the nature of the act, 
rather than the nature of the off ice, that one must look. The decision 
maker must be exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of legislation. 
 
162 The distinct ion between “administrat ive” and “executive” act ion was 
drawn by the Constitutional Court in South Af rican Rugby Football  union 
V.  President of  the Republic  of  South Af rica 2000 (1) SA 1 CC). See also 
Premier, Province of  Mpumalanga V.  Executive Committee of  the 
Association of  Governing Bodies of  State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal  
1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC).  
 
163 In the Matter of  the Surrender of  El izaphan  Ntakirutimana,  Misc. No. L-
96-5, US District Court for the Southern Distr ict of Texas, Laredo 
Division, 1997 US Dist. LEXIS 20714, 17 December 1997. Of course, this 
case concerned the rendit ion of  an indictee and not a witness. In this 
sense, therefore, it  is not quite apposite to the problem at hand. 
However,  the surrender of a fugit ive and the transfer may evoke similar 
human rights concerns, especially if  the surrender or transfer is 
undertaken against the individual ’s wil l.  
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the Constitution. In making this finding, the Court also held that a fugitive could 
not be surrendered without a valid extradition treaty.164
 
    
Reverting to Section 20 of SAIA, it is submitted that a prisoner’s resistance to 
transfer could be premised upon the fundamental rights of a prisoner contained 
in the constitution’s Bill of Rights. Specifically, the prisoner may harbour the 
reasonable apprehension that his contemplated centre of detention165 lacks  
“conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity…adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading materials and medical treatment”,166 or that 
he or she would not be able to communicate with and be visited by their spouse 
or partner, religious counsellor or doctor.167
 
 This would present the Court with a 
conflict between State interests and individual rights.  
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Mohamed v. President of the Republic of 
South Africa168 may provide some guidance on what is likely to be the Court’s 
attitude on the matter. Mohamed, a Tanzanian national, resided in Cape Town. 
He was arrested by immigration officials acting in concert with American 
intelligence officials on suspicion of his involvement in the 7th
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 of August 1998 
164 For a cr it ical analysis of this decision, see G Sluiter “To Co-operate or 
Not to Co-operate? The Case of the Fai led Transfer of Ntakirutimana to 
the Rwanda Tribunal” (1998) 11 Leiden Journal of  International Law 383.  
 
165 In accordance with Section 20 of SAIA, the prisoner remains in 
detention during the period of transfer.  
 
166 See the Constitut ion of  the Republic of  South Africa Act 108 of 1996, 
Article 35(2) (e).  
 
167 Op cit,  Article 35(2)  ( f ) .  Empirical research seems to suggest that 94.8 
per cent of South African prisoners are allowed visits. See J C Mubangizi 
“The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners in South Afr ica: The Law Versus 
the Practice” (2001) 14(3) South Af rican Journal of  Criminal  Justice  310 
at 317 to 318. This high percentage, it  is suggested, would increase the 
likelihood of resistance to transfer.  
 
168 2001 (3) SA 837 (CC). 
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bombing of the United States embassy in Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania. A day later, 
he was transferred to the United States to stand trial. He faced the death penalty 
if convicted for murder, one of the charges against him. 
 
 After an unsuccessful application to the Cape High Court, he brought an urgent 
appeal to the Constitutional Court arguing that his illegal deportation to the 
United States exposed him to the risk of the death penalty. He contended that 
this went against the spirit of the South African constitution, which the South 
African Government was under an obligation to protect, specifically the right to 
life, to dignity, and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Again, it is important to note that this was a case 
involving the surrender of a fugitive rather than the transfer of a witness. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court found that the South African authorities 
had erred in surrendering Mohamed to the United States without first seeking 
the assurance that he would not be sentenced to death in case he was 
convicted.169 The deportation was found ex facie to be illegal and 
unconstitutional. The Court also found that Mohamed’s right to life and dignity 
had been infringed.170 Fundamental to the Court’s reasoning was its earlier 
decision in S v. Makwanyane,171
 
 in which it had held that capital punishment was 
inconsistent with the values and provisions of the then interim constitution. 
Is it not conceivable that the Court might likewise hold that transferring a 
prisoner witness to the ICC without first seeking assurances as to his conditions 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
169 See paragraph 26 of  the judgment.  
 
170 Ib id.  
 
171 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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of detention there is unconstitutional?172 Even if the State were to secure such an 
assurance, the prisoner might nevertheless persist in his resistance. After all, this 
would not simply be a case of an individual having to obey a summons issued by 
the ICC and enforceable by South African courts.173 It involves movement 
outside the jurisdiction within which a prisoner is serving sentence, and 
therefore raises much more fundamental questions than the municipal 
subpoena.174 On the other hand, the State might argue that, in the particular 
instance, the prisoner’s rights are susceptible to limitation in an open and 
democratic society given the purpose of the Act, namely, compliance with the 
Rome Statute.175
 
   
                                                 
172 In the  Mohamed case supra,  the Constitutional Court ’s conclusion 
that there was a duty to seek assurances was based upon the 
Constitut ion’s protection of the r ight to l i fe. See  pages 12 to 14  of the 
judgment. In principle, there is no reason why a similar obligat ion 
should not be imposed on the State where rights under section 35 of the 
constitution are concerned. This is the essence of the concept of the 
indivisibi lity of  human rights, that is, all rights should be protected on 
an equal foot ing. See Vienna Declaration of the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights (1993) sect ion 1.5.  
 
173 See section 19 of  The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. As to the sensitive nature 
of the rights of sentenced as opposed to await ing-trial  prisoners, see D V 
Z Smit “Anchoring the Treatment of Sentenced prisoners in a Rights 
Discourse: The Example of Rewards for Prison Labour in Germany” 
(1999) 116 SALJ 613. 
 
174 Under the Rules of Procedure for the ICTY, there is no nexus between 
the Tribunal and the witness.  See F J Hampson “The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Reluctant Witness” 
(1998) 47 ICLQ 50 at 56. A common way to circumvent this obstacle is to 
provide, through national legislation, for the State ’s power to coerce a 
witness to attend. Op cit 57. For instance,  the United Kingdom has 
passed the United Nations (International Tribunal) (Former Yugoslavia) 
Order 1996 SI 1996 No. 716], Art icles 19 and 9 of which provide for the 
service of ICTR summons and impose an obligat ion to comply therewith, 
as well as empowers a competent court to order that a witness be 
arrested and transferred. See also, in the case of South Africa, The 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal court 
Act 27 of 2002, section 19. 
 
175 See the Kaunda case discussed at page 102 inf ra.  
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The Constitutional Court’s recent decision in Kaunda and Others V. The President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others176
 
 has major implications for the conduct 
of foreign relations in South Africa. The Court affirmed that the State is the best 
judge of its foreign policy, and that courts of law should be slow to interfere in 
such matters. The Court therefore dismissed the applicants’ prayer that the 
Government be compelled to set in motion processes for their extradition from 
Zimbabwe to stand trial in South Africa for alleged mercenary activities. At 
paragraph 177 of the judgment, Chaskalson CJ referred to the considerable 
deference that Government is owed in such matters. However, it is suggested 
that in the case of a contemplated transfer of a prisoner witness against his will, 
the Court might well arrive at a different conclusion. The explanation for this is 
simply that courts of law are not wont to make orders that have extra-territorial 
effect, and are therefore likely to act to protect the rights of an individual who is 
within the territory, than one who is without. 
As regards the substantive law of the Rome Statute, SAIA adopts a definition-by- 
reference approach, in effect copying the Rome Statute definitions root and 
branch. The definition of crimes under SAIA is important for South Africa as 
giving an indication of how seriously conduct that would otherwise be 
characterised as ordinary crime under municipal law will be treated. If South 
Africa chooses to define the crimes exactly as they appear in the Rome Statute, 
one might think, there is full and faithful compliance. Such a course 
demonstrates convincingly that a State intends to fulfil her international 
obligations. 
 
                                                 
176 2004 10 BCLR 1009 (CC).  
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What is remarkable about this adhesion to the Rome Statute formula is the fact 
that no constitutional impediments lay in the way of such a course. In several 
jurisdictions, minor adjustments have had to be made to the Rome Statute 
definitions in order to make them fit within the national context. The quest for 
legal certainty in definition has particularly been of great concern, given that 
most constitutions insist on penal laws being clear about the definition of 
crimes.177
 
 
 The question is whether South Africa’s wholesale incorporation of the Rome 
Statute definitions is a result of the principle of complementarity, or whether it is 
simply a bid to avoid the inconvenience of having to devise new definitions.178
                                                 
177 See, for example,  the German Constitution (Bestimmtheitsgebot )  
Article 103 (2).  The Rome Statute def inition of genocide has resultantly 
been reconfigured to meet this requirement, such that the def inition may 
be satisfied when only one person is kil led. This is in contrast to the 
Rome Statute definit ion, which contemplates the destruction of at least a 
group of people. See Werle and Jessberger op cit (chapter one, note 18 
above) at 204.On the signif icance of the term “genocide” generally, see B 
Saul “Was the Conflict in East-Timor “Genocide” and Why Does it 
Matter?” (2001) 2 Melbourne Journal of  International Law 477 at 480 to 
483. The South Afr ican equivalent of this constitut ional requirement 
would be Art icle 25 (3) of the constitution, which requires that an 
accused person be informed “with sufficient particularity” of the charge 
against him. See The Constitut ion of  the Republic of South Afr ica Act 
108 of 1996.  
 
As has been argued, although the Rome Statute does not in terms impose the 
obligation to implement its substantive law, not doing so simply increases the 
chances that a State will be adjudged unable or unwilling to prosecute under the 
Rome Statute. As this question is comprehensively addressed in the next 
Chapter, it suffices to point out that, ex facie, this approach accords with the basic 
impulse of compliance with the Rome Statute. 
 
178 On the pressure to stick to the “well-establ ished” language with 
regard to some of the concepts discussed during the Rome Conference,  
see R S Clark “Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court” in M Polit i and G Nesi (eds) The Rome 
Statute of  the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity?  
(2001) 75 at 91. 
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3.3.9 
The enactment of SAIA has seen the concomitant amendment of 2 legislative 
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act
Legislative Amendments Pursuant to SAIA 
179 and the Military Discipline 
(supplementary Measures) Act180
 
 respectively. The process of amendment was 
undoubtedly necessitated by the desire to bring the above legislations in line 
with SAIA. It is instructive to consider these amendments in detail. 
The amendment to the Military Discipline Act relates to the application of that 
Act. Hitherto, military personnel could be charged for such crimes as murder 
and rape in civilian courts. There was no provision for their being charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In view of South Africa’s new 
obligations under SAIA, the Military Act will henceforth apply when an offence 
under sections 4181 or 37182 of SAIA has been committed.183 What this 
amendment does is to bring members of the Armed Forces within the reach of 
SAIA. They will not be exempt from the SAIA machinery simply by virtue of 
their membership of the Armed Forces. It is significant to note that, elsewhere, it 
has been lamented that military officials have simply escaped prosecution for 
crimes they allegedly committed especially in times of war.184
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 SAIA sends a clear 
signal that the contrary will be the case in South Africa.  
179 Act 51 of 1977. 
 
180 Act 16 of 1999. 
 
181 Genocide, war cr imes, and crimes against humanity.  
 
182 Offences against the administrat ion of justice.  
 
183 See section 3(4) of  the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Act 16 of 1999. 
 
184 Latin America has been part icularly notorious for this phenomenon. 
See C C Joyner “Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The 
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability” (1998) 26(4)  
Denver Journal of  International  Law and Pol icy 591 at 612. 
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However, within the context of the principle of complementarity, this provision 
presents an intricate problem relating to the protection of military information 
and secrets. Should the ICC decide to admit a case in which the accused is a 
military official, concerns will be raised over whether the accused should be 
allowed, at the trial, to answer questions relating to the operations of the 
military.185 This issue was one of the sticking points during the Rome Conference 
leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Article 93(4) of the Rome Statute 
thus enables a State Party to resist the production, at any trial by the ICC, of 
information that, in the opinion of the State, is likely to compromise her national 
security interests.186
 
 
 For its part, SAIA does not expressly provide for a penalty in the case of a 
person who divulges sensitive information relating to national security,187 but 
instead provides in broad terms that any assistance to the ICC by any competent 
authorities within the Republic must be “subject to the domestic law of the 
Republic and the [ICC] Statute”.188
                                                 
185 Indeed, in the United States, concerns over the exposure of United 
States troops to this kind of  prosecution prompted the passing by 
congress of the Protect ion of United States Troops from Foreign 
Prosecution Act of 1999. Sect ion 2 (5) (t it led ‘f indings”) reads: “Because 
the guarantees of the Bill  of Rights in the United States Constitut ion 
would not be available to those individuals prosecuted by the Court, the 
United States could not participate in, or facil itate, any such Court”.  
 This, obviously, does not cover military 
personnel appearing before the ICC. Neither does section 4 (b) of the Military 
 
186 See also Art icle 72 of the Rome Statute.  
 
187 There appears to be no need for this to be provided for in legislation. 
See Rights & Democracy and The International Centre for Criminal Law 
Reform and Criminal Justice Pol icy International Criminal Court: Manual 
for the Implementation of  the Rome Statute  (2000) 76 (What amounts to 
“national security interests” is a decision that l ies with the Executive 
arm of government).  
 
188 See The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal court Statute Act 27 of 2002, section 14. 
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Discipline Code, which only applies to officers who “treacherously 
[communicate] intelligence to the enemy”.189 Clearly, the ICC cannot be 
construed to be an “enemy”. It is clear, therefore, that the Republic can only 
protect such information through the aforementioned provisions of the Rome 
Statute.190
 
 
The amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act relates to the prescription of the 
right to institute criminal proceedings. The erstwhile section 18 of the Act 
provided for the general prescription period of twenty years, except for certain 
enumerated offences for which no prescription period would apply.191 As 
amended by SAIA, the section now includes the Rome Statute crimes of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.192
 
 As a result, no prescriptive 
period will apply with respect to these offences. This seems to be in keeping with 
the abhorrence with which these crimes are viewed internationally.  
Viewed in the context of the other crimes provided for in the section, there does 
not seem to be a quantum leap that has been introduced by the latter 
amendment. It seems that the Rome Statute crimes may be classified as crimes 
against the person or property, in common with the crimes enumerated under 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
189 See The Military Discipl ine Code 1957 as amended by the Military 
Discipl ine Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999. 
 
190 Australia ’s International Criminal Court Act of 2002 follows the same 
trend in not criminalizing the diverging of vital information relating to 
her national security interests. However, a crucial backstop measure is 
included in the Act, which vests the Attorney General with the 
determination of whether or not national security interests will  be 
compromised during the course of proceedings before the ICC. Op cit  
sections 144 to 149. 
 
191 These offences were murder, treason committed in times of war,  
robbery with aggravating circumstances, kidnapping, chi ld steal ing and 
rape. See section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 
192 Ib id.  
 107 
the old section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act. If one presumes that the 
rationale behind the non-prescription of these crimes is the protected interests 
that they offend against, and the sense of shock that they induce in a given 
society,193
 
 then they are very similar to the Rome Statute crimes in that respect. 
3.4 
South Africa’s observance of her international obligations portrays a cautious 
balance between the demands of international law and the realities of the 
national situation. The amnesty laws that are in place to address South Africa’s 
past best exemplify this phenomenon. Even though it has been argued in this 
thesis that the obligation to prosecute the human rights violations of the past is 
yet to develop into a rule of customary international law, there is increasing 
pressure to regard it as such.
Conclusion 
194
 
 This pressure has focused the international 
spotlight on the Truth and Reconciliation process being undertaken in South 
Africa. Therefore, the fact that the Rome Statute is silent on the issue of amnesties 
has not lessened this pressure. 
Yet, having weathered the storm and resolved to stay the course, South Africa 
surely finds it necessary to demonstrate that there is the requisite resolve to 
ensure that such human rights abuses are punished in future. It is suggested that 
the enactment of SAIA may be viewed in that light. This is a paradox, because 
the suggestion here is that a matter upon which the Rome Statute is silent has 
influenced South Africa in enacting SAIA. This will be explored further in 
chapter four. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
193 See chapter one, note 6.  
 
194 See J Dugard “Possible Conflicts of  Jurisdiction with Truth 
Commissions” in A Cassese et al   (eds) The Rome Statute of  the 
International Criminal Court:  A Commentary Vol. 1 (2002) 693 at 698. 
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From the foregoing discussion, it seems that very modest changes have been 
effected to the South African legal landscape by SAIA. The growing awareness of 
and willingness to embrace international law since the beginning of 
constitutional democracy in 1994 had already ensured seismic shifts in the way 
South Africa’s international obligations are conceptualised. The ratification of the 
two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is a case in point. The 
fact that there is now a constitution in place195 that provides a wide array of 
guarantees of human rights would seem to have provided the necessary impetus 
towards ratification.196
 
 
The role of the National Prosecutions Authority under SAIA deserves scrutiny. 
The traditional principles of prosecutorial independence are designed to ensure 
fair trials for accused persons.197
 
 In this sense, they are principles contrived with 
the individual in mind, as opposed to the interests of States as such. As 
principles rooted in human rights, they tend, generally, to pit the individual 
against the State machinery involved in the prosecution of crimes. 
Naturally, the insulation of the National Prosecuting Authority from undue 
influence is a key ingredient in the effort to secure the Authority’s 
                                                 
195 The Interim Constitution of 1993, the precursor to the 1996 
Constitut ion. 
 
196 Section 12 of the Constitut ion, Act 108 of 1996 protects the right to 
security of the person. It is submitted that this enjoins the State to take 
all reasonable measures, including the implementation of laws, to 
protect this right. See, in relation to terrorism, Neethl ing inf ra (chapter 
four, note 29).  
 
197 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,  
Havana, 27th August to 7th September 1990, U.N. Doc.  
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189 (1990), preamble, paragraph 2. 
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independence.198 The National Prosecuting Authority Act199
 
 provides for 
parliamentary oversight, as well as policy input by the Executive. By any 
standards, and in principle, these measures are commonplace. It is their 
implementation in each case that will determine whether or not the influence 
being exerted on the Authority is unconscionable.  
However, the fact that, in terms of SAIA, the prosecution of an offence against 
the administration of justice may only take place at the request of the ICC is 
peculiar.200 It is submitted that it is a significant attenuation of prosecutorial 
discretion. Offences such as contempt of court and perjury, which are covered by 
this provision, are punishable under South African law.201
 
 This boils down to the 
question whether the ICC is a “court” within national jurisdictions. Does SAIA 
create a separate and unique court within the South African judicial structure? 
For if it does, there is no reason in principle why offences against the 
administration of justice committed in South Africa should not per se be 
prosecuted in South Africa. There appears to the author to be no reason why a 
request by the ICC should be a precondition for such prosecution. 
The above notwithstanding, it is inconceivable that section 37(2) of SAIA would 
be impugned on the basis that, in the context of a fair trial, it exposes the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions to undue influence. This section may 
                                                 
198 Op cit Guidel ine 4.  
 
199 Act 32 of 1998. 
 
200 See The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, section 37(2).  
 
201 See generally J R L Milton South Af rican Criminal  Law and Procedure  2 
ed, Vol.I I  (1982) 105 to 178; J Burchel l and J Milton  Pr inciples of  
Criminal Law (1991) 626 to 647; C R Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1989) 
341 to 360. 
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therefore be characterised as a procedural norm steeped in international comity, 
which does not alter the substance of a fair trial.   
 
However, it is also possible to argue that the ICC is not a “court” within national 
jurisdictions. For this reason, the legislature has, in its wisdom, decided not to 
allow the National Director of Public Prosecutions to mero motu prosecute 
offences relating to the ICC’s authority.202 Such prosecutions may only take place 
in South Africa on the basis of comity, which will be the guiding factor when the 
National Director receives a request from the ICC to prosecute. Seemingly, this is 
not a matter that lies within the policy competency of the National Director in 
terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.203
 
 
It is suggested that the role of the courts in the operation of SAIA will be crucial. 
The major concern will be to ensure that the Executive does not over-step the 
mark in its quest to honour South Africa’s international commitments.204 At the 
same time, however, the judiciary will be wary of interfering with the Executive 
in the latter’s conduct of foreign relations.205 Even though SAIA has not 
necessitated major constitutional or legislative amendments, its actual 
application may nevertheless accentuate the tension between international and 
national norms, often resulting in constitutional litigation. Judicial thinking 
seems to incline towards deferring to the Executive. In Mohamed206
                                                 
202 Cf the Canadian Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act [2000, 
c.24]. The Act does not require the ICC’s request before a prosecution 
may be undertaken in Canada for these offences.  Op cit sections 16 to 
26. 
, the Court 
 
203  See Act 32 of 1998, section 21. 
 
204 See  Mohamed v. President of  the Republic of  South Af rica 2001 (3) SA 
837 (CC).  
 
205 See  Kaunda supra and Harksen V.  President of  the Republ ic of  South 
Af rica 2000 (2) SA 825 (CC).  
 
206 Supra. 
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considered that the removal of an individual to a jurisdiction in which he faced 
the death penalty was unconstitutional. However, the applicant was already 
outside South Africa, and there was little the Court could do to vindicate his 
right. In Kaunda207, the applicants were similarly outside the jurisdiction of South 
African courts, and the Court declined to apply the South African constitution 
extra-territorially. In Thatcher208
 
, despite the applicant’s presence in South Africa, 
the Court was unimpressed by the argument that the applicant’s prayers should 
be granted since he stood to suffer the death penalty upon conviction. Given that 
the ICC will have no power to impose the death penalty, it is submitted that 
there is no reason to expect that the courts will demur from the policy of 
cooperation with the ICC. 
 The Constitutional Court in State v. Basson209
 
 has, obiter, endorsed the policy of 
cooperation with the ICC. That case was an appeal in a case in which the 
respondent had been charged before the trial court with various counts of 
murder, fraud, and conspiracy to commit various other crimes outside the South 
African borders. One of the questions which the Constitutional Court had to 
decide was whether the failure of the Supreme Court of Appeal to have regard to 
South Africa’s international obligations as mandated by the constitution in 
deciding whether or not to quash certain charges laid against the respondent, 
was a constitutional issue. This issue was raised in limine.  
The Court held210
                                                 
207 Supra. 
 that the duty to prosecute those involved in grave breaches of 
humanitarian law was rooted in customary international law, and that failure to 
 
208 Supra.  
 
209  2005(1)  SA 171 (CC).  
 
210 Supra per Sachs J at paragraph 126 of the judgment.  
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consider this obligation constituted a constitutional issue. 211 The Court was keen 
to emphasize that courts of law must always take into account South Africa’s 
international obligations, and that South Africa was definitely under an 
international obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of such abuses.212 This 
decision indicates that the Constitutional Court considers the right to prosecute 
as being an established one at international law. However, what distinguishes 
this decision from AZAPO213 is that the latter dealt with a compromise which 
had been explicitly sanctioned by the constitution. This position, though 
undoubtedly a painful one, simply had to be accepted.214
 
 
 
The “carrot–and-stick” mechanism that underlies the principle of 
complementarity envisages a situation of anarchy and lawlessness in which it 
will operate.215
 
 That situation clearly did not exist in South Africa between the 
period 1994 and 2002 when SAIA was enacted. The “internal logic” of the South 
African legal system has therefore largely been unaffected by SAIA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 Supra,  paragraph 127 of the judgment.  
 
212 See also Case Concerning Mil i tary and Paramil i tary Activ it ies in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) 1986 ICJ 14 at paragraph 220.   
 
213 Supra (page 75 above).  
 
214  S v,Basson supra at paragraph 118 of the judgment.  
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Chapter Four 
 
A RATIONALIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME STATUTE 
“I believe there is no more important problem in the social sciences, and none that is more 
difficult. Understanding why people cooperate and trust one another may be the first step toward 
bringing about more cooperation and trust”1
 
 
4.1 
As has been seen above, SAIA’s provisions largely accord with those of the Rome  
Introduction 
Statute of the ICC. However, what has equally clearly emerged from the 
foregoing discussion is that States’ compliance models vary according to their 
preferences and specific situations. The crucial task is to examine, in the specific 
case of South Africa, the impulses that have led to the choices reflected in SAIA. 
This rationalization process would have to be undertaken against the 
background of the general legal system as discussed in the previous chapter. This 
would assist one in better understanding how best international law precepts 
may be applied in South Africa. 
 
The positivistic overtones of the complementarity regime pose a major challenge 
for the international law enforcement enterprise.2
                                                 
1 J Elster Rational i ty,  Moral i ty and Col lective Action (1985) 141. 
 The structure and powers of 
the ICC, as previously described, make it likely that non-cooperation with the 
ICC will be encountered. It seems, however, that, in the actual implementation of 
the Rome Statute, States have tended to infuse into their legislation comity-based 
 
2 See Kaul loc c i t (chapter one, note 18 above).  
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provisions, perhaps to minimise the chances of conflict with the ICC. Hopefully, 
this consensual-based approach will ensure the smooth operation of the principle 
of complementarity.3
 
 
This chapter seeks to evaluate the obligatory nature of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC within the South African context. More particularly, it poses the question 
whether, and to what extent, the principle of complementarity has influenced the 
enactment of SAIA. In doing so, it is, of course, instructive to recall the 
observation that entirely non-legal considerations may influence a State’s 
actions.4
 
 The motivations for the enactment of SAIA may indeed turn out to be 
wholly political. However, as will be argued, this does not preclude one from 
extrapolating the legal significance of those considerations. It is hoped that the 
discussion in this chapter will reveal the broad policy concerns of the legislature 
in enacting SAIA, and in what way these correlate with complementarity. 
One of the abiding features of the enactments discussed above is that the South 
African Foreign Affairs Ministry only sparingly gets involved in criminal justice 
matters. The bulk of these matters are handled by the Justice Ministry, which also 
often acts as the interface between the Republic and foreign States.5
 
 In reality, 
however, there must be a high level of consultation between the two ministries, 
especially where relations with foreign States are likely to be affected by any 
decision made. 
                                                 
3 However, see Diehl loc c i t (chapter two, note 74 above) on the pitfalls of  
consensualism, and what other factors ought to be taken into account in 
evaluating a State ’s compliance with a treaty.  
 
4 See Henkin op cit (chapter one, note 82 above) at 39 to 40. 
 
5 See the Extradition Act and the International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters Act discussed in chapter two above. 
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Furthermore, the role of the Judiciary in shaping foreign relations is evident from 
the previous chapter. Far from being a passive spectator to the machinations of 
the Executive in such matters, the Judiciary is in some instances quite proactive 
in checking excesses of power. In other instances, legislation mandates judicial 
officials to be in direct contact with officials of other States with regard to the 
provision of evidence and the apprehension of suspects.6 This is particularly so 
in what are termed “cases of emergency”.7 Apart from these specific cases, 
however, the judiciary seems to tread carefully in matters concerning foreign 
relations, often deferring to the wisdom of the Executive.8 Decisions such as 
Harksen9 and Kaunda10 are emblematic of this tendency.11
 
 
This thesis now investigates the role of other factors in the implementation of 
SAIA. Three main issues are discussed: First, is there a possibility, in law, of 
South Africa being held liable for damages arising out of international crimes, 
and is that an important factor in implementation? Second, are there underlying 
benefits to the implementation of the Rome Statute that have influenced South 
                                                 
6 Ib id.  
 
7 See, for example Act 75 of 1996, sect ion 2 (4) (a),  discussed at page 81 
above.  
 
8 See E Benvenisti “Judicial  Misgivings Regarding the Application of  
International Law: An Analysis of Att itudes of National Courts” (1993) 4 
EJIL 159. 
 
9 Harksen V.President of  the Republ ic of  South Af rica 2000 (2) SA 825 
(CC).  
 
10 2004 10 BCLR 1009 (CC).  
 
11 See generally E Benvenisti “Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on 
the Insti tut de Droit International ’s Resolution on ‘The Activit ies of  
National Courts and the International Relations of their State’ “ (1994) 5 
EJIL 1 at 2 (National courts have consistently refused to be the 
custodians of  international law, especial ly where they deem that its 
application is inimical to national interests).  For a South African 
perspective, see R C Blake “The World’s Law in One Country: The South 
African Constitutional Court ’s Use of  Public International Law” (1998) 
115 SALJ 668. 
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Africa in the enactment of SAIA? Is the enactment of SAIA a conscious design to 
insulate the South African Judiciary from the systems of international law, thus 
preserving the core characteristics or “internal logic” of South Africa’s legal 
system? Lastly, what is the role of South Africa’s human rights ethos in the 
enactment of SAIA? 
 
4.2 
While the individual’s criminal liability for international crimes is now well 
established and widely accepted in international law,
Civil Liability for International Crimes 
12
 
 the same cannot be said 
of States’ criminal liability. States are still incapable, in law, of committing 
crimes. 
Civilly, however, States may be liable in damages to other States or individuals 
for failing to take decisive steps to curtail such crimes.13
 
 As has been pointed out 
above, all of the international crimes set out in the Rome Statute offend against 
jus cogens norms in international law. As a result, each State Party owes every 
other State Party a duty to ensure that, at the very least, such acts are outlawed 
within its territory. 
Is the above consideration a catalyst for implementation? It seems to the author 
that criminalizing or outlawing an act diminishes the risk of liability for that act, 
principally through deterrence.14
                                                 
12 See the Nuremberg Principles, discussed at pages 3 and 4 above.  
 The act of criminalization may also reduce a 
 
13 See generally J F Murphy “Civil l iabil ity for the Commission of  
International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution” (1999) 
12 Harvard Human Rights Journal  1.  The phenomenon of holding 
governments liable for international cr imes has particularly proliferated 
in United States courts. Op cit at 32. 
 
14 But see K D Krawiek “Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of  
Negotiated Governance” (2003) 81 Washington University Law Quarterly  
487 at 489 to 490 (crit icises the use of “internal compliance structures” 
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State’s moral blameworthiness in the event of a civil suit.15
 
 Therefore there are 
two levels of discourse; at the global level, general deterrence helps to pre-empt a 
crime that is of concern to the “international community”. At the State level, 
costly civil suits arising from the commission of these crimes are avoided. 
It seems to the author that there is a nexus between civil liability and 
implementation. For instance, it was only after Bosnia-Herzegovina took the 
former Yugoslavia to the ICJ for alleged genocide that the latter incorporated the 
Geneva Conventions into its own law.16 The Convention had been in place since 
1951, but no steps had been taken to implement it. Finally, on 12th march 2001, 
the former Yugoslavia acceded to the Convention.17
 
 It is submitted that the fact 
that Bosnia-Herzegovina had brought a claim at all may have influenced the 
decision to accede. 
The ICJ, mainly on jurisdictional grounds, dismissed the claim.  Bosnia-
Herzegovina had alleged that the former Yugoslavia had breached its 
international obligations towards her during the years 1992 and 1993, when the 
latter’s officials presided over acts of genocide in the territory of the former. 
However, the Court inquired whether the Genocide Convention18
                                                                                                                                                 
in Corporate America as a liabil ity determinant. At 491, the writer 
argues that there is l itt le evidence to suggest that the use of these 
mechanisms has deterred prohibited conduct within organizations).  
 bestowed 
 
15 Krawiek ib id alludes to the “extraordinary” favourable legal treatment 
that organizations with these internal structures receive.  
 
16 See Case Concerning the Appl ication of  the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, Provisional  Measures, Judgment 
of  11th July 1996 (Preliminary Object ions), I .C.J. Reports 1996, p.595. 
 
17 See United Nations,  Treaty Series ,  Vol. 78 p.277. 
 
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  
Genocide, GA Res 260 A (I I I )  of 9 December 1948. 
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rights upon States qua States, thereby enabling them to base their claims against 
other States thereon.  
 
In the Court’s opinion, this is not so. The Convention was sui generis in that it 
imposed upon States obligations towards humanity, not towards individual or 
specific States per se. In the Court’s reasoning: 
 
“The failure of any Contracting Party ‘to prevent and punish’ [genocide] may only be 
rectified and remedied through (i) resort to a competent organ of the United Nations…or 
(ii) resort to an international penal Tribunal, but not by invoking the responsibility of 
States in inter-State relations before the International Court of Justice”.19
 
  
The Court further observed that, even if it were to be assumed that officials of the 
former Yugoslavia were guilty of genocide within the Applicant’s territory, this 
alone did not amount to a “dispute” between the parties that would have 
enabled the Court to be seized of the matter.20
 
 
Would the same outcome be arrived at if the interpretation of the Rome Statute’s 
provisions were at issue? It is submitted that an occasion would never arise for 
the ICC to consider the matter in the first place, as it has no jurisdiction over 
States, criminally or civilly.21
                                                 
19 Op cit at 623. 
 Similarly, the ICJ is likely to decline jurisdiction 
 
20 It is humbly suggested that the above reasoning is sound. Given the 
nature of the crime of genocide, which often str ikes at the very existence 
of humanity, it  is submitted that the interests at stake are far too 
signif icant to be identif ied with a particular State. Through acts of  
genocide, the values of humanity as a whole are under siege.  
 
 
21 Rome Statute (op cit )  Article 1 (The Court shall have “jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of  international concern”).  It  has 
been argued that reference to “persons” implies “natural persons”. See M 
Frull i “Jurisdict ion Ratione Personae” in A Cassese et al  (eds) The Rome 
statute of  the International  Criminal  Court: A Commentary (2002) 527 at 
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over any such matter. As all Rome Statute proscriptions are based upon jus 
cogens norms, the standing of individual States to sue for reparation in respect of 
these crimes is highly doubtful, given the reasoning in the Application of the 
Genocide Convention case.22
 
 
In the final analysis, therefore, such claims for reparation would have to be 
brought before national courts. However, the prospects for the success of such 
claims is a separate matter altogether.  For the purpose of this study, it is 
proposed that a distinction be made between two strands to the enquiry 
regarding the prospects of success: The first relates to claims before South 
African courts against the South African Government. The second relates to 
claims brought in foreign jurisdictions against the South African Government. 
The second category is outside the scope of this study, as the study is specifically 
concerned with the attitudes of South African courts.23
 
  
As for the first category of claims, the author is unable to find any precedent for 
these. Issues such as the South African occupation of South West Africa 
(Namibia) in the 1970s, and South Africa’s “hot pursuit” operations in the 
territories of neighbouring States during the Apartheid years, have not 
                                                                                                                                                 
532. It  is respectfully submitted that this view is incorrect, and that the 
inclusion of juridical persons in this formulation would present 
insurmountable diff iculties relat ing to the Rome Statute crimes.  
 
 
22 See note 16 above.  
 
23 However, where South African courts are called upon to assist in such 
matters, the protect ion of national interests is an important concern. 
Thus in Minister of  Water Af fairs and Forestry and Others V.  
Swissborough Diamond Mines (PTY) LTD and Others 1999 (2) SA 345 (T) it  
was aff irmed that the principle of absolute sovereign immunity is part of  
South African law. Thus, the Court declared inval id a subpoena issued 
under section 7 of the Foreign Courts Evidence Act 80 of 1962, requir ing 
South African State off icials to produce certain evidence before Lesotho 
courts.  In the Court ’s reasoning (at 352) this provision does not bind the 
State and its off icials.  
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engendered any such claims. Perhaps this should hardly be surprising, given 
social attitudes in South Africa as revealed by research. A survey conducted 
under the auspices of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
indicates widespread support for the Namibian occupation within the white 
section of the South African population.24 This is despite unequivocal 
condemnation by the United Nations.25
 
 
 Similarly, the “Apartheid suits”26 commenced in the United States against 
companies that allegedly supported the Apartheid regime have been criticised by 
the South African Government as being counter-productive and going against 
the ideals of reconciliation.27 It is suggested that, were these suits to be instituted 
in South Africa, they would most likely encounter similar reactions by the 
Judiciary.28
                                                 
24 See G Theissen “Between Acknowledgement and Ignorance:  How White 
South Africans have Dealt with the Apartheid Past” Centre for the Study 
of  Violence and Reconcil iation available at  
 Judicial attitudes towards the “Apartheid suits” are likely to reflect 
http://www.csvr.org/papers/papgt6.htm (accessed 29/08/2004).  
 
25 General Assembly A/RES/S-14/1 (20t h September 1986).  
 
26 In June 2002, a group of black South Afr icans instituted an action 
against several defendant multi-national companies, including Credit  
Suisse and Cit i Group. The defendants are alleged to have f inanced the 
former apartheid regime, which in turn allegedly violated the plaintif fs’  
fundamental rights.  The claim was brought under America’s Alien Tort  
Claims Act of 1789, which reads: “The District Courts shall have original 
jurisdict ion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of  the law of nations or a treaty of the United States” (28 U.S.C. 
SS 1350).  
 
27 Mr. Joel Netshitenzhe, the South African Government spokesperson, 
has been quoted as saying that the case “has profound ef fects for the 
future of the country, for instance for the assessment of the country r isk 
profi le, and for investment and job creat ion. See 
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3577_27367_ENG_HTM.htm (accessed 
11/9/2004).  
 
28 The task of examining the crucial role that the Judiciary plays in 
consolidating social and polit ical order has fallen to legal sociologists. To 
some, judges are loath to be seen to disturb any sense of order through 
their judgments.  See, for example, R Cotterrell The Sociology of  Law: An 
Introduction  (1992) 234.  See also E Benvenisti “Judges and Foreign 
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the Constitutional Court’s stance on the alleged duty in international law to 
prosecute the perpetrators of past human rights abuses.   
 
By parity of reasoning, a civil suit against the South African Government in 
respect of the Rome Statute crimes is unlikely to yield much. The reason for this 
contention is twofold: since the Rome Statute creates no enforceable rights for 
individuals, SAIA falls to be interpreted in the same vein, such that individuals 
may not sue the Government purely on the strength of its provisions. Persons 
living in South Africa would probably have to rely on the common law 
regarding delict, provided they satisfy its requirements.29
 
 Moreover, a civil suit 
by a non-resident would likely be viewed as an attempt to enforce extraneous 
values within the South African legal system. 
Given the above, the prospects of success for such suits in South Africa are bleak. 
However, this is not to suggest that the possibility of a suit being instituted in 
South Africa is not a factor that would influence implementation of the Rome 
Statute. As in the case of the former Yugoslavia, perhaps the negative publicity 
that such suits inevitably entail, especially for a nation wishing to embark on 
reconstruction, is a major factor.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Affairs: A Comment on the Insti tut de Droit International ’s Resolution on 
‘the Activit ies of National Courts and the International Relations of their 
State’ “(1994) EJIL 1 at 3.  
 
29  That is, the normal delictual grounds of l iabil ity. General ly, l iabil ity 
for an omission does not arise unless the omission is wrongful, and there 
exists a duty of care towards the plaintif f .  See Minister Van Pol is ie V. 
Ewels  1975 (3)  SA 590 (A) at  596-597. See also J Neethling “Aspects of 
Delictual Liability for Acts of Terrorism” (2003) 120 SALJ 90 at 100. 
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4.3 
The ICC is an international institution with wide-ranging membership. What, 
however, needs to be determined, is the underlying rationale behind 
membership in the institution. From the preceding discussion, the ICC certainly 
manifests the hallmarks of a rule-imposing, rather than benefit-conferring, entity. 
This issue is further explored here below. 
Benefits of Implementation 
 
According to Henkins, “every nation derives some benefits from international 
law and international agreements”.30 This postulate is advanced by the learned 
writer within the context of explaining why States enter into international 
agreements, thereby limiting their own freedom of action. Since this freedom is 
limited across the board for all States concerned, “one nation gets others to 
behave as it desires”.31
 
 
A variant of Henkins’ argument is advanced by Rawls,32 according to whom 
“when an institution creates benefits through the voluntary cooperation of its 
members, those who share in the benefits have an obligation to support the 
institution”.33
 
 Therefore, the voluntary act by which a State becomes a party to a 
treaty ought to ensure observance by that State. The use of the phrase “creates 
benefits through the voluntary cooperation” appears to imply that Rawls 
considers that an agreement arrived at through voluntary cooperation ipso facto 
confers benefits.  
                                                 
30 Henkins op cit at 29. 
 
31 Ib id.  
 
32 See J Rawls “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair  Play” in S Hook (ed) 
Law and Philosophy (1964) 23. 
 
33 Ib id.  
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 However, it is respectfully submitted that the above arguments are too 
consensualist-oriented and ignore the value-laden nature of State action. In the 
first place, Henkins’ postulate, while it may be true of some agreements, does not 
apply to all. For agreements such as the Rome Statute, one certainly has to 
examine the exigencies leading up to their conclusion. It is further submitted that 
the Rome Statute is not so much a pact between the States Parties inter se, as it is 
an arrangement between the States Parties and the ICC, spelling out the 
conditions under which States will continue to exercise their right to prosecute 
international criminals. It represents a sort of compromise between the ICC and 
the States Parties, aimed principally at ameliorating the effects of the impunity 
atmosphere that existed prior to the Rome Statute coming into force. The 
motivation for States entering the agreement was purely to ensure that they 
would always be able to prosecute international crimes, thus keeping the ICC at 
bay.34
 
 
Moreover, the argument that appears to be advanced by Rawls overstretches the 
significance of “benefits” in international agreements. According to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,35 a State can plead coercion and therefore 
escape the obligations of a treaty if “its conclusion has been procured by the 
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations”.36
                                                 
34 International relations theory presumes “self- interested, purposive and 
calculated behaviour by States”. See A A Stein Why Nations Cooperate:  
Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (1990) 10. 
 In practice, very few treaties can be 
invalidated on this ground, meaning that most treaties are entered into 
voluntarily. However, this cannot be taken to mean that all treaties entered into 
 
35 The Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treat ies, signed at Vienna 23 
May 1969 (1155 UNTS 331).  
 
36 Op cit Article 52. 
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voluntarily provide benefits for the signatories. As has been seen in relation to 
the maxim pacta sunt servanda, a wider enquiry ought to be undertaken as to the 
legitimacy that an agreement enjoys in the estimation of a specific State.37
 
 
In relation to the Rome Statute, it is submitted that the State players consist of 
what may be termed “relevant States”38
 
 with respect to international crimes. 
These are States whose interest in the prevention and punishment of 
international crime is relatively higher, by dint of having either experienced strife 
first hand or borne the brunt of refugee influxes as a result of atrocities 
committed elsewhere. South Africa is a fitting example, given the human rights 
abuses that characterised the Apartheid era. For such a State, there is much more 
at stake when the decision as to whether and how to implement the Rome 
Statute is made. 
 While the characterization of some States as “relevant” heavily implies the 
inequality of States in decision making and policy formulation on the 
international plane,39
                                                 
37 See Diehl loc c i t (Chapter two, note 73 above).  
 it also serves to underscore the varying interests of States in 
 
38 This expression is adapted from the phrase “pert inent States” as 
employed by C L Carr and G L Scott “Multilateral Treaties and the 
Environment: a Case Study in the Formation of Customary International 
Law” (1999) 27 (2) Denver Journal of  International Law and Pol icy 313, 
within the context of the formation of customary international law. At 
317, they define pertinent States as “…those States whose participation 
in a treaty is required if  the treaty is to have real meaning and a real 
chance of achieving its intended objective”.  
 
39 See Carr and Scott  op cit at 318: “One might object that, by placing 
such great weight on pert inent states in determining whether 
multi lateral treaties create instant custom, we turn eff icacy into a 
condit ion of lawfulness…. One might wonder, however,  about the 
signif icance of thinking that an eff icacious treaty should obl igate states 
whose people have less at stake with regard to the regulat ions in 
question”.  
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any given agreement.40
 
 States are self-interested entities, and will seek to foster 
those interests through the agreements they enter into. Indeed, the very idea of a 
“consensus” relative to an agreement suggests a compromise, often arrived at 
after much haggling and shifting of goal posts. 
As regards the range of options available to States implementing the Rome 
Statute, these have been alluded to in the previous chapter. It has been suggested 
that South Africa’s preferred option, as a whole, is one that preserves the military 
disciplinary structures provided for by legislation,41 subjects the national 
prosecution machinery to a measure of external scrutiny insofar as the 
prosecution of international crimes is concerned,42 and disaffirms the existence of 
any absolute duty in international law to prosecute the perpetrators of past 
atrocities.43  The Constitutional Court’s decision in S v Basson44 seems to point to 
the fact that a State may choose to pursue prosecutions for past atrocities. The 
facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in AZAPO in that, in the 
former, Basson did not apply for amnesty before the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). The decision to prosecute is not due to obedience to the 
behests of international law.45
                                                 
40 Ib id.  
   
 
41 See Mil itary Disciplinary Code 1957. 
 
42 See Act 27 of 2002. 
 
43 See the AZAPO case (supra )  discussed at page 75 above.  
 
44 Supra.  
 
45 The Constitutional Court in AZAPO  (supra )  did not invoke any 
comparable foreign case law. This is in contrast to the Makwanyane  
decision supra in which foreign case law was widely cited. This apparent 
inconsistency may perhaps be explained on the basis that AZAPO more 
directly involved the interests of the State, touching on national security 
issues. On the other hand, Makwanyane  entailed the right of an 
individual as against the State.  Benvenist i op cit (note 8 above) at 4,  
rationalizes this matter thus: “Whereas the government tolerates its own 
lit igation losses in the domestic legal sphere, since these very defeats 
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4.4 
Whilst it is true that the Rome Statute creates obligations principally for States, 
individuals, too, acquire obligations under the Statute, mainly in the form of the 
duty not to engage in acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
These obligations, in turn, implicate the individual’s rights, making these rights 
significant in the implementation process.
Human Rights and Implementation 
46
 
 
As a result, the Rome Statute cannot be viewed as simply another treaty entailing 
purely State obligations. States ought to pay special regard to the manner in 
which they define crimes under their implementing laws and the manner in 
which suspects and witnesses are dealt with within the established legal 
structures. This, it is suggested, is the context in which authoritative rulings have 
been sought from several constitutional courts regarding the implementation 
strategies of the respective States.47
 
 
How might a State’s human rights ethos affect the decision whether or not to 
implement the Rome Statute? It is suggested that implementation may be as a 
logical result of the State’s having subscribed to any major human rights 
instrument(s). Such instruments then provide an occasion and basis for a State to 
                                                                                                                                                 
prove the overall soundness of the national legal system, it has no 
interest in a defeat in the courtroom in the name of the international 
legal order”. Therefore, in cases involving governmental act ion with 
international implications, courts will often apply municipal law in such 
a way as to further the Executive’s policy in the matter. Op cit at 5.  
 
46 See D C Clarke “China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for 
Compliance” (2003) 2(1) Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 97 at 100 to 102 (points out that the Chinese off icial view has 
always been that international law automatically becomes part of  
domestic law. He further observes that this view was preponderant in an 
era when al l international obligations were State obligations and private 
rights were not involved. The writer, however, argues that this view is 
less convincing now that the majority of international obl igat ions are 
beginning to impinge on private rights).  
 
47 See chapter two, pages 49 to 51 above.  
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enact the Rome Statute. This sets the State on a course of what may be termed  
“implementation inertia”. Of course, this begs the question whether there are 
innate qualities of the Rome Statute that align it to the major international human 
rights instruments. If so, are these similarities sufficient to assure implementation 
without calling to aid the principle of complementarity? 
 
Certainly, a look at an international instrument such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights48 (ICCPR) of 1966 makes clear the range of 
Covenant rights that would be infringed in situations of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The very basis for the protection of the right to life, 
for instance, would cease to exist in such circumstances. Under the Torture 
Convention,49
 
 too, the rights protected would be under jeopardy. 
Indeed, the preamble to the Rome Statute echoes the dire episodes that have 
resulted in massive violations of human rights, such as the two World Wars.50
 
 
States Parties to the Statute affirm their determination to ensure that such 
egregious violations are put to an end. The significance of this section of the 
preamble is the belief that, in order to enhance the protection of human rights, 
the Rome Statute is a necessary tool.  
The decision to implement the Rome Statute may be purely as a result of the 
concept of “auto-challenge”, whereby States, on their own volition, set for 
themselves human rights standards that they should meet.51
                                                 
48 International Covenant on Civil and Pol it ical Rights, UNTS No.14668, 
Vol.999 (1976) 171. 
 States do so because 
 
49 See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc A/39/51 (1984),  entered 
into force June 26 1987. 
 
50 See Rome Statute (Op cit )  preamble, paragraph 2. 
 
51 See D P Forsythe The Internationalization of  Human Rights (1991) 43. 
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of the belief in the innate qualities of these standards, thus no external agency is 
necessary to inspire compliance.52 In Forsythe’s view, although States “are 
pressured in various ways to implement human rights standards, but in a formal 
sense they have initially challenged themselves to meet those standards”.53 This 
initial consent serves to undercut the State’s role as sole determinant of what its 
human rights policies should be.54
 
 
Forsythe’s view therefore recognises the limited value of “initial” State consent, 
as it rightly implies that other forms of pressure may be brought to bear upon a 
State. It is submitted that, to an extent, this idea dovetails with that of Diehl who, 
as has been seen, questions consensualism as the basis of international obligation. 
However, unlike Forsythe who seeks to rely on “pressure” (implying external 
influence), Diehl suggests factors internal to the State that would tend to explain 
the apparent readiness by States to be bound by international agreements. These 
relate to the legitimacy that States ascribe to the international system as a whole, 
and to particular international instruments.55
 
 
One of the factors suggested by Diehl is the degree to which a State would be 
willing to overlook violations by other States of the obligations embodied in an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
52 As stated by Judge Weeramantry in the Application of  the Genocide 
Convention case (op cit) ,  “there is not even the semblance of a suggest ion 
in contemporary international law that [human rights] obligat ions 
amount to a derogation of sovereignty”.  
 
53 Forsythe op cit at 44. 
 
54 Op cit at 43.This phenomenon has been attr ibuted to the fact that 
international law is no longer an “subject-centred” system but a “actor-
centred” one. See F Schorkopf and C Walter “Elements of  
Constitut ionalizat ion: Multi level  Structures of Human Rights Protect ion 
in General International and WTO-Law” (2003) 4(12) German Law Journal  
1359 at 1362. 
 
55 Diehl loc ci t.  
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agreement. It is to be expected that where an agreement embodies jus cogens 
norms, the violation of any obligations provided for would attract absolute 
censure. The Rome Statute being such an agreement, it seems that its 
implementation is almost guaranteed solely by virtue of that fact. This aspect 
also brings into sharp focus the international relations function of human rights 
instruments, as States increasingly define their relations inter se on the basis of 
the protection mechanisms they adopt.  
 
South Africa’s re-entry into the international fold after years of isolation would 
have been a perfect opportunity to define her international relations for a new 
era. On the 10th December 1998, a decisive step was taken: South Africa ratified 
the ICCPR56 and the Torture Convention57, and acceded to the Genocide 
Convention.58
 
 This crucial step placed South Africa on a moral pedestal in the 
international sphere. The clear message being sent out was that her foreign 
policy will henceforth be conducted within the bounds of the respect for human 
rights. It would have been self-defeating not to follow this trend through with 
the implementation of the Rome Statute. This highlights the inertia of 
implementation alluded to earlier. The significant point here is that the 
implementation of the Rome Statute was both strategic and inevitable, given the 
foreign relations dimension.  
Moreover, the Rome Statute’s import in terms of attenuating State sovereignty in 
the sphere of human rights is minimal.59
                                                 
56 See note 48 above.  
 As a human rights instrument, the 
 
57 See note 49 above.  
 
58 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  
Genocide, GA Res 260 A (I I I )  of 9 December 1948. 
 
59 See note 52 above.  
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Rome Statute makes no major dents on the treasured fabric of State sovereignty 
(although as a procedural instrument it does). There are no reporting 
mechanisms in place, or the individual complaints procedure characteristic of 
several other international human rights instruments.60 As a purely procedural 
instrument designed to ensure cooperation between States, however, the Statute 
may have far-reaching implications, or at least may be seen by national 
judiciaries as having such an effect.61
 
 
Therein lies the paradox. As discussed earlier, whether an instrument is 
perceived as having its roots in positive law or natural law affects the manner in 
which the obligations thereunder are observed. The Rome Statute has the 
intriguing distinction of being steeped in both. Whilst States, on their own 
accord, may see the virtue in implementing the Statute, the complementarity 
aspect of the Statute seeks to impose a regime on them. The inclination to respect 
international human rights is characteristic of a trend in which States see 
themselves as actors rather than subjects within the international legal 
structure.62
 
 The result is that States may, quite willingly, implement the Rome 
Statute on principled grounds. However, through the operation of the carrot-
and-stick mechanism that is the hallmark of complementarity, there is likely to 
be a disjuncture between expectation and reality, as States that are adjudged 
unwilling or unable to prosecute, begin to feel the rigours of the 
complementarity process, and to question the exact circumstances in which the 
desiderata in Article 17 of the Rome Statute should apply. 
                                                 
60 See, for example, the ICCPR op cit Article 40 (reporting); First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR (1966) Article 1 ( individual communications).  
 
61 In the realm of enforcement, the views that count are those of court 
off icials. See Clarke op cit (note 46 above) at 102. 
 
62 See note 54 above.  
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As was argued earlier, one of the major assumptions of the principle of 
complementarity is its own ability to ameliorate the effects of impunity. The 
principle has been put forward as a reversal of the anarchical state of affairs, in 
which States have failed to comport themselves in accordance with the basic 
tenets of humanity. Yet, through the concept of human rights in international 
law, States, independently of the principle of complementarity, have realised the 
need to implement international instruments that have significance in the area of 
human rights, as a tool in foreign relations. Of course, whether or not such 
implementation bears fruits in the actual practice of States remains to be seen.  
 
Regarding the State’s concerns in the implementation of international human 
rights instruments, these tend to be at variance with the individual’s 
expectations. Therefore, under the complementarity concept, the principle of the 
independence of justice as protected under the ICCPR may be in jeopardy.63 As 
has been pointed out,64
 
 the incompatibility between the two may arise from a 
provision within a State’s constitution. The main concern here is that accused 
persons should only be tried by courts established by law. Ex facie, a mechanism 
by which a body other than the courts established by law tries an accused person 
is unlawful. Even though SAIA establishes a mechanism for cooperation with the 
ICC, the fact of the matter is that SAIA does not establish the ICC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 See Art icle 14 of the International Covenant on Civil  and Polit ical  
Rights (1966).  
 
64 See chapter two, note 89 above.  
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4.5 
The process of implementing the Rome Statute involves both political and legal 
considerations, and the weight accorded to each varies from State to State. The 
main consideration is the value of implementation to the internal legal order. 
Any major reconfiguration of this order is unlikely to be countenanced.
Conclusion 
65
 
 
The Rome Statute’s proper taxonomy in terms of the natural law/positive law 
dichotomy is difficult to ascertain. The principle appears to be steeped in both 
schools of law in particular respects. However, it seems that, in its 
complementarity aspect, it is positive law-oriented. This may affect the way 
States understand their obligations under the Statute, especially as regards their 
relationship to, and cooperation with, the ICC. The threat of loss of curial power 
is an integral part of the mechanism by which compliance is ensured. To be fair, 
however, this carrot-and-stick mechanism has been touted as a catalyst for, not 
the cause of, compliance.66
 
 
Naturally, therefore, other factors come into play in rationalizing the compliance 
model of any particular State. In the case of South Africa, her particular history 
and legal system may explain the kind of compliance model she has chosen. This 
is in keeping with the general observation that compliance will vary from State to 
State. However, it has also been demonstrated that complementarity may have a 
very limited role to play in influencing compliance. South Africa, at the time of 
enacting SAIA, had already acquired obligations under the major instruments on 
                                                 
65 See I  Tallgren “The Sensibil ity and Sense of International Criminal 
Law” (2002) (13) (3) EJIL 561 at 564 to 566. See also E Orucu “An 
Exercise in the Internal Logic of Legal Systems” (1987) 7 (3) Legal  
Studies 310 at 311 to 312. 
 
66 Kleffner op cit (chapter one, note 39 above) at 89 .  See also Newton 
inf ra (chapter f ive, note one above)  at 32. 
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human rights and humanitarian law. It has been suggested that the enactment of 
SAIA was a logical conclusion to this process.  
 
There is a distinction between the decision as to whether or not to comply on the 
one hand, and the kind of compliance model to adopt. In the case of the former, 
the decision involves broad policy considerations including compatibility with 
the constitution.67 It also involves enquiring into the actions of the “relevant 
States” in the field that is the subject matter of legislation. Should such States 
decide to implement, then the indication is thereby given that the considering 
State should implement, in the interest of diplomatic relations with such States. 
This would seem to be a purely foreign policy decision, because the 
consequences of not complying would be unpalatable.68
 
 
 Therefore, if South Africa had, in principle, decided not to implement the Rome 
Statute, this would probably have undercut her influence on the African 
continent, especially with such “relevant States” as Rwanda and Burundi. These 
States have been through the throes of civil strife, and continue to suffer from the 
effects thereof. South Africa’s hand at diplomacy in these States is all the more 
strengthened if she demonstrates her will to fight international crime. One way 
to do that is to implement the Rome Statute.69
                                                 
67 See H Duffy “National Constitutional Compatibi l ity and the 
International Criminal Court” (2001) 11 Duke Journal of  Comparative and 
International Law 5 at 6.  
     
 
68 With the deployment of  South African troops in Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to help in peacekeeping efforts, 
South Africa cannot be seen as a serious peace-broker if  she remains 
outside the Rome Statute framework. This is the problem that the United 
States of America f inds itself  in following her repudiat ion of the Rome 
Statute. See K K Schonberg “The General ’s Diplomacy: U.S. Military 
Influence in the Treaty Process, 1992-2000” (2002) Seton Journal of  
Diplomacy and International  Relations 68.  
 
69 South Africa’s strategic interest in deploying troops to other Afr ican 
countries l ies in the expected upholding of  regional and national 
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The obligation on States Parties to cooperate with the ICC, as has been 
contended, entails the obligation to enact the substantive norms of the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, the proscription of the crimes of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity within the national system leaves a State with no choice 
but to submit to the higher authority of the ICC. The latter then ensures that the 
State’s prosecution of the aforesaid crimes is above board, through the “threat” 
of intervention in case of default. This serves to demonstrate the State’s bona fides 
in the prosecution of these crimes. 
 
However, as has been demonstrated, there is a more fundamental reason behind 
the decision to render the aforesaid acts punishable within the national justice 
system. In the case of South Africa, a pre-existing constitutional order favourable 
to, and requiring, the protection and upholding of human rights is a key factor. 
This “auto challenge”, coupled with the role of human rights in South Africa’s 
foreign policy, has contributed to the decision to implement. As will be pointed 
out, though, a different significance may be attached to the principle of 
complementarity. This is that, rather than ensure that most trials for international 
crimes take place at the State level, it may actually increase the role of the ICC in 
the municipal order, much to the chagrin of States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
security. See, for example,  S Grunau “Negotiating Survival: the Problem 
of Commitment in U.S.-North Korea Relations” (2004) 15 Journal of  
Public  and International Af fairs 99.  
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Chapter Five 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
“Complementarity is in theory an impartial, reliable, and de-politicised process for identifying the 
cases of international concern, hence international jurisdiction. However, the thicket of subjective 
provisions designed to implement complementarity allows treaty opponents to argue that 
national justice systems are threatened with displacement….”1
 
 
5.1 
The establishment of the ICC heralds the beginning of a complex relationship 
between it and States Parties to the Rome Statute. The process of inaugurating 
the ICC has, without doubt, been an exhausting one in terms of energy and 
diplomacy. It has also been long in coming. The compromise reached by the 
States Parties to the Rome Statute underscores these efforts. 
Summary 
 
The principle of complementarity, the organising principle of the ICC, is an 
integral part of the functioning of the ICC. It is an innovation designed to ensure 
that the ideals espoused in the Rome Statute are realised. The projected modus for 
achieving this goal is that States will, by themselves, without fail prosecute those 
who are suspected of having committed certain crimes that are deemed to be of 
grave concern to the international community. This will put a timely end to a 
streak of unfortunate episodes in the history of mankind, characterised by arrant 
                                                 
1 M A Newton “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdict ion 
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
(2001) 167 Mil i tary Law Review 20 at 73. 
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impunity and political shoe shuffling on such an important matter as grave 
breaches of human rights.2
 
  
The exercise by States of universal jurisdiction over suspected international 
criminals has been an important tool in the quest for justice against international 
criminals.3 However, serious obstacles, owing to the fact that the existing and 
emerging jurisprudence on universal jurisdiction is unsynchronised, have beset 
this device.4
 
 In the final analysis, it has always been up to individual States to 
decide whether or not to prosecute. In the process of States deciding whether or 
not to prosecute, they have sought to perpetuate their own parochial interests, 
and thus produced a limping jurisprudence that has hardly helped to solve the 
problem. 
However, with the added impetus of an International Criminal Court with 
jurisdiction over individuals suspected of committing international crimes, States 
seem to have awakened to the reality that they are no longer the sole 
determinants of the fate of such individuals. These States have now submitted to 
a mechanism through which their bona fides with regards to the prosecution of 
these individuals will be determined. The purpose of such a determination, 
however, will no longer be the hortatory condemnation of the defaulting State. 
The ICC will take over specific cases and prosecute them as a remedial measure, 
                                                 
2 Rome Statute op cit,  preamble, paragraph 2. 
 
3 See Amnesty International 14 Principles for the Ef fective Exercise of  
Universal  Jurisdiction (1999) AI Index IOR 53/01/99.  
 
4 See Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The 
Princeton Principles on Universal  Jurisdiction (2001). Even the 
International Court of Justice has on occasion fai led to lead the way in 
developing this jurisprudence.  In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of  
11 April  2000 (Democratic Republ ic of  Congo V. Belgium),  judgment of 14 
February 2002, the Court effect ively held that a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs enjoys full  immunity when abroad, regardless of  whether the 
alleged acts were performed in a private or off icial capacity.  
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at the expense of the concerned State. In this paradigm, the ICC and States 
Parties to the Rome Statute are placed in a position of competition with each 
other over jurisdiction. This has already been referred to as the theory of 
competing rights. 
 
The evolution of the principle of complementarity suggests a marked shift from 
the traditional modes of enforcement of international law. Given the dearth of 
effective prosecutions prior to the advent of the Rome Statute, there does appear 
to have been consensus at the Rome Conference that these traditional modes 
would no longer suffice for purposes of ending the culture of impunity. 
Sanctions, for instance, appear not to have been effective in bringing about 
prosecutions.5
 
 What, however, are the prospects for success of the “carrot-and-
stick” mechanism of complementarity? What are its implications for the 
relationship between the ICC and State Parties? More importantly, to what extent 
does complementarity compel a change, seismic or otherwise, in the national 
laws of State Parties? 
To arrive at answers to the above questions, a theoretical discussion of 
complementarity was necessary in this study. This discussion, it was hoped, 
would provide a clearer indication of how complementarity would function 
within the context of contemporary international law principles and institutions. 
It was also hoped that this discussion would provide a basis for suggesting any 
reforms to the cooperative machinery between the ICC and States Parties. 
 
                                                 
5 See A A Angelova “Compelling Compliance with International Regimes:  
China and the Missile Technology Control Regime” (1999-2000) 38 
Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law 419. See also A Chayes and A 
Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compl iance with International Regulatory 
Agreements  2 ed (1995) 2 (Coercive economic sanctions are il legitimate 
and cost ly).  
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The affinity between complementarity and the principle of subsidiarity under 
European law suggests that inspiration for the evolution of the former was 
drawn from the latter. However, and perhaps crucially, it seems to obfuscate the 
distinction between the two, with the result that it will often be difficult to 
ascertain what the drafters of the Rome Statute intended in this regard. White 
makes the following claim: 
“Complementarity governs the allocation of jurisdiction within the supranational and the 
national level, while subsidiarity determines the location of prosecution within the 
national level.”6
The prized right of States to exercise jurisdiction over crimes is supposed to be a 
major cog in the wheel of complementarity. It is primarily to safeguard this right 
that States appear to implement the Rome Statute. It has been seen that the main 
stumbling block to efforts to enforce international criminal law has been concerns 
over State sovereignty. By assuring States that their sovereign right to prosecute 
is not taken away, while at the same time requiring States Parties to conduct 
effective prosecutions, complementarity will ensure that this sovereign right is 
utilised accountably. 
 
 
Interestingly, under subsidiarity, accountability appears to be required on the 
part of the European Community too.7 There is, therefore, a reciprocal obligation 
of accountability. Under the Rome Statute, on the other hand, much is required 
of the State, and very little of the ICC. The idea of setting up the International 
Criminal Court appears to have been intended as a remedial measure, which 
casts upon States the burden of ensuring that there is an end to impunity.8
                                                 
6 See White op cit (Chapter two, note 116 above) at 91. 
 In 
such an arrangement, the ICC exists purely as a panacea for the fundamental 
 
7 See chapter two, pages 35 to 38 above.  
 
8 See Rome Statute, Preamble, paragraphs 2 and 5.  
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problem. No comparable onus is placed on the ICC, and States cannot call the 
ICC to account quite in the same way as the ICC can States.9
 
 
There is little emphasis on the capacity of States to perform their obligations 
under the Rome Statute. Once a State becomes a party to the Statute, it is taken 
for granted that it can, and should, perform its obligations. In other words, on 
the basis of its commitment in signing up to the Statute, a State may be taken to 
be making a guarantee that it has the means to perform. This is what has been 
referred to as “consensualism”.10
 
 Therefore, should an allegation arise regarding 
the commission of any of the crimes covered by the Statute, an enquiry is 
immediately initiated as to what a State party is doing about it. Unless the State 
can satisfy the requirement of being able or willing to prosecute, it is presumed 
that the State has contravened its obligations under the Statute.  
The question of onus, it is submitted, will define the way the principle of 
complementarity is put into practice. Indeed, during the preparatory stages of 
the Statute, it was evident that some were of the view that an onus should 
operate against States. Thus, regarding its 1994 Draft Statute of the ICC, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) was of the view that any State challenging 
the admissibility of a case before the ICC11 should bear the burden of proving 
that a case is not admissible.12
                                                 
9 In terms of Art icle 86 of the Rome Statute op cit,  States Parties are 
under an obl igation to cooperate fully with the ICC.  
 Although this provision was not included in the 
  
10 See Diehl op cit.  
 
11 Article 35 of the ILC Draft Statute, 1994. 
 
12 See J Bleich “The International Criminal Court: Report of the ILA 
Working Group on Complementarity” (1997) 25 (2) Denver Journal of  
International Law and Pol icy  281 at 291. 
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final draft in the same terms,13
 
 it is indicative of the reasoning behind 
complementarity and how it may work in practice. It provides evidence of the 
enormous burden that States will have to bear in keeping the ICC at bay. 
It has been written of the Rome Statute that it “articulates no principles or 
policies to govern…decision making on fundamental issues”.14 An overall 
critique of the Rome Statute is outside the scope of this study. However, on the 
issue of complementarity, it certainly has emerged that the Statute leaves a lot of 
questions unanswered. For instance, the indicia contained in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute are vague, as they do not provide for the manner of determining 
the inability or unwillingness of a State to prosecute. Moreover, it is unclear how 
the ICC would determine that a case is of sufficient gravity to justify its action,15 
and whether the ICC would decline to admit a case for insufficient gravity even 
where it appears that a State is evading its obligation to prosecute.16
 
  
Complementarity is a “negotiated regime” in the field of international criminal 
law. As the product of a treaty, it may be distinguished from the regimes 
established by the ICTR and ICTY, which were formed by the Security Council of 
the United Nations. In the case of the Tribunals, these take precedence over 
                                                 
13 Article 19 of the f inal draft (the Rome Statute) provides, inter al ia,  for 
the r ight of States to challenge the admissibi lity of a case before the ICC, 
but makes no mention of the issue of onus.  However, paragraph 5 
requires a challenging State to lodge the challenge “at  the earliest 
opportunity”.  
 
14 White op cit at 92. 
 
15 See Rome Statute op cit Art icle 17 (1) (d). 
 
16 Op cit paragraphs (a) and (b).  For more on the unanswered questions 
regarding complementarity, see M Bergsmo “Occasional Remarks on 
Certain State Concerns About the Jurisdict ional Reach of the 
International Criminal Court, and Their Possible Implicat ions for the 
Relationship between the Court and the Security Council”  (2000) 69 (1) 
Nordic Journal of  International  Law 87 at 97 to 100. 
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States in matters in which the former and the latter have concurrent jurisdiction. 
Complementarity, however, is primarily a set of restraints to sovereignty agreed 
to by the State parties. However, as a regime must instil order, there is an 
obvious tension between the idea of effective regulation and that of a negotiated 
regime. Such a regime can only be incomplete, for no agreement is, in truth, 
complete.17 It has been stated that the prelude to most agreements is 
“opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour”, especially by States.18
 
 This phenomenon 
appears to be reminiscent of game theory, the gravamen of which has been 
discussed above.  
However, “game theory”, as a possible basis for the implementation of the Rome 
Statute, is rather unconvincing. Game theory envisages a situation where States 
will seek to outplay one another on a specific issue, often with the hope of 
making gains against other States. This does not seem to be the underlying 
reason for States implementing the Rome Statute. However, other benefits, 
especially on the foreign relations front, are attached to implementation. These 
benefits are not part of a game, but accrue to States in such a manner that they 
are able to enhance their influence on the international political plane. 
 
It has been maintained in this thesis that complementarity describes the 
relationship between the ICC and States, and not between States inter se. It has 
also been asserted that, as a result of the theory of competing rights, States 
Parties to the Rome Statute are virtually in competition with the ICC over 
jurisdiction. This is competition among unequal entities, with States striving to 
rise up to the expectations of the ICC as spelt out in Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.  
                                                 
17 Agreements leave room for manoeuvre by the part ies, often 
necessitating interpretat ion. 
 
18 See Krawiek op cit (chapter four, note 14 above) at 542.  
 
 142 
The challenge posed by the complementarity regime is for States to preserve 
their own sovereignty while at the same time meeting their obligations under the 
Rome Statute. The Statute contains various “assuring” provisions as regards 
State sovereignty.19 Although detail on important issues is lacking, it is clear that 
an attempt is made to assuage States’ fears of the impact of complementarity to 
their respective national justice systems. It is submitted that, in this regard, 
specific attention ought to be directed at those States which, undergoing some 
form of transition or another, are likely to be keen to preserve the compromises 
that have been achieved.20
 
 
5.2 
South Africa’s implementation of the Rome Statute is indicative of the 
importance attached to the vision of putting an end to the egregious abuse of 
human rights. The Rome Statute’s substantive provisions are now part of South 
African law, with the result that they will be enforced as such.
South Africa and  Cooperation with the ICC 
21 The significance 
of implementing the Rome Statute is that, as a human rights instrument, it has 
been given effect within the realm. The implementation of significant and far-
reaching human rights standards has not always been the norm in South 
Africa.22
 
  
Having had an uneasy co-existence with the international community and 
international law, South Africa’s implementation of the Rome Statute is 
especially significant. Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer a feature of South 
                                                 
19 See Rome Statute, Articles 17, 18 and 19. 
 
20 H Jackson “Status of  Treat ies in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis” (1992) 86 AJIL 310 at 339. 
 
21 See De wet and Strydom op cit at 48. 
 
22 See Dugard International Law Op cit (Chapter two, note 44 above) at  
263. 
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African law. A constitutional democracy is now in place and, imbued with one of 
the most progressive constitutions in the world, South Africa must protect the 
rights of the individual from the effects of international crime. However, these 
rights ought, also, to be protected against interference to the extent that the 
State’s obligations under the Rome Statute are at variance with the constitution.23
 
 
 Heiskanen’s notion of a “conflict of obligations” is therefore quite real. As seen 
in relation to the transfer of detained persons to the ICC as witnesses, South 
Africa’s obligations under the Rome Statute may not accord with the 
requirements of the constitution in relation to the rights of the individual. In 
situations of such conflict, it is likely that the Constitutional Court will be called 
upon to resolve them. It has therefore been significant in this study to gain an 
insight into the attitudes of South African courts towards international law in 
general. 
 
The preceding discussion depicts a conscious policy of deference to the Executive 
in matters of foreign relations. In such matters, the courts are reticent to second-
guess the judgement of the Executive, and often defer to the latter. This trend has 
emerged from the discussion of such cases as Kaunda24 and Harksen25
                                                 
23 See De wet and Strydom loc ci t.  
. In 
applying SAIA, this attitude is unlikely to change given the foreign relations 
dimension of the Rome Statute. Significantly, the way in which the courts in 
general resolve any conflict between individual rights on the one hand and State 
interests on the other will be crucial. It is, perhaps, important to emphasize that 
judicial attitudes are key to understanding any process by which it is sought to 
apply international law to the domestic arena. Knop presciently observes: 
 
24 Supra.  
 
25 Supra.  
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“Domestic Courts seem the best hope for putting international law into action. But this 
relies on and enforces a mechanical view of how international law is applied domestically, 
one that sees international law as simply inserted into the domestic legal system, which 
will carry it out. The language used to promote domestic courts as instruments of 
international law-implementation, compliance, enforcement-only further de-emphasizes 
the exercise of judgement involved in translating from international to domestic law”.26
 
 
Perhaps the above sentiment sounds a caution for those, like the author, engaged 
in studies such as the present. International law can only apply within the 
domestic arena through the judgment process, which necessarily has no 
structured reference point from which one could unassailably extrapolate a line 
of judicial thinking that is the “norm”. One can only surmise. 
 
To revisit the AZAPO decision, it will be recalled that the Constitutional Court 
was called upon to resolve a matter concerning the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) that had been set up to deal with the human rights abuses 
of the past. The Court effectively upheld the essential interest that South Africa 
has in post-Apartheid reconstruction. The Court chose to apply domestic law, 
specifically the constitution, in such a way as to give pre-eminence to its ideals, at 
the apparent expense of an alleged international law obligation. 
 
 As has been mentioned, the criticism is often levelled against domestic courts 
that they do not appreciate international law and, therefore, do not apply it when 
an opportunity presents itself for such application.27
                                                 
26 K Knop “Here and there: International Law in Domestic Courts” (2000) 
32 International  Law and Pol i t ics 501 at 516. See also Tallgren op cit  
(chapter three, note 1 above) at 492. 
  However, this criticism is 
 
27 See Motala op cit.  See also Knop op cit at 501. 
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probably too harsh, considering the role of courts within the polity.28 Courts are 
unlikely to apply a rule of international law that is not socially acceptable within 
the realm. The author agrees with Benvenisti’s assertion that courts should, first 
and foremost, have regard for domestic law in matters involving foreign affairs.29 
This is an effective way of constraining State officials in their dealings in such 
matters, especially insofar as they affect individual human rights.30
 
  
As far as complementarity and cooperation with the ICC is concerned, it has 
been suggested above that the surrender of persons to the ICC is likely to present 
the courts with difficult choices. They may have to decide whether cooperation 
with the ICC is a plausible ground for limiting individual rights under section 36 
of the constitution. It is suggested that, rather than decide whether, as a matter of 
principle, such cooperation can withstand section 36 scrutiny, the courts will 
instead resort to factual determinations of whether, for instance, the conditions of 
detention in the specific proposed location are adequate. If they are, then 
cooperation with the ICC in this regard will be endorsed. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion has been limited by SAIA to the extent that the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision not to prosecute is not a bar to 
prosecution. South African law recognises the National Director as dominis litis in 
all criminal matters. In the seminal case of R v. Sikumba31
 
 De Villiers J said the 
following: 
                                                 
28 See note 31 inf ra.  
 
29 Benvenisti op cit at 5.  
 
30 Ib id.  
 
31 1955 (3) SA 125 [EDLD].  
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“The Prosecutor, as the representative of the Solicitor-General, is the dominis litis. It is 
within his powers to withdraw the charge at any stage of the proceedings and no court 
can prevent him, just as no court can force him to prosecute.32
 
 
Indeed, this is the position in many common law jurisdictions, and is therefore 
not peculiar to South Africa.33 Significantly, with regard to any decision that the 
Solicitor-General makes, he “need not give any reasons”.34
 
  Yet, in the case of 
SAIA, the National Director is required to give reasons for any decision not to 
prosecute. 
No other State has implemented the Rome Statute in quite the same manner. In 
other words, it seems that States have generally preferred not to provide expressis 
verbis for the Attorney General’s discretion in deciding whether or not to 
prosecute.35 Specifically, there is no provision similar to the one alluded to above, 
in terms of which the Attorney General, or any other official in charge of 
prosecutions, is required to provide reasons for any decision not to prosecute. 
Quite to the contrary, it has been observed, in the case of Australia, that its 
implementing legislation preserves the Gouriet position.36
                                                 
32 Supra at 127. 
  
 
33 See also the English case of Gouriet V.  Union of  Post Off ice Workers  
[1978] AC 435 at 487, per Viscount Dilhorne. 
 
34 Ib id.  
 
35 See Act No. 65 of 15 June 2001 Relat ing to the Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998 in 
Norwegian Law (Norway); International Criminal Court Act 2001 (United 
Kingdom); Cooperat ion with the International Criminal Court Act 2002 
(Sweden).  
 
36 This seems to be an instance where Australia would contravene her 
obl igations under the Rome Statute if  she were to insist on the Gouriet  
principle on the international stage. Therefore, it  seems doubtful that 
the Gouriet posture taken by the Australian provision would have been 
intended to bind the ICC. See also Heiskanen loc c i t (chapter one, note 
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In the above respect, it could be argued that SAIA has caused a true revolution in 
South African law. Given that the independence of the National Director is 
constitutionally protected, it is particularly significant that he is now required to 
give reasons for his decision. However, this observation is quite different from 
asserting that in specific cases the courts would hold that the SAIA provision is 
unconstitutional. As was pointed out above, in each case the question is whether 
the fair trial rights of an accused person are jeopardised by any alleged 
interference with prosecutorial independence. The requirement that the National 
Director provide reasons for his refusal to prosecute is unlikely to have such 
effect. 
 
Therefore, the issue of whether or not SAIA’s provision regarding prosecutorial 
discretion is revolutionary has to be answered from the perspective of the 
courts.37
 
 They decide specific cases before them rather than provide opinions 
about particular provisions in Acts of Parliament. The provisions of SAIA can 
only be revolutionary insofar as the courts view them as such. It has already been 
contended that they are not, regard being had to the substance of the right to a 
fair trial. 
 Earlier in this thesis the question was posed whether there was any possibility 
that the amnesty alternative to prosecution may in future be extended to matters 
arising out of the Rome Statute and SAIA.38
                                                                                                                                                 
69 above) on the “conflict of obligations” pertaining to the application of  
international law in domestic courts.  
 To answer this question, one must 
revisit the AZAPO case once more, for in its decision the Constitutional Court 
alluded to the fact that the amnesty laws are defensible on the grounds of “a 
 
37 See Clarke op cit (Chapter 4, note 69 above)  at 102. 
 
38 See chapter three, page 77 above.  
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historical situation which required amnesty for criminal acts to be accorded for 
the purposes of facilitating the transition to, and consolidation of, an overtaking 
democratic order”.39
 
 
 At first blush, it seems that any matters arising from the Rome Statute must be 
treated differently. Even though the Rome Statute is silent on the issue of 
amnesties, it is likely that resorting to such action will be viewed as an attempt to 
side-step the requirements of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Since the very 
essence of this procedure is the perceived need to avoid criminal prosecutions, it 
lends itself too readily to the ‘unwillingness” language of the Article. The 
“historical” reasons suggested in AZAPO must therefore be regarded as confined 
to the era of Apartheid.   
 
An important question has arisen regarding the National Director’s powers in 
terms of section 37 of SAIA. That section is to the effect that, in relation to the 
ICC, the National Director may commence a prosecution regarding offences 
against the administration of justice only at the request of the ICC. This raises the 
further question whether the ICC is a “court” in terms of South African law, 
specifically the constitution.40 The latter envisages a judicial system comprising, 
inter alia, “any other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of 
Parliament….”41
 
 
 In the case of the ICC, it seems that what SAIA does is to recognise it as a court, 
but it does not confer on it the full attributes of a court established by an Act of 
                                                 
39 See AZAPO supra at  paragraph 22 of the judgment. 
 
40 See Act 108 of 1996, section 166 (e).  
 
41 Ib id (emphasis added).  
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Parliament.42 This, it appears, is why the National Director may not commence 
prosecutions under section 37 of SAIA absent a request from the ICC. In other 
words, the authority of the ICC can only be invoked in South Africa on an ad hoc 
basis and with the help of South African authorities. It is submitted that this 
position is reminiscent of a State acting as an organ or agent of the ICC. If, 
despite having in place the substantive provisions to be able to prosecute,43
 
 the 
“request” of the ICC is yet required before that can be done, then it may fairly be 
said that, as regards these offences, South Africa is an agent of the ICC. 
 Earlier in this thesis the point was made that criminal law is based on national 
traditions and values.44
 
 Under SAIA, the offences against the administration of 
justice seem to be based rather on the Rome Statute. However, it is envisaged 
that South Africa will “lend” her legal procedures to the ICC for purposes of 
prosecuting these offences. This may be distinguished from the position as 
regards the “core crimes” of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity: 
These offences will be prosecuted by South Africa on her own behalf, but subject 
to the supervision of the ICC. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 In terms of section 7 (1) of SAIA, the ICC “has such rights and 
privi leges of a South African court of law in the Republic as may be 
necessary to enable it to perform its functions”. However,  as dist inct 
from the rights and privi leges of a South African court, the ICC does not 
have the powers of such a court.  
 
43 That is, the crimes enumerated under sect ion 37 (c) of Act 27 of 2002. 
 
44 See Chapter one, page 2 above.  
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5.3 
      
The Potential for the Use of Complementarity in Other Areas of  
The principle of complementarity seems to be of use only in the application of 
international criminal law. Used principally to enforce jus cogens norms against 
the wanton abuse of human rights,
International Law 
45 the principle’s utility in the enforcement of 
international law would appear to be circumscribed. Being a “concept in 
evolution”,46
 
 it is possible that some may, in time, hold the view that the concept 
of jus cogens should apply to other areas of international law. In the same 
manner, complementarity, jus cogens’s surrogate, may be touted as a panacea for 
the ills that afflict other areas of international law. 
As discussed earlier, one of the major challenges of international law is the 
application of its tenets on the domestic scene. It seems that a norm of 
international law will be more readily accepted on the domestic scene if its 
violation would, in all likelihood, never be condoned by the State concerned. 
This may be as a result of the genuine conviction that such a norm ought to be 
observed internally. It may equally, however, be out of the realization that the 
State has no option but to give effect to the norm if it is to earn the respect of 
other States. 
 
As regards jus cogens norms specifically, the crucial but unclear issue relates to 
their identification.47
                                                 
45 See S Kirchner “Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension 
of International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal 
System?” (2004) 5 (1) German Law Journal 47 at 50. 
 There is no shortage of candidate norms that have been 
proposed for this label, a matter that has led some to muse that its actual utility is 
 
46 Op cit at 51. 
 
47 See Starke op cit (Chapter two, note 2 above) at  56. See also A Damato 
“It ’s a Bird, It ’s a Plane, It ’s Jus Cogens !”(1991) 6 Connecticut Journal of  
International Law 1.  
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doubtful.48
 
 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the concept is absolutely 
indispensable to the development of international law, and that the real task is to 
work out a generally acceptable formula for ascertaining its content. In this 
regard, therefore, clear criteria ought to be evolved to guide those whose task it 
is to apply such norms. 
This uncertainty notwithstanding, it is clear that the concept of jus cogens is not 
commonly associated with international commercial matters or international 
maritime law, for instance. These aspects of international law appear to have a 
relatively tenuous link to human rights, hence the apparent lack of grounding in 
jus cogens norms. This, however, does not detract from the importance of these 
areas of international law.  
 
Given the close relationship between jus cogens and the principle of 
complementarity, it is unlikely that the latter will be employed in areas other 
than international criminal law, as a means of enforcing international law. The 
sanction of loss of jurisdiction over a matter in which a State otherwise has 
jurisdiction is problematic as it is under the Rome Statute.49 There seems to be no 
reason to expect that States will agree to such an intrusive system50
                                                 
48 Examples of the tendency to rely on jus cogens  norms are: discussions 
leading to the Draft  Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind 102 s. U.N. Doc A/CN 4/404 (1987); and negotiations for the 
inclusion of the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea,  UN Doc. A/Conf. 
62/122 (1982). However, jus cogens norms are derived from values that 
are fundamental to international law, rather than “fortuitous or self-
interested choices of  nations”. See Alvarez-Machain V. United States,  No.  
99-56762. 
 in areas other 
 
49 See note 60 inf ra.  
 
50 Compare this view with that expressed by Bergsmo op cit (note 18 
above) at  99, to the effect  that complementarity does not compel States 
to do anything, since the obligations thereunder are premised on the aut 
dedere aut judicare  principle. It is, however, respectfully submitted that 
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than international criminal law. The move towards true “judicial globalization”51
 
 
is therefore not going to be as rapid as one might hope, given that no real effort 
to address States’ concerns over loss of sovereignty has been made. State consent 
is not an answer to this concern, especially when it is not accompanied by 
judicial acculturation to the idea that judicial competencies are henceforth to be 
conditional upon “effective” exercise. 
It is suggested that complementarity would be effective were it based on the 
“socialization” of States towards a system in which the powers of national courts 
are to be subjected to a “global” test. This would be a process in which the State’s 
capacity to adhere to a treaty regime is given serious consideration. Perhaps 
more importantly, it would also be a system premised on “soft” rather than 
“hard” obligations, in order to attract State participation.52
 
  
For example, when one looks at the regime created by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), one sees a regime that did not initially make onerous 
demands on the part of its adherents. What began as the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT)53
                                                                                                                                                 
covert compulsion was intended through the “carrot-and –stick” 
mechanism that is the hal lmark of complementarity.  
 was composed of “soft” obligations, which, though 
binding on State parties, were not applied rigidly. Moreover, these norms were 
not backed by a non-reservation clause, such as one finds in the Rome Statute. 
 
51 See A Slaughter “Judicial Globalization” (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of  
International Law 1103. This process has been described as the “synergy 
between national and international judiciaries”. Ibid,  note 1.  
 
52 See D J Joyner “Bridging the Gap between International Law and 
Foreign Policy Making” (2003) 31 (3) Denver Journal of  International  Law 
and Pol icy  437 at 462. See also J S Martinez “Towards an International 
Judicial System” (2003-2004) 56 Stanford Law Review 429 at 492 to 493. 
 
53 General Agreement on Tarif fs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 
188, as amended, 278 U.N.T.S. 168. 
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Instead, there was a withdrawal clause in the Agreement.54
 
 With time, however, 
these norms ossified into the concrete commitments that now constitute the 
WTO. 
The same may be said of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) system, in that, 
although deviation by member States is discouraged, the counteractive measures 
attached to deviation are “administrative” rather than what may be termed 
judicial sanctions.55
 
 The IMF applies policy rather than rules in its dealings with 
member States, and, as such, there is room for capacity enhancement rather than 
strict conformity.  
5.4 
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be concluded that SAIA has effected a 
fundamental change on the South African legal landscape, especially respecting 
prosecutorial discretion. The common law position regarding such discretion, as 
depicted by the Sikumba dictum,
Conclusion 
56
 
 seems to have been altered insofar as the 
National Director is now required, on a particular issue, to give reasons for his 
decision. Seemingly, such a requirement is not to be commonly found in the 
implementing laws of other States.  
This is not unconscionable interference with prosecutorial independence; at least 
not in the sense of seeking to influence prosecutorial policy or decisions in a 
                                                 
54 Op cit,  Art icle XXI (b)  ( i i i )  [ “Nothing in this Agreement shall  be 
construed…to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any actions 
which it considers necessary for the protect ion of its essential security 
interests…taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations….”].  
 
55 Heiskanen op cit (Chapter one, note 69 above) at 238. See also J Gold 
“The ‘Sanctions’ of the International Monetary Fund” (1972) 66 AJIL 737 
at 738 to 739. 
 
56 See note 31 above.  
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certain direction. However, it remains a unique position of the law, which 
perhaps is an indication of the seriousness with which international crime is 
regarded in South Africa. It is submitted that such a provision of the law can 
only be explained on the basis that the crimes concerned really hit at the core of 
international peace and security. However, in contradistinction to Judge 
Sidhawa’s dictum in the Tadic case,57 there is a conviction that national courts 
should first try these crimes before an international tribunal tries them.58
 
 
The provision of reasons for the refusal to prosecute would appear to be geared 
towards ensuring that a finding by the ICC that South Africa is unable or 
unwilling to prosecute does not occur too easily. This is in line with the basic 
goal of complementarity, which is that States should always be able to prosecute 
crimes of international concern. In fact, the basic motivation for States 
implementing the Rome Statute is that they should always be able to do so. Once 
the Central Authority has received the National Director’s reasons for declining 
to prosecute, and the same are subsequently communicated to the ICC,59 South 
Africa would in effect be waiving its right to prosecute.60
                                                 
57 See chapter two, page 33 above. 
 The ICC can then take 
over the specific case concerned. As indicated earlier, a dynamic involving 
 
58 This convict ion is premised on the maxim aut dedere aut judicare. See 
chapter two above.  
 
59 In terms of section 5 (5) of Act 27 of 2002 (SAIA) the Central Authority 
must forward the National Director ’s decision to the Registrar of the ICC. 
 
60 Another possible interpretation is that the Central Authority, by 
communicating this decision to the Registrar of the ICC, would in effect  
be “referring” the case to the ICC in terms of the Rome Statute. However, 
this would be an anomaly, for the National Director’s decision should not 
necessarily be equated with the State’s decision. The National Director 
has no authority to represent the State in international fora.  Perhaps the 
Act ought to specif ically provide for the Central Authority’s power to 
ratify the National Director’s decision, whereupon it shall be deemed to 
be the State ’s decision.  
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competing rights is afoot; therefore, it follows that a waiver of such rights is 
theoretically possible. 
 
However, it is submitted that the above scenario is fundamentally different from 
what is envisaged by the twin concepts of inability and unwillingness under the 
principle of complementarity. These are concepts that are so interwoven with the 
strife situation as to be incapable of precise application in a normal situation 
where there is no widespread annihilation and emasculation of the institutions of 
the State. If the machinery of the State is still largely in place, it seems, then an 
occasion can hardly arise for the ICC to find that a State is unable or unwilling to 
prosecute. It is suggested that the language of “inability” and “unwillingness” is 
a result of the influence of the ICTR and ICTY, whose formation, as seen above, 
was necessitated by particular conflicts. In such situations it is objectively feasible 
to determine that a State is either unable or unwilling to prosecute. Where the 
State machinery is in place, an unseemly polemic is likely to ensue about the 
meaning of these two terms in the particular context. 
 
As for the “carrot-and-stick” mechanism, the extent to which this has contributed 
towards South Africa’s implementation of the Rome Statute has not been 
conclusively established. The major assumption of this thesis was that radical 
changes to an implementing State’s legal setting are an indication that the State is 
responding to this “threat”.  Latterly, however, it has emerged that this may be 
attributed to “auto-challenge”, rather than to any threat per se. Therefore, to 
regard the Rome Statute, and especially the principle of complementarity, as 
being the creation of an Austinian-type system of restraints to which States 
respond, is a misplaced notion. The carrot-and-stick mechanism is not of such a 
quality as to compel compliance by itself. The better view is that the principle of 
complementarity is a participatory regime, agreed upon by States, by which it is 
intended to redress some of the shortcomings of the ad hoc Tribunals. However, 
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in the actual implementation of the Rome Statute, the over-bearing nature of 
complementarity will come to the fore. 
 
Complementarity’s purely consensual basis is cause for concern insofar as 
implementation is concerned. States may readily implement the Rome Statute in 
their respective legal systems on the basis of their good will. In reality, though, 
attaining the “ability” and “willingness” thresholds required for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over cases may prove more difficult, given that the content of the 
State parties’ obligations in this regard remains unclear.61
 
  
For an international regime to truly inspire a revolution in the national justice 
system, it ought to have a pervasive effect in the area of law concerned. 
Complementarity, on the other hand, focuses on a specific event, namely, the 
prosecution of a case. It presumes that the real malaise afflicting the international 
criminal justice system is lack of prosecutions. That view may be correct, 
because, empirically, there are very few prosecutions relative to international 
crimes that one could point to.62
 
 Complementarity further assumes that this 
dearth of prosecutions is due to the wilful and calculated decision of States’ 
prosecution authorities. Perhaps this explains SAIA’s approach to prosecutorial 
discretion. As has been suggested, however, a change in judicial attitudes may be 
just what is required. 
Therefore, while the manner in which South Africa has dealt with the issue of 
prosecutorial independence is revolutionary, cases may yet wind up in the ICC 
simply because the South African Judiciary, rather than apply international 
                                                 
61 See Newton op cit at 44 to 48. See also G Dawns et al  “Is the Good 
News about Compliance Good News about Cooperat ion?” (1996) 50 
International Organization 379. 
 
62 Most of these are on going before the ICTR and ICTY. 
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norms to specific cases, prefer to apply national norms that are at variance with 
the former. This may, in turn, be construed as “inability” to conduct “effective” 
trials. This problem is what Professor D’amato refers to as the “macro-micro 
problem”, where the application of international norms is not readily 
accommodated within the national sphere.63
 
 As a result, there will be a 
disjuncture between expectation and reality. 
South Africa’s strategy with regard to prosecutorial discretion seeks to answer 
the “unwillingness” concern of the complementarity principle. Inevitably, the 
“inability” strand of the principle is more uncertain, and its fate lies with the 
courts, specifically the manner in which they continue to apply the laws 
discussed above.64 In this regard, SAIA’s impact on the prosecution of 
international crimes in South Africa is far-reaching, though not all embracing. 
Few changes have been effected to South Africa’s pre-existing “baseline of 
conduct”,65 save for the innovative nature of prosecutorial accountability now 
instigated. However, it must be noted that this accountability does not affect the 
substance of a fair trial, which is the pre-eminent value protected by the principle 
of prosecutorial independence. Rather, this accountability is “demanded” by an 
external agency, namely, the ICC, which is not a court in South African law. To 
this extent, therefore, SAIA does not represent a “costly change” to the status quo 
ante.66
 
 
                                                 
63 See A D’Amato “International Criminal Law and the Macro-Micro 
Problem” (1991) 15 Nova Law Review 343. 
 
64 See chapter three above.  
 
65 See L Heifer “Constitut ional Analogies in the International Legal 
System” (2004) 37 Loyola of  Los Angeles Law Review 1 at 21. 
 
66 See K Raustiala “Compliance and Effectiveness in International 
Regulatory Cooperation” (2000) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of  
International Law 387 at 408. 
